

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedures

Part (1): Immediately notifiable communicable diseases

AFP investigation steps Inform immediately the ESU central Get an ID Step 1: Verify case definition Contact treating physician / hospital focal person number Ask physician to fill Fill investigation Step 2: Start data collection investigation form 1 form 2 Collect 2 specimens Fill investigation Step 3: Start specimen collection Ship specimens <14 days of onset contacts if needed Collect specimen Conduct coverage Flag case Step 4: Assess if hot case Review criteria survey (form 4) inform lab/ EPI Step 5: Search for AFP cluster Review criteria If positive for wild Step 6: Receive lab result Confirm outbreak Refer to polio SOP Consultation at day Ask physician to fill Step 7: Search of residual weakness Prepare and submit Step 8: Review by NEG if needed Review criteria Fill investigation Step 9: Classify the case Ensure classification Step 9a: Discarded Step 9b: Confirmed Confirm outbreak Refer to algorithm B Step 9c: Compatible Weekly sharing with Step 10: Communicate Monthly bulletin WHO

مموّل من الاتحاد الأوروبي Funded by the European Union



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طبع هذا الدليل بدعم من الاتحاد الأوروبي ومنظمة الصحة العالمية بالشراكة مع مفوضية الأمم المتحدة العليا لشؤون اللاجئين وذلك في إطار مشروع بإدارة وزارة الصحة العامة. إن وزارة الصحة العامة هي الجهة الوحيدة المسؤولة عن محتوى هذا الدليل ولا يمكن اعتباره بأي حال من الأحوال على أنه يعكس وجهة نظر الاتحاد الأوروبي.

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This guideline was prepared by the Epidemiology Surveillance Program, with the contribution of the Communicable Diseases Department for the sections related to response, and under the supervision of the Director General of the Ministry of Public Health.

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This guideline is available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health:

www.moph.gov.lb - (\rightarrow prevention \rightarrow surveillance)

Reference: MOPH circulars



Surveillance Standard Operating Procedures

Part (1): Immediately notifiable communicable diseases

Introduction

المقدمة

قامت وزارة الصحة العامة في العام 2001، باصدار التعميم رقم 81 الذي يقدم دلائل ارشادية حول تقصي حالات التسمم الغذائي. وكان بمثابة المستند الرسمي الاول الذي يفسر للعاملين لدى وزارة الصحة العامة على مختلف المستويات في الادارة المركزية والمحافظات والاقضية كيفية تقصي هذه الحالات شاملا تعريف الحالات، وطرق تقصي الاصابات واهمية فحص المواد الغذائية، والكشف على المؤسسات التجارية والصناعية، ومقارنة نتائج الفحوص المخبرية.

ثم قامت الوزارة في العام 2005، باصدار تعميم رقم 49 الذي يتناول الارشادات الفنية لتقصي الحالات البشرية لداء الكلب. وقد شكل هذا التعميم المستند الرسمي الثاني الذي يوضح لفرق الوزارة كيفية تقصي الحالة وأهمية القيام بزيارات ميدانية: زيارة المستشفى حيث المريض، زيارة المريض ومحيطه، زيارة بلدية المحلة، ومراجعة برنامج مكافحة داء الكلب في المنطقة.

ثم تلاها اصدار العديد من التعاميم المماثلة في السنوات اللاحقة التي تناولت الامراض الانتقالية الاخرى ذات الاهمية على المستوى الوطنى.

تقوم الوزارة حاليا باصدار الارشادات الفنية لكافة الامراض الانتقالية المستهدفة في نظام الابلاغ الاساسي. وتوضح هذه المنهجية (Standard Operating Procedures) تعريف العتبات الوبائية للكشف عن الانذارات والفاشيات، كيفية جمع المعلومات الخاصة بالمرضى، وتثبيت الحالات مخبريا، اضف الى البحث عن حالات اضافية، وتحديد مكونات التحليل الوصفي، كما تسليط الضوء على أهمية تبادل المعلومات بين وحدات الوزارة من جهة ومع الجهات الاخرى ذات العلاقة.

تم وضع الصيغة الاولى لهذه الارشادات باللغة الانكليزية على ان يتم ترجمتها بالعربية في وقت لاحق.

نشكر كل من شارك باعداد هذا الدليل من قبل برنامج الترصد الوبائي، وطباعته من قبل منظمة الصحة العالمية بدعم من الاتحاد الاوروبي بالشراكة مع مفوضية الامم المتحدة العليا لشؤون اللاجئين.



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Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP)

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 26 (19th Jan 2015)

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I. Purpose
The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps to be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance program in case of alert of AFP or polio.


II. Generalities

Acute Faccid Paralys	sis
Agent	Poliovirus (genus Enterovirus), with 3 serotypes: 1, 2 and 3
Incubation	7-14 days (3-35 days)
Period of communicability	 7-10 days before onset, up to 3-6 weeks after onset Virus present in throat 36 hours after infection, up to 1 week Virus present in feces 72 hours after infection, up to 3-6 weeks
Reservoir	Humans
Modes of transmission	- Person-to-person: fecal-oral route, and rarely pharyngeal - Rarely through water and food
Clinical presentation	 - 90-95% asymptomatic infection - 4-8% mild illness (influenza-like illness or gastro-intestintal illness) - 1-2% aseptic meningitis - <1% paralytic poliomyeltis
Worldwide	 Endemic countries in 2015: Nigeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In May 2014, WHO declared polio as public health event of international concern
Lebanon	Last local cases in 1994. Last imported case in 2003. Lebanon declared "polio-free" in 2002.
Control objective	Worldwide eradication initiative (in 1988). Since 1999, the poliovirus type 2 has been eradicated worldwide.
Surveillance and Inve	estigation
Surveillance approach	Syndromic-based surveillance: acute flaccid paralysis
Collect data about case	Clinical findings, medical diagnosis, CSF/EMG results, vaccination status, travel history, follow-up at 60 days for residual weakness
Collect specimen from case	2 stool specimens from case within 14 days from paralysis onset, with at least 24 hours apart
Collect data about contacts	If polio or highly suspicion of polio: rapid survey on vaccination status (OPV3/IPV3 coverage) at the community level
Collect specimen from contacts	 If delay in collection specimens from case or highly suspicion, stool specimens are collected from at least 3 contacts among children (preferably under 5 years) If polio case: stool specimens are collected from siblings, neighbors and inpatients
Test	Virological culture
Laboratories	WHO accredited laboratories: Vacsera in Egypt, and National Jordanian laboratory
Outbreak level	At least 1 confirmed case of polio
Notification to WHO	- To notify to WHO on confirmed and compatible cases - Routine weekly dataset sharing
Control	
Primary prevention	Immunization: 3 doses under 1 year, and 2 boosters > 1 year

Case management	Symptomatic
Isolation	Enteric precautions
Mass prevention	Immunization
Poliomyelitis case de	efinition (MOPH circular no. 34 dated on the 5 th May 2012)
Confirmed case	A confirmed case is suspected case with isolation of wild poliovirus in stool specimens collected from the suspected case or from a close contact of the suspected case.
Suspected case	A suspected case is defined as: - A child under 15 years of age presenting with acute flaccid paralysis AFP whatever was the medical diagnosis - Or any person at any age with paralytic illness if poliomyelitis is suspected by the physician.
Forms	
Reporting	Standard reporting form
Investigation	For case, contacts and neighborhood: specific polio investigation forms (MOPH circular no. 100 dated on the 21st June 2007) - Form (1): case reporting and investigation - Form (2): case investigation - Form (3): specimen collection - Form (4): rapid coverage survey - Form (5): follow up at 60 days - Form (6): final classification.


National figures

Figure 1: Reported acute poliomyelitis cases in Lebanon, 1961-2014 (Source: MOPH)



The last local cases were reported in 1994 (one in the North and one in the South). In 1995, an imported case from Africa was reported (the child has the onset in Africa and came to Lebanon for case management).

In 2003, a confirmed polio was reported in the North. The case did not travel. The virus was identified as from Indian source. Two other persons were infected by the virus (1 sibling and 1 cousin). Two national campaigns were conducted. No additional cases were found despite active search.



III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of AFP surveillance are:

- To detect and confirm rapidly any polio case
- To document "polio-free" status in case of absence of polio cases in the country
- In case of presence of polio cases:
 - Ensure rapid detection
 - Monitor and document containment / re-establishment of "polio-free" status.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An alert is defined by any suspected case of acute poliomyelitis:

- Any patient less than 15 years old presenting acute flaccid paralysis and suffering from sudden onset of weakness, paresis, or paralysis, irrespective of medical diagnosis
- Or any patient, regardless of age, if the treating physician suspects acute poliomyelitis

An outbreak is defined by at least one laboratory confirmed acute poliomyelitis case.

V. Procedural steps

The steps detailed below are those to follow in case of any alert. They are summarized in figure (5).

Step 1: Verify case definition

Upon the notification of an AFP case, the Esumoh caza/mohafaza team contacts the treating physician or the hospital focal person to verify if the case met the case definition: onset of acute flaccid weakness.

Once case definition is verified, the Esumoh peripheral team informs the Esumoh central level immediately.

At the central level, the national coordinator of the AFP surveillance provides a national ID number for the new case.

Step 2: Start data collection

The Esumoh caza/mohafaza team asks the hospital or treating physician to fill the investigation form no. 1 related to the patient.

Simultaneously, the Esumoh caza/mohafaza team contacts the patient's parents and fills the investigation form no. 2.

The investigation forms includes information on the following:

- Demography
- Illness: date of onset, medical diagnosis, fever, asymmetry, rapid progression, motor power...
- Laboratory results
- Vaccination status
- Risk: travel to polio countries
- Presence of similar cases.

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Step 3: Identify hot case

Each AFP case is assessed if meeting the following criteria of a hot case:

- Child with incomplete vaccination history (< 3 OPV/IPV dose) and clinical findings compatible with polio (fever with rapid progression of asymetric paralysis)
- Or AFP patient who has been in high risk areas of polio-endemic countries or countries experiencing current polio outbreak
- Or AFP patient for whom the physician is highly suspecting an acute poliomyelitis.

When a case is flagged as hot case, the EPI and reference laboratory are informed. The laboratory ensures then rapid testing and rapid sharing of results.

Step 4: Collect clinical specimen

To confirm any polio case, there is need to conduct virological culture on stool specimens collected from case and contacts.

a) From the case

The Esumoh caza/mohafaza team coordinates with the physician, the hospital focal person or the head nurse at pediatrics floor to collect stool specimens from the patient. If patient is discharged, coordination is done with the parents at household level and the physician.

The needed specimens are:

- Nature: stool specimens
- Number and time: Two stool specimens are requested within 14 days from paralysis onset, representing optimum period to isolate virus in stools
- Interval between specimens: A minimum of 24 hours due to intermittent shedding of virus in the stools
- Conservation: at 4-8°C which means that specimens are transported in ice box with ice-packs from hospitals/households to MOPH.

b) From the contacts

Stool specimens are collected from contacts of the AFP case, in the following situations:

- Absence of collection of specimens from case
- Delay in collection specimens from case > 14 days from paralysis onset
- Death or loss of the AFP case before adequate stool collection
- Inadequate cold chain during collection, storage or transportation
- Poor quality of specimen due to leakage, desiccation or inadequate amount
- High suspicion of acute poliomyelitis or AFP case flagged as hot case.

Specimens from contacts are collected according to the following criteria:

- Number of contacts: 3 contacts, preferably less than 5 years old
- Number of specimen: one stool specimen from each contact
- Conservation: at 4-8°C.

c) Specimen labelling and documentation

Once specimens are collected, the Esumoh peripheral team labels the specimens specifying the following:

- The name
- The ID number
- The date and time of collection
- The nature of specimens: stool.

Also the Esumoh peripheral team fills investigation form no. 3.

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d) Specimen packaging

The triple packaging is used:

- Specimens are placed in screw-capped first containers.
- The first containers with absorbent material (cotton) are placed in a second container: small well-sealed plastic bag
- The second container (small well-sealed plastic bag) is placed into a third container: bigger well-sealed plastic bag
- Finally the third container is placed in cool-box with enough ice packs.

Specimens are referred to the Esumoh central team, who is in charge to ship them to the reference laboratory.

e) Specimen shipment

Once specimens reach central level, the Esumoh central level verifies the following:

- Labelling of specimens: case identification number, date and time of specimen collection
- Adequacy: correct date, correct time interval. If the time interval between 2 specimens is <24h, additional specimen is requested.
- Quantity: if the quantity is not enough (<8 grams), further specimens are requested.
- Container: if the container is not solid or not screw-capped, specimens are replaced in adequate container.

Specimens are shipped as soon as possible to reference laboratories. The Esumoh central level liaises with an authorized shipping company to send specimens following category B, triple packaging specification.

Specimens are sent to WHO accredited laboratory in Egypt or in Jordan for virological isolation.

f) Laboratory results

Results are communicated by the reference laboratory to Esumoh central level. The Esumoh central team shares the information with:

- The Esumoh peripheral teams
- The hospital focal person / treating physician
- The parents.

In case of positive results, the Esumoh central team informs immediately the MOPH concerned units and the EPI. The MOPH informs officially the WHO, based on the IHR (2005).

Step 5: Search for AFP cluster

Cluster of AFP cases represents a high suspicion of poliomyelitis outbreak.

An AFP cluster is defined by one of the following:

- At least 2 cases of AFP, in same locality or adjacent localities with the date of onset of paralysis within 2 months of each other
- Or at least 2 cases of polio-compatible AFP, in same locality or adjacent localities with the date of onset of paralysis within 2 months of each other.

The search of cluster is based on:

- The review of the reported/detected AFP cases by time and place
- The search of additional cases via the interview of the patient or patient parents
- The community-based surveillance.

Step 6: Conduct rapid coverage survey

In case of hot case or AFP cluster, the Esumoh peripheral team conducts a rapid coverage survey.

The rapid coverage survey is conducted in the neighbourhood of the case, where 30 children between 6 months and 5 years (excluded) are assessed for their vaccination status. The procedure is based on field interview with the parents and vaccination card/ child health record verification. During the rapid survey, the investigation form no. 4 is filled.

The survey aims to measures the 3OPV/IPV coverage. The result is communicated to the Caza team and to the EPI team.

Step 7: Conduct stool and environmental surveillance

In case of cluster of AFP cases, the Esumoh team initiates the following:

- Stool surveillance: collecting stool specimens from inpatients aged < 5 years old in the caza of the cluster
- Environmental surveillance: collecting sewage in coordination with local municipalities. Stool and sewage specimens are sent to the WHO-accredited laboratory for virological culture.

Step 8: Conduct follow up at 60 days

All AFP cases are followed up to 60 days from paralysis onset, to assess the presence of residual weakness.

In order to assess the evolution of the paralysis, the AFP patient is reviewed by his/her treating physician 60 days after paralysis onset. The child may also be seen by a MOPH physician. Paralysis and reflexes are tested and compared to the findings at paralysis onset. The results of the follow up are documented in the AFP investigation form no. 5.

Step 9: Classify the case

a) Review by the National Expert Group NEG

The national expert group reviews specific cases as:

- Cases with inadequate specimens collection
- Cases with suspicion of VAPP.

Based on the review of the file and / or the child, the case is classified.

b) Case classification algorithm

Based on the investigation, case is classified as polio-confirmed, polio-compatible or polio-discarded. The figure (3) summarizes the classification schema.

AFP cases are polio-discarded cases in the following conditions:

- If adequate specimens are collected and are negative, the AFP case is classified as polio-discarded.
- For AFP cases whose specimens are negative but inadequate or absent, the case is classified as polio-discarded if
 - · The NEG can rule out acute poliomyelitis based on clinical and para-clinical findings
 - Or there is no residual weakness at 60 days from paralysis onset.

AFP cases are polio-confirmed if wild poliovirus was isolated from the case or any contact. The isolation of wild poliovirus from a contact while the case is negative is an evidence of wild poliovirus circulation in the community. The index case is then classified as polio-confirmed.

AFP cases are polio-compatible if:

- The specimens are negative but inadequate or there are no specimens collected
- And the NEG cannot rule out acute poliomyelitis based on clinical and para-clinical findings.

When cases are classified, the investigation form no. 6 is filled.

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Step 10: Describe cases

a) Descriptive analysis

Cases are described by:

- Time: week, month and year of onset
- Place: locality, caza and mohafaza of residence
- Person: age group, gender, nationality, vaccination status
- Disease: disease classification, final diagnosis.


b) Indicators

Two main indicators are monitored:


- Annual rate of non-polio AFP cases per 100000 children under 15 years. The target is to reach at least 2/100000.
- Proportion of AFP with adequate specimen. The target is to reach at least 80%.


Step 11: Write summary report

On weekly basis, the Esumoh central team shares the AFP datafile with WHO regional office. On monthly basis, the Esumoh central team prepares a summary bulletin on the findings of the AFP surveillance and shared with MOPH units and health professionals.



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الجمهورية اللبنانية _ وزارة الصحة العامة

إستمارة رقم (1) لتقصي حالة شلل رخو حاد: المعلومات الطبية الأولية Form no. (1) for Acute Flaccid Paralysis: initial medical information حالة رقم | ____

	لبيب المعالج	تعبأ الاستمارة من قبل الم	
			1)- المريض والعنوان
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	القضاء		
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			الجنسية
		🗖 لاجئ 🗎 زائر	الاقامة 🗖 مقيم
			2)- العناية الطبية والاستشفاء
	اسم المستشفى		تاريخ بدء الشلل
	اسم الطبيب المعالج		تاريخ التشخيص
	رقم هاتف الطبيب		تاريخ دخول المستشفى
		•	3) الوضع التلقيحي / مشاكل صحية سابقة
□ کلا	وجود مرض عصبي 🛮 نعم		عدد جرعات OPV/IPV
	:77~		تاريخ آخر جرعة
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, ,	هل يوجد فقدان في العصب		هل الشلل رخو / flaccid ؟
ں CSF؟ □ نعم □ کلا			هل الشلل حاد / acute ؟
EMG? نعم کلا			هل الشلك assymmetric العج
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Triceps	Triceps	Extension	Extension
Biceps	Biceps	Flexion	Flexion
Supinator	Supinator	Extension	Extension
		Extension Flexion	Flexion
Knee	Knee	Extension	Extension
		Flexon	Flexion
Ankle	Ankle	DorsoFlex PlantaFlex	DorsoFlex PlantaFlex
		<u> </u>	5)- التشخيص الطبي / السريري
☐ Acute anterior poliomyelitis	☐ Trichinosis	☐ Dermatomyositis	☐ Mitochondrial diseases (infantile)
☐ Vaccine associated paralytic polio	□ Botulism	☐ Acute myopathy in ICU patients	☐ Corticosteroids & blocking agents
☐ Peripheral neuropathy	☐ Arthropod bites	☐ Myasthenia gravis	☐ Cord compression: tumor, trauma,
☐ Guillain Barre syndrome	☐ Tick bite paralysis	☐ Periodic paralysis	paraspinal absc., haematoma, vascular
☐ Acute axonal neuropathy	☐ Snake bite	☐ Systemic disease	malformation thrombosis/bleeding
☐ Acute myelopathy	☐ Post-viral myositis	☐ Acute porphyries	☐ Ischaemic cord damage: Anterior,
☐ Focal mononeuropathy	☐ Muscles disorders	☐ Transverse myelitis	spinal artery syndrome, peri-operative
☐ Critical illness neuropathty	□ Polymyositis	☐ Multiple sclerosis	complication
☐ Other neurotropic viruses enterovisuses, herpesviruses	☐ Acute toxic neuropathies: heavy metals, snake toxin	☐ Other demyelinating diseases: acute disseminated encephalomyelitis	☐ Other:
☐ Neuropathies of infectious diseases:	☐ Insecticide:	☐ Disorders of neuromuscular	
Diphtheria, Lyme disease	organophosphate poisoning	transmission	
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	تاريخ جمع العينة الثانية		تاريخ جمع العينة الاولى
			7)- المبلغ
	تاريخ الإبلاغ		اسم المبلغ وتوقعه

شكر التعاونكم. بعد تعبئتها، ترسل الاستمارة الى لبرنامج الترصد الوبائي في القضاء أو المحافظة أو بيروت (هاتف: 01614194 فاكس:01610920)

MOPH circular no.100 (21/6/2007)

AFP - Annex 2a

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة ـ برنامج الترصد الوبائي النتام (2) لتقصي حالة شلل رخو حاد: التقصي الوبائي الأولي Form no. (2) for Acute Flaccid Paralysis: initial epidemiological investigation حالة رقم الله المالية المال

	تعبأ الاستمارة من قبل وزارة الصحة العامة وفريق الترصد الوبائي										
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					ع اللقاح	يخ ونو	🗖 نعم، حدد التار	🗖 کلا	بل صحي ؟	بطاقة تلقيح / سج	هل يوجد
NID(s)		Booster (2))	Booster (1)	О	PV/IPV (3)	OPV/II	PV (2)	OPV/IPV (1)	
							لبنان ؟	وع لشلل خارج	30 يوم قبل ب	ل المريض خلال	د)۔ هل تنف
									🗖 نعم، حدد	کلا	
يخ العودة	تار	فر	تاريخ الس					مكان السفر			#
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											2
											3
			?	ِ فغانستان)	ستان وأ	يريا، باك	بشلل الاطفال (نيج	ن بلدان موبؤة ب	ن المريض مر	افد زوار الی سک	
									🗖 نعم، حدد		
تاريخ العودة	ىفر	تاريخ الس		، السفر	مكاز		هاتف		م الزائر	اسد	#
											1
											2
											3
								<u> </u>	, المحيط ؟	يد حالات شلل في	
								:77	□نعم حد	کلا	
	ا سم المحقق: التاريخ:										

AFP - Annex 2b

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة- برنامج الترصد الوبائي استمارة رقم (2) لتقصي حالة شلل رخو حاد: التقصي الوبائي الأولي Form no. (2) for Acute Flaccid Paralysis: initial epidemiological investigation حالة رقم ______

تعبأ الاستمارة من قبل وزارة الصحة العامة وفريق الترصد الوبائي					
		ز) – اقوال الاهل			
		·			
	التاريخ:	ىم المحقق:			

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة – برنامج الترصد الوبائي

استمارة رقم (3) لتقصي حالة شلل رخو حاد: جمع العينات Form no. (3) for Acute Flaccid Paralysis : specimen collection حالة رقم المالة والمالة والمالة

	1) إرشادات
لحالة اشلل الرخو الحاد: تجمع عينيتين اثنين: وذلك في غضون 14 يوم منذ تاريخ بدء عوارض الشلل الرخو الحاد. وتجمع العينة الثانية بعد مرور 24 ساعة على الأقل من العينة الأولى. توضع كل عينة في عبوة منفردة.	
تجمع عينات من المخالطين في حال : - جمع عينات غير ملائمة لحالة الشلل الرخو الحاد - أو في حال كان الاشتباه بمرض شلل الأطفال شديد. يشمل المخالطين: الإخوة و لجيران من عمر 10 سنوات و ما دون. تجمع عينة واحدة من كل طفل مخالط وتوضع في عبوة منفردة. يحدد عدد المخالطين على الأقل 3 أو 5 أطفال.	المخالطين
الكمية المطلوبة على الأقل : 8 جرام أي ما يوازي ضفرين من الابهم	الكمية
يتم جمع العينة في العبوات التي يتم توفرها من برنامج الترصد الوبائي.	العبوات
يتم عنونة كل عبوة عبر كتابة اسم الطفل وعمره وتاريخ سحب العينة على ورق لاصق، يلصق على العبوة	عنوانة
- توضع كل عبوة في كيس منفصل. وتوضع قطعة من القطن داخل الكيس، وذلك من اجل امتصاص أي تسرب. يغلق الكيس بإحكام لمنع التسرب. - توضع كافة العبوات وأكياسها في كيس كبير. - و يحفظ الكيس الكبير في البراد، حيث تكون درجة الحرارة بين 4 و 8 دراجات مئوية.	طريقة الحفظ:

	تعبأ الاستمارة من قبل وزارة الصحة العامة وفريق الترصد الوبائي								
						ئں	2) عينات من المريط		
عنوانة كاملة	عينات ملائمة	الكمية كافية	بين العينتين 24 ساعة على الأقل	العينتين في غضون 14 يوم	تاريخ جمع العينة الثانية	تاريخ جمع العينة الأولى	تاریخ بدء عوارض الشلل		
□ نعم □ کلا	□ نعم □ کلا	□ نعم □ کلا	□ نعم □ کلا	□ نعم □ کلا					
		النتيجة			تاريخ استلام النتيجة	تاريخ إرسالها لمصر	تاريخ إرسالها لبيروت		

			بشلل الأطفال	عال شدة الاشتباه	ر ملائمة أو في م	في حال عينات غي	بنات من المخالطين: تجمع ف	3) عي
	راز	عينات البر		تاريخ آخر	تاريخ الولادة			
النتيجة	تاریخ إرسالها لمصر	تاريخ إرسالها لبيروت	تاريخ جمع عينة البراز	حریع ,حر جرعة OPV (يوم/شهر/سنة)	تاريخ الولادة (يوم/شهر/سنة) اوالعمر	الصلة بالمريض	الاسم	#
								C1
								C2
								C3
								C4
								C5
								C6
								C7

اسم المحقق: التاريخ:

الجمهورية اللبنانية _ وزارة الصحة العامة _ برنامج الترصد الوبائي

استمارة رقم (4) لتقصي حالة شلل رخو حاد: التغطية التلقيحية Form no. (4) for Acute Flaccid Paralysis : vaccination coverage حالة رقم الله رقم الله والمالة والم

		مد الوبائي	وفريق الترم	صحة العامة و	ع وزارة الد	أ الاستمارة من قبل	تعب		
		-						ل من عمر 5 سنوا	لائحة الأطفا
القطاع	6 أشبهر و ما فوق		عدد جرعات OPV IPV /		توفر وثيقة	تاريخ الولادة		الاسم	#
	>=3doses (🗸)	أكمل 6 أشهر (√)	NID	routine	تلقیح (√)	(يوم/شهر/سنة)		,	n
□حكومي/خيري □خاص									1
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□حكومي/خيري □خاص									4
□حكومي/خيري □خاص									5
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□حكومي/خيري □خاص									31
□حكومي/خيري □خاص									32
	(d)	(c)	المجموع		(b)	المجموع	(a)	مجموع الأطفال	
	(d/c)	نسبة تغطية 3PV			(b/a)	نسبة التوثيق			
		الامضا			 تاريخ			اسم المحقق	
		۶			التقصي			اللكم المحقق	

الجمهورية اللبنانية _ وزارة الصحة العامة _ برنامج الترصد الوبائي

إستمارة رقم (5) لتقصي حالة شلل رخو حاد: متابعة بعد مرور ستين يوم Form no. (5) for Acute Flaccid Paralysis: 60-day follow up حالة رقم | ____|___

	- برنامج الترصد الوبائي	تعبأ من قبل وزارة الصحة العامة		
				1)- المريض
	اسم المستشفى			اسم وشهرة المريض
	اسم الطبيب المعالج			تاريخ الولادة
	رقم الهاتف	□ أنثى	□ ذکر	الجنس
	رقم الفاكس			تاريخ بدء الشلل
				2)- التقصى المخبري
	المختبر المرجعي			تاريخ جمع العينة الاولى
	تاريخ ورود النتيجة			تاريخ جمع العينة الثانية
ا للحالة:	نتيجة الزرع 🛘	۵ کلا	🗖 نعم	عينات ملائمة
] للمخالطين:				عدد عينات من المخالطين
	- tı tı	11112.1.		
	ب المعالج	تعبأ من قبل الطبيد	(2)	
		على بدء ظهور الشلل الرخو الحاد		
	·: . 🗖		نعم، حددکلا ، حدد	تم معاينة المريض
□ غیرہ: □	□ سفر الي :	السبب 🔃 وقاه تاريخ الوفاة:	77Z , ZZ []	اذا كلا، لماذا؟
				4)- معطيات المتابعة
	بق	بق 🔲 لا يوجد ضعف مت	🗖 ضعف متر	نتيجة الفحص
deep tendon reflexes	حدد حالة	: (من 1 إلى 5)	القوى العضلية	777
R	L	R	\bigcirc	L
Triceps Biceps Supinator Knee	Triceps Biceps Supinator Knee	Extension Flexion Extension Extension Flexion Extension Flexon DorsoFlex PlantaFlex		Extension Flexion Extension Extension Flexion Extension Flexion DorsoFlex PlantaFlex
				5)- التشخيص النهائي
1 3	Trichinosis	☐ Dermatomyositis		drial diseases (infantile)
☐ Vaccine associated paralytic polio ☐		☐ Acute myopathy in ICU patients		eroids & blocking agents
	Arthropod bites	☐ Myasthenia gravis		apression: tumor, aspinal absc., haematoma,
	Tick bite paralysis	☐ Periodic paralysis	vascular mal	•
	Snake bite	☐ Systemic disease	thrombosis/b	oleeding
	Post-viral myositis	☐ Acute porphyries		c cord damage: Anterior,
☐ Focal mononeuropathy ☐	Muscles disorders	☐ Transverse myelitis		syndrome, peri-
☐ Critical illness neuropathty ☐	Polymyositis	☐ Multiple sclerosis	operative co	mpucation
enterovisuses, herpesviruses hea	Acute toxic neuropathies: avy metals, snake toxin	☐ Other demyelinating diseases: acute disseminated encephalomyelitis	☐ Other:	
<u> </u>	Insecticide: ganophosphate poisoning	☐ Disorders of neuromuscular transmission		
2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.3.2.3.2.3.2.3.2.2.2.2.2	o prooprime poisoning			6)- الطبيب المعالج
	الامضاء			اسم الطبيب
				التاريخ

شكرا لتعاونكم. ترسل الاستمارة بعد تعبئتها لبرنامج الترصد الوبائي في القضاء أو المحافظة أو بيروت (هاتف: 01614194 فاكس:01610920)

الجمهورية اللبنانية - وزارة الصحة العامة - برنامج الترصد الوبائي

إستمارة رقم (6) لتقصي حالة شلل رخو حاد: تصنيف الحالة Form no. (6) for Acute Flaccid Paralysis: case classification حالة رقم الله المالية الما

	لوطنية	جنة التصنيف ا	ة الصحة العامة وا	من قبل وزار	تعبأ		
							1)- المريض
							اسم وشهرة المريض
							اسم الطبيب المعالج
	، من المخالطين	كلا، عدد العينات			نعم	i 🗆	عينات ملائمة
		للمخالطين:			للحالة:		نتيجة الزرع
							تاريخ المتابعة 60 يوم
	🗖 سافر	🗖 نوفي	عف متبق	□ لاض	ضعف متبق	i	نتيجة متابعة 60 يوم
						,	2) احالة الملف الى لجنة
VAPP / VD	PV □	Hot case □	د عينة براز	□ لا يوج	عينات غير ملائمة		سبب إحالة
							تاريخ الاجتماع
							الحاضرون
ه، حدد:	□ غير	CSF □	Б	MG □	ملف المستشفي		المستندات
				🗖 کلا	نعم		تم فحص المريض
			د ضعف متبق				نتيجة الفحص
deep tendon reflex	حدد حالة xes				حدد القوى العضلية		
R			R)			L
Triceps Biceps Supinator Knee	Trice Bice Supi Knee	ps inator	Extension Flexion Extension Extension Flexion Extension Flexon DorsoFlex PlantaFlex)	Extension
<u> </u>							3)- التشخيص النهائي
☐ Acute anterior poliomyelitis	☐ Trichinosi	S	☐ Dermatomyositis	3	☐ Mitochon	ndrial	diseases (infantile)
☐ Vaccine associated paralytic polio	\square Botulism		☐ Acute myopathy	in ICU patier	nts 🗆 Corticost	eroid	s & blocking agents
☐ Peripheral neuropathy	☐ Arthropod	bites	☐ Myasthenia grav	is	☐ Cord com	npres	sion: tumor, trauma,
☐ Guillain Barre syndrome	☐ Tick bite p	paralysis	☐ Periodic paralysi	S			haematoma, vascular
☐ Acute axonal neuropathy	☐ Snake bite	;	☐ Systemic disease		manormano	on un	rombosis/bleeding
☐ Acute myelopathy	☐ Post-viral	myositis	☐ Acute porphyries	3			d damage: Anterior, spinal
☐ Focal mononeuropathy	☐ Muscles d		☐ Transverse myel		artery syndro complication		peri-operative
☐ Critical illness neuropathty	□ Polymyos	itis	☐ Multiple sclerosi		•		
Other neurotropic viruses enterovisuses, herpesviruses	☐ Acute toxi heavy metals	c neuropathies: , snake toxin	☐ Other demyelina acute disseminated encephalomyelitis	_	☐ Other:		
☐ Neuropathies of infectious diseases: Diphtheria, Lyme disease	☐ Insecticide	e: hate poisoning	☐ Disorders of neu transmission	romuscular			
	3-8Opinosp						4)- التصنيف النهائي
□ مستبعدة / discarded	Com	مطابقة/ patible	. 🗆	C	مؤكدة / onfirmed	· 🗆	4)- التصنيف النهائي التصنيف النهائي التاريخ
							الامناء

Acute Flan
Acute Flaccid Paralysis Surveillance LINE LISTING (1)
urveillar I)
Ю́е

<##LEB##>

₽

Name

Fever

Asymet Rapid ric (<=4d)

Hot case

Υ,Ν>

^Y,N>

^Y,N>

^Y,N>

YEAR |__|_|_

Republic of Lebanon. Ministry of Public Health. Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Republic of Lebanon. Ministry of Public Health. Epidemiological Surveillance Program Acute Flaccid Paralysis Surveillance LINE LISTING (2)

					<##LEB##>	ō
					<dd mm="" yy=""></dd>	Date first contact physician
					<dd mm="" yy=""></dd>	Date notificatio n
					<dd mm="" yy=""></dd>	Date investigati on
					<dd mm="" yy=""></dd>	Date 1st stool
					<dd mm="" yy=""></dd>	Date 2nd stool
					<y,n></y,n>	Adequ ate
					#>	conta cts with stool
					<dd mm="" yy=""></dd>	Date sent to Lab
						Stool culture result
					<dd mm="" yy=""></dd>	Date stool result
					#	Days from onset to notificat.
					<#>	Days from notificat. to investigat.
					#	Days from 2nd stool to Lab.

Republic of Lebanon. Ministry of Public Health. Epidemiological Surveillance Program Acute Flaccid Paralysis Surveillance LINE LISTING (3)

					<##LEB##>	ō
						First diagnosis
						Hospital
					<y,n></y,n>	Compl eted form
					<y,n></y,n>	CSF
					<Υ,Ν>	EMG
					<y,n></y,n>	Disc harg e sum mary
					<y,n></y,n>	Study vaccin e covera
					<##%>	% Vaccin e covera
					<dd mm="" yy=""></dd>	Study % y vacin Vaccin Date covera covera follow up ge ge
						Follow up results
					<y,n></y,n>	NEG
					<dd mm="" yy=""></dd>	Date NEG
						Final classification
						final diagnosis

Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Public Health Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Acute Flaccid Surveillance Findings, Area: _____ _____, Year _

1	Cases of AFP : ID	6 Cases by vaccination status
		80%
2	Cases by month	60%
~	15	
	14	40%
	13	20%
	12	
	11 10	
	9	0 d d l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l
	8	7 Cases by adequate specimen collection (%
	7	
	6	Adequate
	5	Inadequate
	4 3	No specimens
	2	20 40 60 80
	1	
	Jan Mar Apr May Jul Jul Jul Jul Oct Nov	8 Cases by lab results (%)
	- 4 2 4 5 0 0 Z U	
3	Cases by place: caza (map)	- Wild
3	Cases by place. Caza (map)	VDPV
		Sabin like
		NPEV NPEV
		Negative
		Pending 20 44 60 80
		20 46 60 80
		9 Cases by follow up findings (%)
4	Cases by age group (%)	No weakness
	100%	140 weakiess
		Weakness
	80%	
	60%	Lost
	40%	Died
	10/10	
	20%	Pending
		20 40 60 80
	<1 y 1-4 y 5-9 y 10-14 y 15+ y	10 Cases by final classification (%)
	<1.7 5-9 5-9 10-14 115+	
		Discarded
5	Cases by gender (%)	Compatible
	M	Confirmed
	E	
	F	Pending
	20 40 60 80 100	20 40 60 80

Done by, signature and date:

Notes

Notes

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure:

Imported poliomyelitis

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 28 (19th Jan 2015)

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Step 1: Verify the laboratory confirmation a) Polio laboratory confirmed	
b) Polio compatible	
Step 2: Declare outbreak and inform	
Step 3: Assess OPV/IPV3 coverage Step 4: Search for additional cases of paralytic poliomyelitis	
a) At health settings	
b) At community level	
c) Hotline	
Step 5: Conduct stool and environmental surveillance	
a) Stool surveillance	
b) Water and sanitation	
c) Sewage surveillance Step 6: Investigate source	
Step 7: Enhance monitoring	
a) Description of cases	
b) Monitoring indicators	
Step 8: Assess containment	
Step 9: Write summary report	
Annexes	
Annex 1: AFP retrospective search form	

Annex 2: Polio vaccine coverage survey form

Polio 32

I. Purpose
The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps to be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance program in case of an outbreak of polio.

II. Generalities


Acute Poliomyelitis	
Agent	Poliovirus (genus Enterovirus), with 3 serotypes: 1, 2 and 3
Incubation	7-14 days (3-35 days)
Period of communicability	 7-10 days before onset, up to 3-6 weeks after onset Virus present in throat 36 hours after infection, up to 1 week Virus present in feces 72 hours after infection, up to 3-6 weeks
Reservoir	Humans
Modes of transmission	- Person-to-person: fecal-oral route, and rarely pharyngeal - Rarely through water and food
Clinical presentation	 - 90-95% asymptomatic infection - 4-8% mild illness (influenza-like illness or gastro-intestintal illness) - 1-2% aseptic meningitis - <1% paralytic poliomyeltis
Worldwide	Endemic countries in 2015: Nigeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In May 2014, WHO declared polio as public health event of international concern.
Lebanon	Last local cases in 1994. Last imported case in 2003. Lebanon declared "polio-free" in 2002.
Control objective	Worldwide eradication initiative (in 1988). Since 1999, worldwide, the poliovirus type 2 has been eradicated.
Surveillance and Investig	ation
Surveillance approach	Syndromic-based surveillance: acute flaccid paralysis
Collect data about case	Clinical findings, medical diagnosis, CSF/EMG results, vaccination status, travel history, follow-up at 60 days for residual weakness.
Collect specimen from case	2 stool specimens from case within 14 days from paralysis onset, with at least 24 hours apart.
Collect data about contacts	If polio or highly suspicion of polio: rapid survey on vaccination status (OPV3/IPV3 coverage) at the community level.
Collect specimen from contacts	 If delay in specimens collection from case or highly suspicion of polio, stool specimens are collected from at least 3 contacts among children (preferably under 5 years) If polio case: stool specimens are collected from siblings, neighbors and inpatients
Test	Virological culture
Laboratories	WHO accredited laboratory in Egypt or in Jordan.
Outbreak level	At least 1 confirmed case of polio
Notification to WHO	- To notify to WHO on confirmed and compatible cases - Routine weekly dataset sharing

33 Polio

Control	
Primary prevention	Immunization: 3 doses under 1 year, and 2 boosters > 1 year
Case management	Symptomatic
Isolation	Enteric precautions
Mass prevention	Immunization
Poliomyelitis case defir	nition (MOPH circular no. 34 dated on the 5 th May 2012)
Confirmed case	A confirmed case is suspected case with isolation of wild poliovirus in stool specimens collected from the suspected case or from a close contact of the suspected case.
Suspected case	A suspected case is defined as: - A child under 15 years of age presenting with acute flaccid paralysis AFP whatever was the medical diagnosis - Or any person at any age with paralytic illness if poliomyelitis is suspected by the physician
Forms	
Reporting	Standard reporting form
Investigation	For case, contacts and neighborhood: specific polio investigation forms (MOPH circular no. 100 dated on the 21st June 2007) Form (1): case reporting and investigation Form (2): case investigation Form (3): specimen collection Form (4): rapid coverage survey Form (5): follow up at 60 days Form (6): final classification


National figures

Figure 1: Reported acute poliomyelitis in Lebanon, 1961-2014 (Source: MOPH)



The last local cases were reported in 1994 (one in the North and one in the South) In 1995, an imported case from Africa was reported (the child has the onset in Africa and came to Lebanon for case management).

In 2003, a confirmed polio was reported in the North. The case did not travel. The virus was identified as from India source. Two other persons were infected by the virus (1 sibling and 1 cousin). Two national campaigns were conducted. No additional cases were found despite active search.



III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of AFP/Polio surveillance are:

- To detect and confirm rapidly any polio case
- To document polio-free status in case of absence of polio cases in the country
- In case of presence of polio cases:
 - Ensure rapid detection
 - Monitor and document containment/re-establishment of "polio-free" status.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is defined by any suspected case of poliomyelitis:

- Any patient less than 15 years old suffering from sudden onset of weakness, paresis, or paralysis, irrespective of medical diagnosis
- Or any patient, regardless of age, if the treating physician suspects poliomyelitis.

An **outbreak** is defined by at least one laboratory-confirmed polio case. It dictates immediate rigorous response plan to contain the outbreak and prevent viral circulation.

V. Procedural steps

In case of poliovirus outbreak, the Epidemiological Surveillance Program proceeds with the following steps summarized in figure (3).

Step 1: Verify the laboratory confirmation

a) Polio laboratory-confirmed

Based on the AFP investigation, polio case is detected if culture was positive. The poliovirus can be isolated from the case or the contacts.

Upon the notification by the laboratory, the Esumoh central team verifies the nature of the poliovirus isolated:

- Is it wild poliovirus?
- Is it Sabin-like poliovirus?
- Is it vaccine-derived poliovirus?

Polio 35

The virological culture detects the presence of poliovirus.

The intratypic differentiation informs on the presence of wild or vaccine virus (Sabin-like or originating from the vaccine).

The nucleotide sequencing informs on the level of diversity of the VP1 (viral protein 1) in the structural part of the genome. Compared to vaccine virus, 3 levels are identified:

- < 1%: vaccine virus
- 1-15%: vaccine-derived poliovirus
- >15%: wild poliovirus.

Also, the genotype sequencing informs on the source of the virus.

b) Polio compatible case

If the classification turned to be polio-compatible, the Esumoh will proceeds as the case was laboratory-confirmed.

Special considerations will be taken if the polio-compatible case is associated with an OPV dose.

Step 2: Declare outbreak and inform

The Esumoh central team informs immediately the concerned units at the MOPH: MOPH/DG, EPI, and CD.

The MOPH notifies the event as potential PHEIC to WHO, based on IHR (2005).

The MOPH issues official memos, informing the following:

- Health professionals: Order of Physicians, Syndicate of Private hospitals, Order of Nurses, hospitals...
- Partners: Ministry of Education and High Education, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Defense...
- Public via the media.

Step 3: Assess OPV/IPV3 coverage

There is need to assess the susceptibility profile of the area where the polio case is confirmed. The Esumoh team conducts a field study to measure the vaccine coverage. The survey is conducted door-to-door verifying vaccination documents for children aged 6 months to 5 years. The objective is to measure OPV/IPV3 coverage for targeted age group. If the case lives in a small locality: all the households are visited. If the case lives in a city of large locality: all the households in the sector of the case are visited. The minimal sample size is 100 households with children < 5 years. The survey is conducted by the Esumoh caza team with the support from the mohafaza and central levels (if needed). The results of the survey are shared with the MOPH/DG, and EPI.

Step 4: Search for additional cases of paralytic poliomyelitis

One case of polio indicates the presence of poliovirus circulation in the community and the possibility to have other polio cases.

a) At health settings

Health facilities (hospitals, medical centers, private physicians) are informed on the event. Passive reporting is enhanced. The MOPH issues memos. The Esumoh central team conducts sessions in affected mohafaza(s) targeting the health professionals. The sessions focus on case definition, importance of rapid notification, importance of high quality of weekly zero-reporting. Active surveillance is enhanced. All hospitals in the area of the case are included in the active surveillance. The quality of the active surveillance is revised.

Retrospective search is conducted by the Esumoh mohafaza/central teams. All hospitals in the affected area are visited, and the admission logbooks are revised. The target period is 6 months prior to the onset of the first polio case.

b) At community level

At the community level, cases are searched via various approaches:

- Municipalities are gathered and informed. They are requested to notify the MOPH on any rumour of AFP or polio.
- NGOs are informed and requested to notify MOPH.
- Specific settings are visited and searched for any AFP case.
- The vicinity of the case is visited and asked for any AFP case:
 - Neighbourhood
 - School / kindergarden ...

c) Hotline

The hotline 1214 is tested for AFP/polio reporting.

The Esumoh central team conducts a refreshment course targeting the hotline team.

Step 5: Conduct stool and environmental surveillance

a) Stool surveillance

Stool specimens are collected from children to detect the presence of poliovirus.

Two groups are targeted:

- The children and contacts of the case, including the neighbourhood
- The children < 5 years admitted to the hospitals of the caza or mohafaza of the case.

For each person, one stool specimen is collected and preserved at 4-8 °C. Specimens are sent to the WHO-accredited laboratory for virological culture.

b) Water and sanitation

The area where the case lives is assessed for:

- Water safety: sources of drinking and domestic water are listed. Water samples are collected and tested for microbial and chemical parameters.
- Sanitation infrastructure is explored. What system is in place for sewage: networks or septic tanks?

c) Sewage surveillance

In coordination with the municipalities and the WHO-accredited laboratory, sewage specimens are collected and sent for virological culture.

Step 6: Investigate source

The polio case or parents are interviewed to identify any potential source of infection:

- Travel to polio countries
- Travel of relatives to polio countries
- Travel of other contacts in neighbourhood, school... to polio countries.

The laboratory's genotype results will orient to the source of the virus.

Step 7: Enhance monitoring

During the outbreak, the Esumoh central team monitors closely the epidemiological data.

a) Description of cases

AFP and polio cases are described by:

- Time: week, month and year of onset
- Place: locality, caza and mohafaza of residence
- Person: age group, sex, nationality, vaccination status
- Disease: classification, outcome.

A weekly bulletin is generated and shared.

Polio 37

b) Monitoring indicators

All districts are monitored in terms of:

- Non-polio AFP rate /100000
- Proportion of specimen adequacy
- Proportion of notification of AFP within 7 days of onset
- Timeliness of zero-reporting
- Completeness of active surveillance
- Completeness of stool and sewage surveillance.

Step 8: Assess containment


Containment is assessed at 6 months from confirmation of polio outbreak by:

- Description of polio cases by time, place and person
- Findings of stool and sewage surveillance
- Quality of AFP surveillance.

There is need to have at least 6 months free of new cases of polio to declare the end of the outbreak.

Step 9: Write summary report

At the end of the outbreak, the Esumoh central team prepares a summary report. It is communicated with partners.



Polio - Annex 1

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صفحة رقم (

الجمهورية اللبنائية – وزارة الصحة العامة – برنامج الترصد الوبائي دراسة رجعية لحالات الشلل الرخو الحاد Etude retrospective des cas de paralysie flasque aigue

39

Polio - Annex 2

إستمارة دراسة التغطية التلقيحية ضد شلل الأطفال

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Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Anthrax

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 31 (19th Jan 2015)

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Annex 1: Anthrax investigation form

I. Purpose
The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps to be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance program in case of alert/outbreak of anthrax.

II. Generalities

Anthrax	
Agent	 - Bacteria: Bacillus anthracis, Gram positive, aerobic, rod-shaped, encapsulated, spore-forming, and non-motile. - Can be used in biological warfare.
Incubation	1-7 days (up to 60 days for inhalation form)
Period of communicability	No person-to-person transmission
Reservoir	 Animals (herbivores both livestock and wildlife) who shed the bacilli in terminal hemorrhages or blood at death Soil and environment where spores may remain viable for years Dried or processed skins and hides of infected animals, that may harbor spores for years
Modes of transmission	 Cutaneous form: contact with tissues, hair, wool, hides, products of infected animals; contact with soil containing spores or contaminated with bone meal; possible flies bite that fed on infected animals Inhalation form: inhalation of aerosolized spores in industries (tanning hides, processing wool or bone products); accidental inhalation in laboratory; intentional release of spores using aerosol devices including mail-items Digestive form: ingestion of contaminated undercooked meat Injection form: injection of contaminated heroin
Clinical presentation	 Cutaneous form (95% of cases) on exposed skin: evolutive lesions from itchiness, to papular, vesicular then eschar with or without surrounding redness with extensive oedema. Untreated lesions may progress to regional lymph nodes and/or to septicemia. Case fatality is 5-20%. Inhalation form (rare): mild respiratory infection that evolves in 3-6 days to acute respiratory distress. At Chest XR, a mediastinal widening (with or without pleural effusion) is observed. Meningitis may occur. The case fatality is almost 100% with delayed or no treatment. Intestinal form (rare): fever with intestinal symptoms (abdominal pain and diarrhea). Case fatality rate is 25-75%. Oropharyngeal form: a painless mucosal lesion in the oral cavity or oropharynx, with cervical adenopathy, edema, pharyngitis, fever, and possibly septicemia Injection form: similar to cutaneous form, but there may be infection deep under the skin or in the muscle. Complications: septicemia, meningitis, death.
Worldwide	- Worldwide zoonosis, with accidental infection for humans - Intentional release: USA in 2001 - Accidental release: Ex-URSS (Sverdlovsk) in 1979 - Injectable form: in Europe since 2000
Lebanon	Intestinal form observed in the 1960s

Control objective	Control							
Surveillance and Inv	Surveillance and Investigation							
Surveillance approach	Disease approach							
Collect data about case	Clinical presentation, complications, occupation, exposure to infected animals, consumption of undercooked meat, intra-venous drug user, intentional or accidental release, contaminated mail							
Collect specimen from case	Blood, clotted blood, skin, lesions, respiratory specimens (sputum, pleural fluid, lung aspirate), CSF							
Collect data about contacts	Similar cases among contacts, identification of exposed persons to contaminated items							
Collect specimen from contacts	No							
Test	- Demonstration of Bacillus anthracis using polychrome methylene blue - Isolation of Bacillus anthracis in clinical specimens							
Laboratories	Supranational reference laboratories (ex: Namru3)							
Outbreak level	At least 1 case							
Notification to WHO	Yes if intentional release and /or injectable form and /or inhalation form							
Anthrax case definiti	on (MOPH circular no. 98 dated on the 5 th May 2015)							
Confirmed case	A case with one of the following laboratory confirmation: - Culture and identification of Bacillus anthracis from clinical specimens in reference laboratory - Detection of Bacillus anthracis by nucleic acid testing (PCR) - Demonstration of Bacillus anthracis antigens in clinical specimen by immunofluorescence - Seroconversion of antibodies to Bacillus anthracis on paired specimens							
Probable case	 A suspected case with demonstration of Bacillus anthracis by microscopic examination of stained smears Or a suspected case with positive ELISA test or RedLine Alert test or lethal factor by mass spectrometry in clinical specimen Or a suspected case with epidemiological-linked with a confirmed case Or a suspected case with documented anthrax environmental exposure 							

Suspected case	Suspected case is a case with clinical presentation and a history of exposure. The clinical presentation includes one of the following: - Cutaneous form: papular or vesicular lesion, or depressed black eschar with surrounding oedema - Pulmonary form: fever with acute respiratory distress or radiological evidence of mediastinal widening - Gastro-intestinal form: fever with severe abdominal pain or diarrhea - Injection form - Meningitis form: fever with convulsions, loss of consciousness or meningeal signs.					
	The exposure history includes any exposure to animal cases, common source, or contaminated food /drinking water.					
Forms						
Reporting	Standard reporting form					
Investigation	Anthrax investigation form (MOPH circular no. 2 dated on the 7 th January 2015)					
National figures						
Gastro-intestinal cases were reported from 1960-1974. Source: Z. A. Kanafani, A. Ghossain, S. S. Kanj. Endemic gastrointestinal anthrax in 1960s Lebanon: clinical manifestations and						

III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance for anthrax are:

surgical findings. EID, May 2003; 9(5): 520-525.

- To detect and confirm any case of anthrax
- To identify source of infection
- To activate the CBRN national committee in case of bioterrorism attack
- To ensure necessary contact tracing of exposed persons
- To document containment after accidental / intentional release.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is defined by at least one suspected case of anthrax.

An **outbreak** of anthrax is defined by at least one confirmed case of anthrax.

V. Procedural steps

The following standard operating procedure is triggered by any alert of anthrax. Every suspected case of anthrax needs to be investigated according to the steps summarized in figure (2).

Step 1: Verify alert

Once an anthrax case is reported (by phone or fax), the peripheral Esumoh staff contacts immediately the treating physician or the hospital focal point to verify the diagnosis: Do they really mean anthrax?

If yes, the peripheral Esumoh staff immediately informs the Esumoh central staff who will contact the treating health care providers to collect minimal data on the following clinical presentation:

- Cutaneous signs (underlying a cutaneous mode of transmission): lesions, stages of lesions, redness, edema, treatment

- Infection deep under the skin or in the muscle (underlying an injection mode of transmission)
- Respiratory sings (underlying an inhalation mode of transmission): respiratory infection, acute respiratory distress, pleural effusion, mediastinal widening
- Intestinal signs (underlying a digestive mode of transmission): fever, intestinal symptoms
- Oropharyngeal signs (underlying digestive mode of transmission): mucosal lesion in the oral cavity or oropharynx, with cervical adenopathy, edema, pharyngitis, fever, and possibly septicemia
- Complications: septicemia, meningitis, death.

If the suspected anthrax case was admitted to more than one health setting (hospital, medical center, private clinician), all treating physicians are contacted and copies of the medical files are requested.

Also, the Esumoh central staff forwards the information to the DG who will decide to inform the minister, the CBRN national committee, and WHO.

Step 2: Collect data

The peripheral and central Esumoh staff will visit the health premise where the patient is and fill the investigation form (Annex 1).

The investigation form includes the following information:

- Identity of the patient(s)
- Clinical presentation and complications
- Exposure factors: occupation, exposure to infected animals, consumption of undercooked meat, intra-venous drug use, exposure to contaminated items
- Identifying contacts and similar cases among contacts
- Identification of contacts to contaminated items.

It is very important to identify the clinical form of the anthrax and the suspected exposure environment which will guide the following steps.

Step 3: Confirm the case

Upon suspicion and identification of the clinical form, there is need to confirm the case by laboratory testing. Supranational laboratory is contacted to ensure readiness to receive the samples.

Specimens are collected by the attendant medical professionals and the Esumoh central staff.

a) Clinical specimen collection

To confirm anthrax diagnosis, the following specimens can be collected: Blood, vesicular fluid, respiratory specimens (nasal swabs, sputum, pleural fluid, lung aspirate...) and CSF.

Table 1: Needed specimens and tests for anthrax								
Clinical form	Clinical specimens	Quantity	Container	Target tests				
Cutaneous anthrax	Vesicular fluid	3	Sterile swabs	M'Faydean capsule test, culture, antigen detection				
Inhalational/ pulmonary anthrax	Blood	10 mL	Sterile tubes	M'Faydean capsule test, culture, antigen detection				
	CSF	0.5 mL	Sterile screw-capped container	M'Faydean capsule test, culture				
	Nasal swab	2	Sterile swabs	Culture				

Clinical form	Clinical specimens	Quantity	Container	Target tests
Gastrointestinal anthrax	Blood	10 mL	Blood culture bottles	M'Faydean capsule test, culture, antigen detection
	Ascitic fluid	2 mL	Sterile screw-capped container	M'Faydean capsule test, culture, antigen detection
Anthrax meningitis	CSF	0.5 mL	Sterile screw-capped container	M'Faydean capsule test, culture
	Blood	10 mL	Blood culture bottles	M'Faydean capsule test, culture, antigen detection

The selection of specimen types depends on the health condition of the patient:

- Vesicular fluid is not appropriate for treated patient and for cutaneous form older than 3-4 days
- For deceased patients: B. anthracis cannot be isolated from blood until the last few hours of life.

Specimens are stored at 2-8 °C, and transported in cool boxes.

b) Environmental specimen collection

Collection of environmental samples is needed to identify the source of the infection. Samples are collected by the partners (MOA, CBRN task force) from exposed surfaces, water, food and soil. Collection of samples is potentially dangerous and should be handled with a certain biosafety level. Therefore, it is supervised by the CBRN taskforce.

c) Specimen shipment

Specimens are shipped within 24 hours to supranational laboratories (Namru-3...). Shipment follows IATA requirements.

d) Personal protective equipment

The professional collecting the specimens should be equipped with the following personal protective equipment before getting in contact with the anthrax case or any contaminated environmental:

- Double disposable gloves
- Gown or overall, depending on the situation
- Full-face respirator
- Eye protection.

Step 4: Describe and classify the case

Based on the available information, cases are described by:

- Time: time of onset, time of suspected exposure, time of starting case management
- Place: place of residence, place of work, place of suspected exposure
- Person: age, gender, occupation, nationality...
- Disease: clinical form, outcome.

The cases are classified as confirmed, probable, suspected or discarded (figure 1). The classification is dynamic, updated with any new information.

Medical treatment is started once the case is suspected. Treatment is stopped only if the case is discarded.

If one case is confirmed, the outbreak is declared. Such information is shared by the MOPH to partners: CBRN national committee, WHO and health professionals...

Step 5: Specific steps for non-respiratory form

When cutaneous, digestive or oropharyngeal forms are identified, it reflects accidental exposure.

The following steps are conducted in coordination with the CBRN national committee.

a) Investigate the source

If the exposure is suspected to be in professional setting (ex: laboratory...), the Esumoh staff with involved professionals conducts biosafety assessment at workplace setting. If the exposure is suspected to be of animal origin, the Ministry of Agriculture is informed and requested to conduct animal investigation.

b) Find additional cases

One case of anthrax may reflect the release of the bacteria and the occurrence of other cases. The MOPH informs officially the health professionals (hospitals, syndicates of physicians, syndicate of private hospitals, and syndicate of laboratories...) on the event and requests them to report immediately any suspected cases. Specific official memos are issued including summary of the event, case definitions, and how to report.

Active surveillance teams are also mobilized to include in their field rounds the search of suspected anthrax.

c) Conduct contact/exposure tracing

For any suspected contaminated environment, or source, all persons who have been at the place at the time of exposure are listed.

The line listing includes the following: name, contact details, occupation, link with the contaminated environment...

Identified contacts are assessed for their exposure and followed up daily for a duration of 7 days to detect new cases among them. Also suspected contacts are oriented for chemoprophylaxis treatment.

Step 6: Specific steps for respiratory form

When inhalation form is suspected, the intentional release is suspected.

a) Coordinate with the CBRN committee

The MOPH ensures reception of the information by the leader of the CBRN committee. The former activates the CBRN plan. Once activated, the Esumoh staff will report jointly to MOPH/DG and to CBRN/leader committee.

b) Find additional cases

Additional cases are searched via the indicator-based (IBS) and event-based system (EBS). The IBS includes issuing specific memos for national health partners (hospitals, laboratories, physicians...), conducting sessions for hospitals on disease presentation, case definition, reporting and lab confirmation...

The EBS incudes activating the hotline 1214 and training the 24-hours/7-days team trained on anthrax.

c) Conduct contact/exposure tracing

The Esumoh teams (peripheral and central) ensure:

- Identification of contacts and exposed persons
- Assesment of exposure
- Daily follow up of exposed persons for symptoms onset and prophylaxis observance.

The daily follow up is documented for 7 days for cutaneous/digestive form and 60 days for inhalational form.

d) Enhance monitoring


The Esumoh central level, monitor on daily basis:


- Cases: number of cases by time, place, person and outcomes
- Exposed: number of daily follow up and outcomes.

A weekly bulletin is edited and shared with MOPH/DG and CBRN national committee.

Step7: Write summary report

Once the event is contained, the Esumoh central staff writes a report summarizing important findings. Summary report mainly contains the following information: description of the case by time, place, person, laboratory findings, and exposure history. This summary report is shared with involved partners.





Anthrax - Annex 1



Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Unit

Anthrax Investigation form

							Case I	D	
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Treating physician					Phone				
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Patient full name						, Caza:			
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Date last dose:									
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Date o	f onset of 1st sympto	oms:	_/	/					
	<u>Gastrointestina</u>		<u>Cuta</u>	neous or					
<u>General</u>	<u>Oropharynge</u>			<u>jection</u>	T	<u>Inhalation</u>		- 	<u>Meningeal</u>
☐ Fever ☐ Malaise/fatigue	☐ Abdominal pain/ter☐ Abdominal swelling		☐ Pruriti ☐ Erythe			hest pain ough		☐ Heada	
☐ Anorexia	☐ Vomiting		☐ Edema			yspnea			pain/stiffness
☐ Hypoxia	☐ Diarrhea (not blood	y)	□ Vesicle			emoptysis		☐ Convu	
☐ Cyanosis	□ Bloody diarrhea		☐ Eschar		☐ Acute respiratory distress ☐ Altered ment			ed mental status	
☐ Other:	☐ Neck swelling		☐ Celluli			bnormal chest x-ray	1	□ Coma	
	☐ Pharyngitis		☐ Fasciit			ther:		☐ Other	:
	☐ Oropharyngeal lesic☐ Other:	ons	□ Lympr	adenopathy angitis					
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V. Labo	oratory testing								
Specimen type	Nb	Date of o	collection	Date of ship	ment	Test	Labora	atory	Result
Blood									
CSF									
Vesicular fluid									
Swab									
Peritoneal fluid									
Ascitic fluid									
Other:		-							

MOPH circular no. 2 dated on the 7th January 2015



Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Unit

Anthrax Investigation form

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							Case ID		
\/I Cose m									
	anagement Name	Troatir	og NAD	Admission	Admission d	ato	ICU	r	Data disabarga
a) Health facility	Ivairie	Treatin	Ig IVID	Aumission	Autilission u	ale	100	T	Date discharge
-									
-									
b) Antibiotics	Name	lDate si	tartod	Date ended	Posolog	<u>L</u>		Notes	
b) Antibiotics	Ivaille	Date 5	iai ieu	Date ended	F 03010g	S y		Notes	
-									
**						<u>_</u>			
VII Cutana	eous / injectio	n form							
In the past 14 days p Work with or around									
 work with or around mammals or their bo 		☐ Yes If yes,	□ No Date (☐ Unknown of exposure:	1	,			
mammais or their so	ay maras.	specify:		ion of exposure:					
				al type:					
• II		☐ Yes	□ No	Unknown					
Had any contact with animal skins, furs, hair, or bone products?				of exposure:	/	1			
,,		specify: Locati		ion of exposure:					
		Produ		ict type:					
Garden or work with soil?		☐ Yes	□ No	□ Unknown					
		If yes, Date		of exposure:	/_	/			
		specify:		ion of exposure:					
Work in a clinical or i	microbiological	☐ Yes	□ No	Unknown	,				
laboratory?		If yes, specify:		of exposure:	/	_/			
		specify.	Locati	ion of exposure:					
 Receive an injection: 		☐ Yes	□No	□ Unknown					
		If yes, specify:		of injection:	/	/			
		specify.	Drug t Drug i	type: name:	☐ Medicinal	□ IIIICIT			
				ion site:					
			Cond	ucted by:					
**									
VIII. Gastro	o-intestinal / o	oropharyng	eal form	1					
In the past 7 days pr		e onset, did	the patie	nt:					
 Consume or was exp 		☐ Yes	□No	Unknown					
undercooked or raw meat?		If yes, specify:		of exposure:	/	/			
		specify.		ion of exposure: Imed items:					
			Sourc						
 Consumed same foo 		☐ Yes	□ No	Unknown	,	,			
confirmed anthrax ca	ase :	If yes, specify:	Date of Locati	of exposure:	/	_/			
		specity.		ion: imed items:					

MOPH circular no. 2 dated on the 7th January 2015

Source:



Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Unit

Anthrax Investigation form

						Case ID	.1
	IX. Inhala	tion forms					
F	In the past 60 days	-	Yes	the patient: ☐ No ☐ Unknown			
	 Receive unusual let 	ters or packages?	⊔ Yes If yes,	Date of exposure:			
			specify:	Location of exposure:			
L				Country source:			
Г	Open mails or pack	ages for others:	□ Yes	□ No □ Unknown			
		J	If yes,	Date of exposure:			
			specify:	Location of exposure:			
L				Details:			
Г	 Had contact with ur 	nusual powders,	☐ Yes	□ No □ Unknown			
	dusts or aerosols?		If yes,	Date of exposure:	/		
			specify:	Location of exposure:			
L	**			Details:			
	X. Exposu			tat e .			
Г	In the past 6 weeks Attend large gather		Se Offset, aid ☐ Yes	Titne patient: ☐ No ☐ Unknown			
	events?	iligs of special	If yes,	Date of event:	/ /		
			specify:	Location of event:			
	 Travel outside the of 	country?	□ Yes If yes,	☐ No ☐ Unknown Date of travel:	, ,		
			specify:		/		
				Country:			
L				Date of return:			
	Get in contact with	the state of the s	☐ Yes	□ No □ Unknown			
	similar illness in frie coworkers, or other		If yes, specify:	Date of contact: Contact's name:	/		
	coworkers, or other	Contacts:	specify.	Contact's location:			
				Contact's phone:			
L	**			Contact's priorie.			
		me and classific	ation				
	Dates	Status (alive, re		Classification	No	otes (date of death if death)	
Γ		July Status (alive, rev	covered, death)			(date of death if death)	
r							
ŀ							
L	**						
	XII. Enviro	onmental invest	tigation				
	Dates	Partr	=	Inspection/Sampling		Results	
Γ							

MOPH circular no. 2 dated on the 7th January 2015

XIII. Investigator
Form filled by: (name and signature)

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Cholera

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 32 (19th Jan 2015)

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I. Purpose

This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is intended to assist the Epidemiological Surveillance Program teams on how to proceed in case of cholera case.

II. Generalities

Cholera is an acute bacterial enteric disease characterized by sudden onset of profuse watery stool with or without vomiting. The stool of cholera patients typically becomes a clear liquid flecked with white mucus, known as "rice –water" stool. It is usually odorless or has a mild fishy smell. Vomiting, which can be severe, and painful leg cramps are common symptoms. If untreated it may led to rapid dehydration, acidosis, circulatory collapse, renal failure, hypoglycemia and death. More information about the disease is presented in the table below.

Cholera	
Agent	 Bacteria: Vibrio cholera, serogroup O1 (biotype classical or El Tor, subtype Ogawa or Inaba), or serogroup O139. Enterotoxin producer.
Incubation	2-5 days (can be few hours)
Period of communicability	As long as the bacteria is excreted in feces, up to few days after recovery
Reservoir	Humans, brackish waters and estuaries
Modes of transmission	 Consumption of contaminated water Consumption of contaminated food: by water, by human feces, by soiled hands, raw or undercooked seafood Person-to-person transmission: fecal-oral route
Clinical presentation	 - Acute abundant watery diarrhea (rice-water) - Asymptomatic infection is common - Complications: dehydration and death. Case fatality can reach 5% if untreated and <1% if treated
Worldwide	Worldwide. The 7th pandemic started since 1961 with O1 El Tor biotype in particular in Asia and Africa.
Lebanon	Last outbreak in 1993
Control objective	Control
Surveillance and Invest	tigation
Surveillance approach	Disease (cholera) and syndromic (watery diarrhea)
Collect data about case	Complications, water exposure, food exposure, travel history
Collect specimen from case	Stool specimens or rectal swab (in AMIES or Carry Blair media)
Collect data about contacts	Search of cases among contactsInterview of meal companions for the 5 days prior to onset
Collect specimen from contacts	Stool specimen or rectal swab from household members and close contacts
Test	Coproculture, and identification of the serogroup
Laboratories	Clinical laboratories for isolationRHUH for serogroup identification
Outbreak level	At least 1 confirmed case
Notification to WHO	Yes

Cholera case definition	Cholera case definition (MOPH circular no. 99 dated on the 5th May 2015)							
Confirmed case Isolation of Vibrio cholerae O1 or O139 from stools in any patie with diarrhea								
Suspected case	 In area where the disease is not known to be present: severe dehydration or death from acute watery diarrhea In area where cholera is endemic: acute watery diarrhea with or without vomiting In an area where there is a cholera epidemic: acute watery diarrhea, with or without vomiting in any patient 							
Forms								
Reporting	Standard reporting form							
Investigation	Cholera investigation form (MOPH circular no. 151 dated on the 15 th October 2007)							

National figures

Last outbreak in 1993

International figures

Figure 1: Reported cases of cholera worldwide, 2000-2014 (Source: WHO, WER no. 40, 2015, 90, 517-544)





Figure 2: Distribution of cholera cases, worldwide, 2010-2014 (Source: WHO)



III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance of cholera are:

- To promptly detect and confirm cholera cases
- To identify risk factors and sources of infection
- To document containment in case of outbreak.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is defined by one of the following:

- At least 1 suspected case of cholera
- A cluster of severe acute watery diarrhea cases in the same settlement of refugees or internally displaced persons (IDP) camp or in the same village
- Doubling of cases of "acute watery diarrhea" for two consecutive weeks
- Isolation of vibrio cholera in one clinical specimen.

Alerts are detected at caza, mohafaza and central levels. Alerts are communicated between the three levels within 24 hours.

An **outbreak** is defined whenever a single strain of Vibrio Cholera type O1 or O139 has been isolated.

V. Procedural steps

The steps described below are recommended for the verification and investigation of chlolera alert/outbreak. They are summarized in figures (4) and (5).

Step1: Verify alert

a) Suspected case of Cholera

If the notification originates from a health facility, the Esumoh team (caza, mohafaza or central) contacts within 24 hours the treating physician or hospital focal person. If the patient is a suspected case of cholera? Is there any isolate?

If the notification comes from the community, the information is verified with the health facilities who diagnosed or treated the patients.

b) Cluster of cases

If a cluster is notified in particular setting, the Esumoh caza/mohafaza teams verifies the information. The setting is visited.

Step 2: Verify diagnosis

a) Clinical specimens

In case of suspected case of cholera, stool specimens are collected from the case. If the case passed away, stool specimens are collected from all household members. The needed test is microbiological culture. This test can be done in any clinical laboratory.

It is recommended to collect specimen from the case:

- Within 4 days from onset
- During the phase of acute watery diarrhea
- Before the administration of antibiotics.

b) Isolates

In case the clinical laboratory identifies Vibrio Cholera, there is need to collect the isolate and refer it to a reference laboratory in order:

- To confirm the isolate
- To identify serotype: O1 or O139.

Usually, isolates are referred to RHUH.

Step 3: Collect Data

If Vibrio cholera is isolated, the Esumoh mohafaza/central team contacts the patient or proxy to collect additional information. The investigation form for cholera is provided in Annex 1.

The investigation form includes the following information:

- Demographic data: age, gender, nationality, place of residence
- Illness: onset, outcome
- Case management
- Laboratory findings: specimen, laboratory results
- Risk factors: cluster, travel history, consumption of seafood, source of drinking water, occupation
- Preexisting conditions...

In case of death, a copy of the medical file is requested by an official letter.

Step 4: Confirm the outbreak

In case the isolate is O1 or O139, the outbreak of cholera is confirmed.

The Esumoh central team informs the MOPH units. The MOPH issues official letters to inform various partners:

- Health professionals
- Other governmental institutions
- WHO, and other UN agencies...

Step 5: Search for additional cases

a) Field search

Immediately after confirmation, the Esumoh team conducts field visits where cases of cholera are confirmed. Additional cases are searched in the immediate surroundings of the case. A specific line listing is used (Annex 2).

During the field visits, the cholera rapid kits can be used (if available).

b) Indicator-based surveillance

Additional cases are searched from various surveillance systems:

- Classical surveillance
- Medical centers
- Schools
- Hospital-based mortality surveillance...

The passive reporting system is enhanced. Health facilities are informed on the presence of the outbreak and are asked to report any suspected case immediately to MOPH.

The active surveillance is also enhanced to detect any suspected case of cholera.

c) Event-based surveillance

The community is informed on the presence of the outbreak, including municipalities and NGOs. Specific sessions are done for NGOs and municipalities to inform them on the disease.

The hotline 1214 is also used for reporting from any source.

Any suspected case reported by the community is to be verified by the Esumoh caza team.

Step 6: Describe cases

Cases are described by:

- Time: week, month and year of onset
- Place: place of residence, place of work, place of school, in term of locality, caza and mohafaza
- Person: age, gender, nationality

- Disease: classification, outcome, case management
- Agent : serotype, antimicrobial resistance, pattern.

Indicators include counts and incidence rates.

Step 7: Assess risks factors

a) Water testing

In concerned localities or institutions, the municipalities are contacted to describe the water sources and networks. Based on that information, the critical water points are identified for water sampling.

A date is arranged with the locals and the designated laboratory to conduct water sampling and referral to the laboratory.

Water samples should include samples from network water and non-network water.

The water is tested for fecal contamination.

b) Food inspection and testing

If the investigation forms point the presence of suspected meal in same locality, area or institution, the food is suspected to be contaminated.

The identified food premises are inspected. During the inspection, the conditions are reviewed, the available food is sampled, and the food handlers are checked for their medical cards, hygienic presentation and presence of illness of acute diarrhea in the previous 2 weeks.

In case of history of acute diarrhea among food handlers, stool is collected from suspected food handlers for bacteriological culture.

c) Hygiene assessment

If the cholera is in a specific setting, as a refugee settlement, the site is inspected. During the field inspection the following is assessed:

- Availability of safe drinking water
- Availability of domestic water
- Sanitation infrastructure
- Hygiene behavior.

d) Further studies

Based on the needs, the Esumoh central level will conduct advanced studies as:


- Analytic studies: case control or retrospective cohort
- Microbiological studies
- Antimicrobial resistance
- Access to treatment...


Step 8: Enhance monitoring

During an outbreak a regular epidemiological report will be prepared by Esumoh central team and shared with partners on weekly basis.


Step 9: Write summary report

Once the outbreak is ended, the Esumoh central tram prepares a summary report on the outbreak.





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Cholera - Annex 1

Rep	oublic of Lebanon	– Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program Vibrio surveillance report
		•
		LEB-A00- _ _ -
		I. Patient information
1.	Patient ID	
	ID	LEB-A00- _ _ -
	Patient name	
	Date of birth	
	Age (years) Gender	
	Nationality	
	Nationality	
2.	Principal place o	f residence
	Country	
	Mohafazat	
	Caza	
	Locality	
	Street	
	Building	
	Floor	
	Phone 1	
	Phone 2	
<i>3</i> .	Place of work	
	Occupation	
	Country	
	Mohafazat	
	Caza	
	Locality	
	Address	
	Institution	
	Phone	
4.	Secondary place	of residence
••	Country	of residence
	Mohafazat	
	Caza	
	Locality	
	Address	
	Phone	

$\begin{tabular}{ll} \textbf{Republic of Lebanon}-Ministry of Public Health-Epidemiological Surveillance Program & Vibrio & Surveillance Program & Vibrio & Surveillance & Program & Vibrio &$

	LEB-A00-	
	II. LABORAT	ORY FINDINGS
Date of	ecimen Specimen collection Specimen Stool Ind or other, specify:	l Blood □ Wound □ Other
	Local laboratory	Reference laboratory
Name	,	•
Species	□ V. alginolyticus □ V. cholerae O1 □ V. cholerae O139 □ V. cholerae non-O1, non-O139 □ V. cincinnatiensis □ V. damsella □ V. fluvialis □ V. furnissii □ V. hollisae □ V. metschnokovii □ V. mimicus □ V. parahaemolyticus □ V. vulnificus □ Vibrio species – not identified □ Other	□ V. alginolyticus □ V. cholerae O1 □ V. cholerae O139 □ V. cholerae non-O1, non-O139 □ V. cincinnatiensis □ V. damsella □ V. fluvialis □ V. furnissii □ V. hollisae □ V. metschnokovii □ V. mimicus □ V. parahaemolyticus □ V. vulnificus □ Vibrio species – not identified □ Other
7. If Vibri	o cholerae O1 or O139, complete:	
Serotype		□ Inaba
	☐ Ogawa ☐ Hikojima ☐ Unsp	□ Ogawa □ Hikojima □ Unsp
Biotype	☐ El Tor ☐ Classical ☐ Unsp	☐ El Tor ☐ Classical ☐ Unsp
Toxigenic	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unsp	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unsp
Test	☐ ELISA ☐ Latex agglutination	☐ ELISA ☐ Latex agglutination

 \square Other

 \Box Other

2/6

$\begin{tabular}{ll} \textbf{Republic of Lebanon}-Ministry of Public Health-Epidemiological Surveillance Program \\ \it Vibrio \ surveillance \ report \end{tabular}$

8. MicroAntibioResistance

Antibio-
susceptibility

		Local laboratory				Reference laboratory				
-		S	I	R	Unsp	S	I	R	Unsp	
<i>y</i>	Ampicillin									
	Chloramphenicol									
	Furazolidone									
	Nalidixic acid									
	Ciprofloxacin									
	Tetracycline									
	Trimethoprim- Sulfamethoxazole									

\sim	α
"	Other

Were other organisms isolated from the s	ame	\square No	\square Unsp
specimen that yielded Vibrio?			
If yes, specify: _			

Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program *Vibrio* surveillance report

LEB-A00-|__|_|_|-|__|

	III. CL	INICAL I	NFO	RMATION			
10. Onset Date of onset Time of onset	_ - _ □ am	_ - _ n / □ pm					
11. Signs							
	Yes No	Unsp			Yes	No	Unsp
Fever			1	Abdominal cramps			
Max: _ °C			2	Headache			
Nausea			3	Muscle pain			
Vomiting			4	Cellulitis			
Diarrhea			5	Bullae			
Nb / day: _			6	Shock			
Visible blood in stools			7	Other			
12. Hospital, case manag Admitted Hospital name Date of admission Antibiotic	gement Yes 1	No 🗆 Un	sp				
13. Issue Death	Yes No	Unsp	1	Sequelae	Yes	No	Unsp
Date of death _	_ - -		2	Specify:			
14. Pre-existing condition	ns Yes No	Unsp			Yes	No	Unsp

15. Previous medications

Hematologic disease

Alcoholism

Peptic ulcer

Gastric surgery

Heart disease

Diabetes

	Yes	No	Unsp			Yes	No	Unsp
Antibiotics				1	Immunosppressants			
Chemotherapy				2	Antiacids			
Radiotherapy				3	H2 blocker/ulcer			
Systemic steroids				4	medication			

1

2

3

4

5

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Immunodeficiency

Liver disease

Malignancy

Other

Renal disease

	<i>Vibrio</i> surv	eillance	report	t				
	LEB-A00-		_ -					
IV. EP	DEMIOLOG	ICAL 1	INFO	RMAT	ION			
16. Outbreak: did the case of	ccur as part of							
		Place	Yes	No	Unsp	Nb		
	Workin	Family					. 	
	Informal						.l 	
	Other, s	-						
17. Travel in the 7 days prior	r to onset							
Country	Date entered			D	ate left			
		_ _		_ - _	_ - _	_ _		
	_ - -			- _	- _			
	_ - - .			. -	- _	_		
18. Consumption of seafood	in the 7 days p							
	[nsumpti			iten raw		
Clama /	 بطلينوس / Praire	Yes	No	Unsp	Yes	No	Unsp	
Mussels / Mou								
	بـ عدري بـ عـم / ٠٥ محار / Huitre /							
	سلطُعون / Crabe							
ر جراد او/ Lobster / Homard								
	قریدس / evettes							
ر، جراد / Crawfish / Ecrevisse								
FISH	سمك / Poisson Other, specify							
19. Source of drinking water								
Yes	No Unsp	7				Yes	No	Unsp
Public water system		_			ed water			
Shared well Public well		-		Citte	rn water Other			
Individual well]			Other			
20. Sanitation infrastructure								
Yes	No Unsp	7	a .			Yes	No	Unsp
Sewage network		-			sewage nan excreta			
Septic tanks]	Conta	et with hun	iuii exercia			
21. Personal risk						Yes	No	Unsp
				_	n travel			
0.4	/ X - 1.4	1 1			led food			
Othe Contact with recent	er person(s) with							
	TOTOIGH allival !	mmmgle	الكاد منتند	ugou, VII	1101			

Republic of Lebanon – Win					niological	Surveillance Progra
		surveillar				
	LEB-A00)- _	_ -	_	_	
22. Exposed skin in the 7 do	avs prior to	illness on	set			
-			Yes	N	o Unsp	Where
Exposed skin in the 7 days pr						
		sh water alt water				
		er, other:				
		,				
Exposure to other marine / fr						
Drippings from						
	ing/cleaning ming /diving					
	king on beac					
	Fell on roc					
Во	oating/skiing	-				
**	Biti	ng/stung				
Vound(s):	Presence o	of wound				
		wound wound				
		d wound				
	Specify 1	location:				
23. Family and household i	m am b ang					
Name Relation	Year of birth	Nationa	lity	Ill	Date of illness	Notes
			_			
			\dashv			
			+			
	1			П		
	V. P	Patient in	forma	tion		
Date of no	I.	_ _ - _	_ -	_ _		
Date of inverse Date of specimen sent to refe		_ - _	_ -	_ _	_	
Date of specimen sent to refe	rence lab	-	-			

6/6

Cholera - Annex 2

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فحوص اخر <i>ی</i>	نظيجة الزرع	ناریج عینه دمم	تطور المرض	العوارض	تاريخ بدء العوارض	الهاتف	العنوان	الجنس		الجنسية	آج عل	
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				ر ا								
				يخفاني تجفاني								
				ا دهی				ا نکر				
				ا غيان				اتاً				
				د د ا								
				ايج ا								
				ا دهی								
				ا غثیان				اتاً				
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				ا نجفاف								
				دهی				_ نکر				
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Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Diphtheria

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 63 (23rd Jan 2015)

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
Diphtheria

I. Purpose
The purpose of this Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is to assist the Epidemiological Surveillance program in verifying and investigation any alert/outbreak of diphtheria.

II. Generalities

Diphtheria	
Agent	- Bacteria: Corynebacterium diphtheria (4 biotypes: gravis, mitis intermedius and belfani), and Corynebacterium ulcerans - Toxin producer (DTX)
Incubation	2-4 days (1-10 days)
Period of communicability	Usually 2 weeks
Reservoir	- For Corynebacterium diphtheria: humans - For Corynebacteirum ulcerans: bovins
Modes of transmission	 For Corynebacterium diphtheria: person-to person via droplets (respiratory secretions), skin lesions or fomites; and rarely through indirect contact For Corynebacterium ulcerans: through contaminated raw milk
Clinical presentation	 - Anterior nasal, pharyngeal and tonsillar (pseudo-membranes), laryngeal (stridor) forms - Cutaneous diphtheria (vesicles and later ulcers) - May be asymptomatic - Main complications: myocarditis, neuropathy from mild weakness to total paralysis
Worldwide	Worldwide. Major outbreaks: URSS and Mongolia (1990), Ecuador (1993-1994)
Lebanon	Last local case in 2002
Control objective	Control
Surveillance and Invest	igation
Surveillance approach	Disease-based approach
Collect data about case	Clinical findings (signs), complications, outcomes, vaccination status
Collect specimen from case	- Nose/throat swab - Skin swab for cutaneous form
Collect data about contacts	Search for similar cases among contactsVaccination status profile for close contactsSearch of food handler or KG/school staff
Collect specimen from contacts	Nose/throat swab from close contacts: search for carrier
Test	 Bacteriological culture in special media (blood and tellurite agar) If positive: identify biotype and toxigenicity (toxinproducing) by Elek test or PCR
Laboratories	RHUH
Outbreak level	At least 1 confirmed case
Notification to WHO	To notify confirmed cases to WHO if outbreak, case with travel history or case during humanitarian crisis

Control	
Primary prevention	Active immunization (three primary doses and booster at 18 months to 4 years; booster with an adult formulation at 11-18 years of age; Td every 10 years)
Case management	 Diphtheria antitoxin (sensitivity testing before administering the antitoxin) Antibiotics: procaine penicillin (IV), erythromycin, or oral penicillin V.
Isolation	 Contact and droplet precautions for 14 days while on antibiotherapy; or up to two negative cultures 24 hours apart at least 24 hours after cessation of antibiotherapy Disinfection of the patient belongings
Contact prevention	 Single dose of benzathin penicillin or 7-10 days course of erythromycin Previously immunized: booster dose if more than five years elapsed from the last booster Unimmunized: a primary series should be initiated
Contact quarantine	- Surveillance for seven days - Those who are in contact with un-immunized children or handle food should be excluded from work.
Mass prevention	Active immunization
Diphtheria case definit	ion (MOPH circular no. 107 dated on the 6th September 2006)
Confirmed case	 Probable case confirmed by laboratory with of Corynebacterium diphteria isolation from a clinical specimen Or probable case epidmiologically linked to a laboratory-confirmed case
Carrier	Presence of Corynebacterium diphteria in nasopharynx with no symptoms
Probable case	- Case presenting with laryngitis, pharyngitis or tonsillitis with presence of adherent membranes of tonsils or nasopharynx
Forms	
Reporting	Standard reporting form
Investigation	 For case: diphtheria investigation form (MOPH circular no. 190 dated on the 2nd November 2007) For contacts: diphtheria contacts investigation form (MOPH circular no. 192 dated on the 2nd November 2007)
National figures	
The last confirmed diphtl	neria case was reported in 2002, in a Lebanese pupil in the North.



III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance are to:

- Detect and confirm any case of diphtheria
- Conduct needed contact tracing to identify secondary cases
- Investigate outbreak and identify risk factors
- Document containment.

IV. Alert and outbreak definitions

One suspected case of diphtheria is considered an **alert** and necessitates a investigation. One confirmed case of diphtheria is considered an **outbreak**.

V. Procedural steps

The steps described below are recommended for investigation of any alert/outbreak of diphtheria. The steps are summarized in figure (3).

Step 1: Verify alert

In case of suspected case, the Esumoh caza team contacts the treating physician. Why does he/she suspecting diphtheria? Is there a laboratory confirmation? Is the patient status critical?

Upon verification, the Esumoh caza team informs the mohafaza and central teams immediately.

Step 2: Collect data

The Esumoh mohafaza/central team conducts field visits where patient is. An investigation form is filled via patient/parents and physician interview (Annex 1).

The investigation form includes the following information:

- Demography
- Illness: onset, lesions description ...
- Vaccination status
- Exposure: occupation...

Step 3: Confirm the case

Diphtheria needs to be laboratory confirmed.

a) Detection / Isolation of C. diphtheria

Various specimens can be collected. They are summarized in table (1).

Clinical specimens for bacterial isolation can be collected from patients or close contacts. For bacterial culture, it is needed to have the specimens collected before treatment. Specific swabs are used with specific media for bacteria. At the laboratory, the culture needs specific media (ex: containing tellurite...)

Table 1: Needed specir	mens and tests for	r diphtheria confirmation	
Specimens	Tests	Laboratory	Notes
Nasal swab, nasopharyngeal swab, throat swab, membranes	Culture	Clinical laboratory	 To collect before starting antibiotics Swab is preserved in adequate media for bacteria growth Need of specific media containing tellurite
Nasal and throat swabs, pieces of membranes, biopsy	PCR	Reference laboratory	To detect the presence of C. diphtheria even after starting antibiotics
Serum	Serology (antibodies to diphtheria toxin)	Reference laboratory	Informs on the level of immunity - <0.01 IU/ml: immunity is absent - 0.01-0.09 IU/ml: limited immunity
C. diphtheria isolate	Toxigenicity testing: Elek test	Reference laboratory	To confirm the pathogenicity of the strain

The PCR detects the presence of C. diphtheria even after starting antibiotics.

The detection needs to identify the biotype of C. diphtheria: intermedius, belfanti, mitis, or gravis.

b) Toxigenicity testing

Not all C. diphtheria strains are toxic. There is need to confirm the toxigenicity of isolated bacteria. Specific test is performed, the Elek test.

Step 4: Confirm outbreak

Based on the available clinical, epidemiological and laboratory results, the case is classified (Figure 2). The outbreak is declared if meeting the needed criteria.

If the outbreak is confirmed, the Esumoh informs the concerned units at the MOPH. The MOPH informs the concerned local health professionals. The WHO is informed if the outbreak mets the IHR criteria.

Step 5: Investigate close contacts

a) Data collection

All close contacts are identified:

- Household
- Neighborhood
- Work place
- Study place.

The needed information for the contacts includes:

- Identification
- Age
- Demography
- Relation with the case
- Vaccination status
- Presence of symptoms
- Collection of specimen: date of collection and results.

This list is needed to be shared with the response team in charge to ensure antibioprophylaxis and vaccination. A specific line listing is used (Annex 2).

b) Specimen collection

From close contacts in particular the household and classroom, clinical specimens are collected: nasal swab, nasopharyngeal swab or throat swab for bacterial culture.

Step 6: Investigate source of infection

If possible, the source of infection is searched.

a) Time

The source is found in the 10 days prior to illness onset.

b) Person

The patient is asked on previous contacts with persons with respiratory illness. The person may not be identified.

For each suspected person, the following information is collected:

- Name
- Contact details
- Relationship with the patient
- Diagnosis (if known)
- Place and time of exposure
- Case management: medical consultation, hospital admission, laboratory testing...

d) Place

The patient is asked on previous places visited within 10 days prior to illness onset. Specific places are listed:

- Countries: travel history
- Within the country:
 - Health facilities
 - Refugees settings
 - Schools
 - Social events...

For each place, the following information is collected:

- Type of visit
- Date and time
- Presence of persons with respiratory symptoms.

Step 7: Describe cases

Cases are described by:

- Time: day, week and year of onset
- Place: place of residence, place of work, place of school, in term of locality, caza and mohafaza. Also travel history is described.
- Person: age group, gender, nationality, vaccination status ...
- Disease: classification, outcome...
- Laboratory results: from patient and contacts.

Step 8: Search for additional cases

Additional cases are searched via:


- Enhanced passive surveillance
- Including diphtheria in the active surveillance for hospitals
- Search among the contacts of the patient
- Community-based surveillance.


Step 9: Enhance monitoring

During the outbreak, daily monitoring of cases is done by time, place, person and disease. A weekly report is issued and shared with partners.

Step 10: Write summary report

Once the outbreak was confined, the Esumoh central staff prepares a summary report describing the outbreak in term of time, place and person, and outcomes.





Diphtheria - Annex 1

Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Diphtheria surveillance report: The case

LEB-A36-|__|_|_|-|__| Patient ID Patient ID LEB-A36-Patient initial Gender □Male □Female Date of birth |dd-| mmyearsmonths Care Provider Hospital name Clinician name Clinician Order No. Clinician Tel Patient Residence Address: Mohafazat Address: Caza Address: Locality Tel Patient Occupation Occupation Institution Institution type □ Educational ☐ Health care □ Day care Address: Mohafazat Address: Caza Address: Locality Tel Patient Vaccination Status Vaccination documentation □Health □ Vaccination \square No document card document Y/NDate Where Dose type YesNoUnspPrimary immunization: First Second Third **Boosters:** First

Diphtheria. Agent: toxins produced by Corynebacterium diphtheriae. Reservoir: Humans. Transmission: contact with a patient or a carrier; rarely indirect through contact with articles soiled with discharges from lesions of infected patient; raw milk. Incubation: 2-5 days. Communicability: variable, until bacilli disappeared from discharges and lesions, usually 2 weeks, seldom 4 weeks.

Second

Ministry of Public Health Circular no. 190 dated on the 2^{nd} November 2007 Page~1/5

Diphtheria surveillance report: The case LEB-A36-|__|_|-|-|-|-|

6	Preliminary History			
		of symptoms		
	Date first se	en by doctor		
	Was patient h	ospitalized?	□Yes □No	□Unsp
		hospitalized		<u> </u>
	<i>3</i> – 7	1		
	Has the patient been admitted to int		□Yes □No	\Box Unsp
	If yes, d	ate admitted		
	Has the patient been placed on	a ventilator?	□Yes □No	$\Box \mathrm{Unsp}$
		ate intubated		r
7	Clinical History			
	Briefly describe history and general			
	symptom progression			
	symptom progression			
8	Specific Symptom History			
	Specific Symptom History			
	Fever	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
	Sore throat	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
	Difficulty swallowing	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
	Change in voice	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
	Shortness of breath	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
	Weakness	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
	Fatigue	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
	Other	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
	Paralysis	\Box Yes	\Box No	□Unsp
	If yes, describe paralysis			

Diphtheria. Agent: toxins produced by Corynebacterium diphtheriae. Reservoir: Humans. Transmission: contact with a patient or a carrier; rarely indirect through contact with articles soiled with discharges from lesions of infected patient; raw milk. Incubation: 2-5 days. Communicability: variable, until bacilli disappeared from discharges and lesions, usually 2 weeks, seldom 4 weeks.

Ministry of Public Health Circular no. 190 dated on the $2^{\rm nd}$ November 2007 Page~2/5

Diphtheria surveillance report: The case LEB-A36-|__|_|-|_|-|_|

9 Vital Signs on Admission			
Temperature Blood pressure Heart rate Respiratory rate	_ . °C _ / _ _ _ /mn _/mn	mmHg	
10 Physical Examination Findings			
Membrane present If yes, specify site: Tonsils Soft palate Hard palate Larynx Nares Nasopharynx Conjunctiva Skin	☐ Yes	□No	□Unsp
If yes, specify: Bilaterality	□Bilateral	□Left	□Right
Extension Stridor	□Submandibular only □Below clavicle □Yes	✓ □Midway to clav □To clavicle □No	icle □Unsp □Unsp
Wheezing	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
Palatal weakness	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
11 Complications			
Airway obstruction	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
Myocarditis	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
If yes, specify: EKG abnormalities	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
Polyneuritis If yes, specify: Lower limbs Upper limbs Troncus Respiratory command	□Yes □Yes	□No □No □No □No □No □No	□Unsp □Unsp □Unsp □Unsp □Unsp
Other	□Yes	□No	□Unsp

Diphtheria. Agent: toxins produced by Corynebacterium diphtheriae. Reservoir: Humans. Transmission: contact with a patient or a carrier; rarely indirect through contact with articles soiled with discharges from lesions of infected patient; raw milk. Incubation: 2-5 days. Communicability: variable, until bacilli disappeared from discharges and lesions, usually 2 weeks, seldom 4 weeks.

Ministry of Public Health Circular no. 190 dated on the $2^{\rm nd}$ November 2007 Page~3/5

Diphtheria surveillance report: The case LEB-A36-|_|_|-|-|-|-|

12	Laboratory Results			
a)	Was specimen for diphtheria			
u)	culture obtained?	□Yes	$\square No$	□Unsp
	If yes, Date	- -		□ СПБР
	Specimen site and type		_	I
	Local laboratory			
	Culture result	□ Positive	□Negative	Unsp
	0 0.700.70 7 0.000.70		_1.0 g	_ 0 110p
b)	If positive culture:			
	Biotype	□Mitis	□Gravis	□Intermedious
		□Belfanti	\square Unsp	
	Toxigenicity testing result	□Yes	□No	□Not done
c)	Was specimen sent to reference			
	laboratory?	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
	If yes, reference lab		1 1 1	
	Date			
	Specimen type		☐ Clinical sawb	
	Specimen details			
	Confirmation	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
	Biotype	□Mitis	□Gravis	□Intermedious
		□Belfanti	□Unsp	
	Toxigenicity testing result	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
	PCR	□Yes	□No	□Unsp
13	Treatment			
a)	ATB			
u)	Date starting ATB	- -		
	ATB used	□Erythromycin	<u> </u>	
	1112 0000	□ Penicillin		
		1	ipicilin/Augmentin/	Ceclor/Cefixime
		□Clarithromycin		
		□Cotrimoxazole		
		☐ Tetracycline/Do	xvcvline	
		☐ Other, specify:	, ,	
		<u> </u>		
b)	Was Antitoxin given?	□Yes	\square No	\Box Unsp
	If yes, Date	- -		•
	Quantity			
			<u> </u>	
c)	Was the patient isolated?	□Yes	\square No	\Box Unsp
	If yes, Date starting isolation	_ - -		
	D: 1.1 · 1 · 1 1	1 0 1	1: 1:1 ·	

Diphtheria. Agent: toxins produced by Corynebacterium diphtheriae. Reservoir: Humans. Transmission: contact with a patient or a carrier; rarely indirect through contact with articles soiled with discharges from lesions of infected patient; raw milk. Incubation: 2-5 days. Communicability: variable, until bacilli disappeared from discharges and lesions, usually 2 weeks, seldom 4 weeks.

Ministry of Public Health Circular no. 190 dated on the $2^{\rm nd}$ November 2007 Page~4/5

Diphtheria surveillance report: The case LEB-A36-|__|_|-|-|-|-|-|

14	Exposure risk				
a)	Has the patient traveled away from				
	Lebanon in the last month?	□Yes	□No	□Unsp	
	If yes, specify:	Country	From		То
			- -		-
					_ _ -
				-	-
1.	TT				
b)	Has the patient traveled in the country (different mohafazats) in the				
	last month?	□Yes	□No	□Unsp	
	If yes, specify:	Mohafazat (caza)	From	Unsp	То
	if yes, specify.	1410Harazar (Caza)	110111		10
c)	Has the patient been a contact of a				
c)	known diphtheria case?	□Yes	□No	□Unsp	
	If yes, specify, ID of the known case				
	J - 7 1 - 37	1			
d)	Has the patient been a contact of a				
	known diphtheria carrier or contact?	□Yes	□No	□Unsp	
	If yes, specify, carrier name				
	Related to known diphtheria case ID				
e)	Has the patient been in the last				
,	month, a contact of the following?	□Yes	□No	□Unsp	
	Similar case	□Yes	□No	□Unsp	
	Foreign case	□Yes	□No	□Unsp	
	Health care center / hospital	□Yes	□No	□Unsp	
15	Summary				
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
	Differential Diagnosis by Clinician				
	Patient Outcome/Status	Still admitted	□Discharged	□Died, date:	
	Classification:	□ Confirmed	□ Probable	□Died, date:	
	Ciassification.		1 Tobable		

Diphtheria. Agent: toxins produced by Corynebacterium diphtheriae. Reservoir: Humans. Transmission: contact with a patient or a carrier; rarely indirect through contact with articles soiled with discharges from lesions of infected patient; raw milk. Incubation: 2-5 days. Communicability: variable, until bacilli disappeared from discharges and lesions, usually 2 weeks, seldom 4 weeks.

Ministry of Public Health Circular no. 190 dated on the $2^{\rm nd}$ November 2007 Page~5/5

Diphtheria - Annex 2

Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Diphtheria surveillance report: The close contacts	LI	Diphtheria s
eport: The close contacts	B-A36-	urveillance r
The close contacts	_	eport:
close contacts	_	The
contacts	_	close
		contacts

Male Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Fema	# Name Date of birth
□ Male □ Female □ Female □ Female □ Male □ Female □ Male □ Female □ Male □ Female □ Male □ Female □ Female □ Male □ Male □ Female □ Female □ Male □ Female □ Male □ Female □ Fem	
□ Male □ Female □ Hemale □ Female	Date of birth
□ Male □ Female □ Hemale □ Female □ Female □ Hemale □ Female □ Hemale	
	Gender
	Relation
O Y S O S O S O S O S O S O S O S O S O	Document
	Nb doses
	Year last dose
O C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C	Symptoms
O C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C	Done
	Date
□Pos. □Neg. □Pos. □Neg. □Neg. □Neg. □Neg. □Neg. □Neg. □Neg. □Neg. □Neg.	Result
□ Yes, □ □ No □	ATB Prophylaxy
O C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C	Toxoid

and lesions, usually 2 weeks, seldom 4 weeks. with articles soiled with discharges from lesions of infected patient; raw milk. Incubation: 2-5 days. Communicability: variable, until bacilli disappeared from discharges Diphtheria. Agent: toxins produced by Corynebacterium diphtheriae. Reservoir: Humans. Transmission: contact with a patient or a carrier; rarely indirect through contact

ATB: 1 Erythromycin; 2 Penicillin; 3 Amoxicillin/Ampicillin/Augmentin/Ceclor/Cefixime; 4 Clarithromycin/azithromycin; 5 Cotrimoxazole; 6 Tetracyclin; 7 Other MOPH Circular no. 192 dated on the 2nd November 2008

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Food poisoning

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 33 (19th Jan 2015)

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I. Purpose

The purpose for this SOP is to highlight the major steps to be undertaken by the epidemiological surveillance program in case of a food poisoning alert or outbreak.

II. Generalities

Food poisoning

Agents

Several agents:

1) Bacteria:

- Bacillus Cereus, toxin producing, spore forming
- Brucella
- Clostridium botulinum, spore forming, toxin producer
- Campylobacter jejuni and Campylobacter coli
- Clostridium perfringes, spore-forming, toxin producing
- Escherichia coli
- Listeria monocytogenes
- Salmonella typhi
- Non-typhi Salmonella
- Shigella dysenteriae, S. flexneri, S. boydii, S. sonnei
- Staplyococcus aureus, toxin producer
- Vibrio Cholera
- Vibrio parahaemolyticus
- Vibrio vulnificus
- Yersinia enterocolitica...

2) Virus:

- Adenovirus, coronavirus, rotavirus, parvovirus, calicivirus, astro virus...
- Poliovirus and enterovirus
- Viral hepatitis A
- Viral hepatitis E...

3) Parasites:

- Entamoeba histolytica
- Giardia intestinalis
- Toxoplasma gondii
- Trichinella spiralis...

4) Natural toxins:

- Scomboid fish poisoning: following the consumption of fish of the family Scombroidea or Scomberesocidae (tuna, mackerel, skipjack, bonito) containing high levels of free histamine. This occur when the fish undergoes bacterial decomposition after capture.
- Paralytic shellfish poisoning: caused by the presence of saxitoxins and gonyautoxins in the shellfish (Alexandrium sp., and other dinoflagelates)
- Tetrodotoxin poisoning: caused by the tetrodotoxin, non-protein neurotoxin concentrated in the skin and viscera of puffer fish, porcupine fish, ocean sunfish...
- Mushroom toxins
- Plant toxins...

5) Chemicals

- Pesticides (Organophosphates, antimony...)
- Toxic metals (cadmium, copper, lead, mercury, tin...)
- Polychlorinated biphenyls
- Fluoride
- 7inc
- Nitrites (food preservatives)
- Sodium hydroxide
- Monosodium glutamate...

The information below will present the information related to Bacillus cereus, Clostridium botulinum, Clostridium perfringes, Staplycoccus aureus, Vibrio parahaemolyticus, Vibrio vulnificus, Yersinia enterocolitica, Adenovirus, Norovirus, Trichinella spiralis, Toxoplasma gondii, Tetrodotoxin poisoning, Histamine poisoning / scombroid, and Paralytic shellfish.

The other agents were exposed in other sections: Brucella, Campylobacter jejuni, Campylobacter coli, Cholera, Escherichia coli, Listeria monocytogenes, Salmonella, Shigella, Coronavirus, viral hepatitis A, viral hepatitis E, Rotavirus, Poliovirus, Entamoeba histolytica, and Giardia intestinalis.

Incubation period

The incubation varies with the agent.

Agent	Incubation period
Bacteria	
Bacillus cereus	24-36 hours
Clostridium botulinum	12-36 hours (several hours to 8 days)
Clostridium perfringes	8-24 hours
Staplyococcus aureus	2-6 hours
Vibrio parahaemolyticus	9-25 hours, up to 3 days
Vibrio vulnificus	12 hours-3 days
Yersinia enterocolitica	24-36 hours
Virus	
Adenovirus	1-10 days
Norovirus	12-48 hours
Parasites	
Trichinella spiralis	8-15 days (5-45 days)
Toxoplasma gondii	5-23 days
Chemicals and toxins	
Tetrodotoxin poisoning	< 1 hour
Histamine poisoning	Minutes to few hours
Paralytic shellfish	< 1 hour
Organophosphates	Within minutes to hours

Period of	The period of communicabi	lity varies with the agent.
communicability		
	Agent	Period of communicability
	Bacteria	
	Bacillus Cereus	No person-to-person transmission
	Clostridium botulinum	No person-to-person transmission
	Clostridium perfringes	No person-to-person transmission
	Staplyococcus aureus	No person-to-person transmission
	Vibrio parahaemolyticus	Usually no person-to-person transmission
	Vibrio vulnificus	No person-to-person transmission
	Yersinia enterocolitica	Bacteria excreted in feces for 2-3 weeks
	Virus	
	Norovirus	As long as the virus is excreted, in
	Adenovirus	particular during the acute phase
	Parasites	
	Trichinella spiralis	No person-to-person transmission
	Toxoplasma gondii	No person-to-person transmission
	Chemicals and toxins	
	Tetrodotoxin poisoning	No person-to-person transmission
	Histamine poisoning	No person-to-person transmission
	Paralytic shellfish	No person-to-person transmission
	Organophosphates	No person-to-person transmission
Reservoir	The reservoir vary with the	agent.
	Agent	Reservoir
	Bacteria	
	Bacillus Cereus	Widely distributed in nature (soil)
	Clostridium botulinum	Soil, marine, freshwater sediments, intestinal tracts of fishes, animals, birds, and insects
	Clostridium perfringes	Soil, sewage, dust, feces of animals and humans, animal-origin feedstuffs
	Staplyococcus aureus	Humans (skin, nose, throat)
	Vibrio parahaemolyticus	Coastal seawater, estuarine brackish waters, marine fish and shellfish
	Vibrio vulnificus	Coastal and estuarine waters
	Yersinia enterocolitica	Animals

	Virus	
	Adenovirus	Humans
	Norovirus (Norwalk-like virus)	Humans
	Parasites	
	Trichinella spiralis	Swine, dogs, cats, horses, bears
	Toxoplasma gondii	Cats and other felinesIntermediate hosts: sheep, goats, rodents, pigs, cattle, and birds
	Chemicals and toxins	
	Tetrodotoxin poisoning	Puffer fish, porcupine fish, ocean sunfish
	Histamine poisoning	Fish of the family Scombroidea or Scomberesocidae (tuna, mackerel, skipjack, bonito)
	Paralytic shellfish	Shellfish (Alexandrium sp., and other dinoflagelates)
	Organophosphates	- Accidental: Food sprayed with insecticides containing organophosphates - Intentional poisoning
Modes of transmission	The modes of transmission contaminated food or tox	on are mainly by consumption of ic food.
	Agent	Modes of transmission
	Bacteria	
	Bacillus Cereus	Consumption of contaminated food (usually stored at ambient temperature after cooking) as: fried rice, spices, dried foods, milk, dairy products, vegetable dishes, sauces
	Clostridium botulinum	 Ingestion of toxin pre-formed in food stored in anaerobic conditions as: vegetables, condiments, fish, meat Honey may transmit the bacteria.
	Clostridium perfringes	Ingestion of contaminated food inadequately cooled as meat and poultry
	Staplyococcus aureus	Consumption of food containing the toxin, and contaminated by food handlers as ham, chicken, egg salads, creams, ice creams, cheese
	Vibrio parahaemolyticus	Consumption of raw or undercooked fish or fishery products, or foods subject to cross-contamination from raw fish
	Vibrio vulnificus	Consumption of seafood and raw oysters
	Yersinia enterocolitica	Consumption of contaminated food: pork products, milk products

Virus	
Adenovirus	 Person-to-person transmission: fecaloral route Ingestion of contaminated food: by foodhandler or harvested from
Norovirus (Norwalk-like virus)	contaminated water (seafood and vegetables) - Ingestion of contaminated water or drinks
Parasites	
Trichinella spiralis	Consumption of raw or undercooked infected animal
Toxoplasma gondii	Ingestion of occysts: - By playing/ handling with cats - By consumption of raw / undercooked meat - By consumption of food/water contaminated by feline feces
Chemicals and toxins	
Tetrodotoxin poisoning	Ingestion of puffer fish, porcupine fish, ocean sunfish
Histamine poisoning	Ingestion of shellfish
Paralytic shellfish	Ingestion of fish of the family Scombroidea or Scomberesocidae
Organophosphates	Consumption of food sprayed with organophosphates

Clinical presentation

The clinical presentation includes gastro-intestinal symptoms, neurological symptoms, respiratory illness, general symptoms...

Agent	Clinical presentation
Bacteria	
Bacillus Cereus	Gastro-enteritis
Clostridium botulinum	Paralytic manifestations: ocular disturbance, dry mouth, difficulty in swallowing and speaking, limb paralysis, respiratory paralysis
Clostridium perfringes	Gastro-enteritis
Staplyococcus aureus	Upper gastro-intestinal tract symptoms with no fever
Vibrio para- haemolyticus	Gastro-enteritis
Vibrio vulnificus	Gastro-enteritis with bloody stool Complications: septicaemia in persons with chronic liver diseases or immune-suppression
Yersinia enterocolitica	Gastro-enteritis
Virus	
Adenovirus	Fever, vomiting, watery non-inflammatory diarrhea
Norovirus (Norwalk-like virus)	Watery diarrhea, vomiting, nausea
Parasites	
Trichinella spiralis	Symptoms depend on the number of larvae ingested and location May include facial oedema and hypereosinophilia
Toxoplasma gondii	 - Acute lympho-adenopathy - May be asymptomatic - Complications during pregnancy: abortion, congenital chorioretinitis, congenital brain damage - Complications in immune-compromised persons: cerebritis, chorioretinitis, pneumonia, myocarditis

	Chamicals and to	
	Chemicals and to	
	Tetrodotoxin poisoning	- Neurological manifestations: paresthaesias, ataxia, para-lysis, death - Case fatality: 60%
	Histamine poisoning	Tingling and burning sensations around the mouth, facial flushing, sweating, nausea, vomiting, headache, palpitations, dizziness, rash
	Paralytic shellfish	Neurological manifestations: paresthaesias of the mouth and extremities with gastro-intestinal symptoms
	Organophos- phates	Cholinergic syndrome: excess respiratory and oral secretions, diarrhea and vomiting, diaphoresis, convulsions, altered mental status, miosis, bradycardia, and generalized weakness that can progress to paralysis, respiratory arrest and death
Worldwide	- Tedrodotoxin pois	s are found worldwide. oning is usually known in Japan: in the past years, bserved in the Middle East.
Lebanon	following agents: E	s, investigated food poisoning episodes showed the scherichia coli, non-typhoid Salmonella, Shigella, eus, Trichinella spiralis, tetrodotoxin poisoning,
Control objective	Control	
Surveillance and I	Invesigation	
Surveillance approach	Syndromic	
Investigation: data about case		cal presentation, incubation period, consumed food I consumption and source
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	- Clinical specimens	s: stool or other depending on the infectious agent
Investigation: data about contacts	Search of similar ca	ases
Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts and environment	- Clinical specimen	s from contacts: if similar cases s from food handlers left over food items, similar food items or ingredients
Test	- Organophosphate	
Laboratories		s: clinical laboratories reference laboratories
Outbreak level	The occurence of a reflects food poisor	t least 2 patients following a food consumption ning episode.
Notification to WHO		ria of the International Health Regulations (2005)

Food poisoning c	ase definition (MOPH circular no. 81 dated on the 27th December 2001)
Suspected case	At least two patients experiencing same illness following the consumption of common meal or food item
Confirmed Case	At least two patients experiencing same illness following the consumption of common meal or food item, with laboratory confirmation or confirmed link between food and illness
Forms	
Reporting	Standard reporting form
Investigation	 Food poisioning investigation form (MOPH circular no.80 dated on 14th October 2011) Food premises inspection form (MOPH memo no.121 dated on 5th August 2015) Trichinella investgation form (MOPH circular no.79 dated on 6th August 2013) Botulism inestigation form (MOPH circular no.153 dated on 15th November 2007) Isolate form (MOPH circular no.163 dated on 28th November 2015)
National Figures	
	food poisioning cases, Lebanon,1997-2014 (Source: MOPH)
500 450 400 350 350 250 250 200 150 100 50 0	99 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of food poisoning surveillance are to:

- Detect and investigate food poisoning episodes and outbreaks
- Identify microbial agents and contaminated food items
- Investigate sources of contamination.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is when two and/or more suspected cases had same illness following common meal or food item.

Year

An **outbreak** is when two and/or more cases had same illness following common meal or food item with laboratory confirmation and/or confirmed link between food and illness.

Table 1: T	hresholds for alert and outbreak
Alert	- At least 2 cases with same illness - Common meal/food item
Outbreak	- At leasrt 2 cases with same illness - Common meal/foot item - Laboratory confirmation or link between food and illness

V. Procedural steps

The steps below are recommended for food poisoning investigation. They are summarized in figure (3)

Step 1: Collect data

Food poisoning is among the immediate notifiable diseases. Upon reception, the Esumoh caza team contacts the patient or the family and fills the food poisoning investigation form.

The investigation form is provided in annex (2).

The investigation form is filled for each household or group. It includes the following variables:

- Household / group exposed: composition
- Illness: date and time of onset, symptoms, stool culture...
- Exposure: meal, source, date of consumption ...

Step 2: Confirm the case

The Esumoh caza team collects the results of any stool culture done for the patients. In case the patient was not tested yet, the Esumoh team requests to perform stool culture. Stool culture is done at any clinical laboratory.

Step 3: Test suspected household food

In case there are household food leftovers, the Esumoh caza team collects them and sends them to the designated reference laboratory (Agriculture Research Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture).

The food items are sent with an official request specifying the following:

- Reference number of the request at the caza level
- Food item: type, place of collection, date of collection, household

Step 4: Search for additional cases

During the investigation of the patient/family/group, the Esumoh caza team asks whether other member(s) developed the same illness (family, friends ... etc) following the common meal. A case definition is formulated in order to find additional cases at the community level if any. Passive and active surveillance are reinforced to find additional cases based on the case definition formulated.

Another method of finding cases is through the event-based surveillance (EBS) including the community-based approach.

Step 5: Inspect food premises

In case the suspected food item originates from a food premise, the premise is identified. Once identified, the premise is inspected by the caza team in coordination with Esumoh team. Samples from the suspected food (end-items and ingredients), water (drinking, cooking and domestic), and food handlers (stool samples...) are taken.

The food samples are referred to the Agriculture Research Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture. The sampled food items are labeled and numbered, and a request form is filled with the food item details (number, type, place of collection, date of collection).

The water samples are tested in the laboratories of the public hospitals in the mohafaza. The food handlers' stool samples are sent to Rafik Hariri Governmental Hospital for testing.

Step 6: Describe cases

The basic descriptive analysis is done once the data is collected.

Cases are described by:

- Time: time of symptom onset, incubation period
- Place: of residence, of exposure...
- Person: age group, sex, nationality

- Disease: symptoms, classification, outcome, inpatient
- Agent: type, serotype, antimicrobial resistance...

Describing the symptoms experienced and the incubation period (time between food intake and symptom onset) orients towards suspecting the infectious agent involved in the illness.

Step 7: Conduct microbial surveillance

In case of positive bacteriological culture in stool or food, the isolates of the below agents are collected:

- Salmonella
- Shigella
- Escherichia coli
- Campylobacter...

The Esumoh central team coordinates the collection of isolates from the clinical laboratories to the designated reference laboratories (Pulse-Net laboratory).

At the reference laboratory, the isolates are tested for:

- Confirmation and serotypes identification
- Identification of subtypes by molecular testing
- Antimicrobial resistance.

This process helps to:

- Assess the link between the cases and the consumed food
- Compare isolated strains
- Trace back the origin of contamination.

Step 8: Conduct further studies

In case of an outbreak, further analytical studies are conducted to find association between disease and food agent. The type of the study depends on the context of the outbreak.

Table 2: Indications for co	phort and case/control studies
Study	Context
Retrospective Cohort Study	Closed setting such as a wedding, prom, camp
Case-Control Study	Open setting with undefined borders such as eating in a restaurant or consuming commercial food item

The outbreak can be confirmed by:

- Laboratory findings
- Or by the positive results of analytical studies.

Once the source has been identified, traceability to the source can be conducted, in coordination with the involved partners (Ministry of Agriculture...).


Step 9: Write summary report


During the course of the outbreak investigation, preliminary reports are generated by the Esumoh teams.

Once the investigation is completed, a summary report is finalized and shared with the MOPH involved units.

The summary report should include the following sections:

- Background of the situation
- What was done, i.e. methods
- Results of laboratory tests
- Results of investigation
- Conclusion
- Recommendations.





Food poisoning - Annex 1

Major Foodborne Hazards: predominant clinical features

Source: WHO Foodborne Disease Outbreaks: Guidelines for Investigation and Control

A supposition to time to		Associated automican outowin	Assessment of functions
onset of symptoms	r leagilliaite symptomis	Sociated Offamon of toxin	(food-handlers)
Upper gastrointestinal tro	Upper gastrointestinal tract symptoms (nausea, vomiting) occur first or predominate	te	
Less than 1 hour	Nausea, vomiting, unusual taste, burning of mouth.	Metallic salts	Vomit, urine, blood, stool
1-2 hours	Nausea, vomiting, cyanosis, headache, dizziness,	Nitrites	Blood
	dyspnea, trembling, weakness, loss of consciousness.		
1–6 (mean 2–4) hours	Nausea, vomiting, retching, diarrhea, abdominal pain, prostration	Staphylococcus aureus and its enterotoxins	Stool, vomit, (swabs from nostril, skin lesions)
8–16 hours (2–4 hours	Vomiting, abdominal cramps, diarrhea, nausea.	Bacillus cereus	Rectal swab, stool
if emesis predominant)			
6–24 hours	Nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, thirst, dilation of pupils,	Mycotoxins (<i>Amanita</i> sp. Fungi)	Urine, blood (SGOT, SGPT),vomit
	collapse, coma.		
12–48 (median 36)	Nausea, vomiting, watery non-bloody diarrhea,	Norovirus	Stool
hours	dehydration.		
Sore throat and respiratory symptoms occur	ry symptoms occur		
12–72 hours	Sore throat, fever, nausea, vomiting, rhinorrhea, sometimes a rash.	Streptococcus pyogenes	Rectal swab, stool
2–5 days	Inflamed throat and nose, spreading greyish exudate, fever, chills, sore throat, malaise, dysphagia, oedema of cervical lymph node.	Corynebacterium diphtheriae	Swabs of skin lesions, nose, oropharynx, blood for toxin testing
Lower gastrointestinal tro	Lower gastrointestinal tract symptoms (abdominal cramps, diarrhoea) occur first or predominate	r predominate	
2–36 (mean 6–12) hours	Abdominal cramps, diarrhea, putrefactive diarrhea (Clostridium <i>perfringens</i>), sometimes nausea and	Clostridium perfringens, Bacillus cereus, Streptococcus faecalis, S. faecium	Rectal swabs, stool
	vomiting.		
6–96 hours (usually	Fever, abdominal cramps, diarrhea, vomiting,	Salmonella spp, Shigella, Aeromonas,	Rectal swabs, stool
1–3 days)	headache.	enteropathogenic E. coli	
6 hours to 5 days	Abdominal cramps, diarrhea, vomiting, fever, malaise,	Vibrio cholerae (O1 and non-O1), V.	Stool
	nausea, headache, dehydration. Sometimes bloody or	vulnificus, V. fluvialis, V.	
	mucoid diarrhea, cutaneous lesions associated with Vibrio vulnificus.	parahaemolyticus	
1–10 (median 3–4) days	Diarrhea (often bloody), abdominal pain, nausea,	Enterohaemorrhagic <i>E. coli</i> (including <i>E.</i>	Stool, rectal swabs
	0157).	7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 - 7 -	

Muscle tissue	Triorthocresyl phosphate (oil substitute)	Gastroenteritis, leg pain, ungainly high-stepping gait, foot and wrist drop.	
Urine, blood, hair	Organic mercury	Numbness, weakness of legs, spastic paralysis, impairment of vision, blindness, coma.	More than 72 hours
Blood, stool, gastric washing	Clostridium botulinum and its neurotoxins	Vertigo, double or blurred vision, loss of light reflex, difficulty in swallowing, speaking and breathing, dry mouth, weakness, respiratory paralysis. Characteristic syndrome is descending bilateral flaccid paralysis, starting with cranial nerves ad with preserved sensorium.	2 hours to 6 days, usually 12–36 hours
Blood, urine, stool, gastric washing	Ciguatera toxin Chlorinated hydrocarbons (insecticides, pesticides)	Tingling and numbness, gastroenteritis, temperature reversal, dizziness, dry mouth, muscular aches, dilated pupils, blurred vision, paralysis. Nausea, vomiting, tingling, dizziness, weakness, anorexia, weight loss, confusion.	1–6 hours
	Tetradon (tetrodotoxin) toxins	irregular pulse, pupils constricted, asthmatic breathing. Tingling and numbness, dizziness, pallor, gastric haemorrhage, and desquamation of skin, fixed gaze, loss of reflexes, twitching, paralysis.	
Gastric washing Blood, urine, fat biopsy	Shellfish toxin (see final section of this table) Organic phosphate Muscaria type much come	Neurological and/or gastrointestinal symptoms. Gastroenteritis, nervousness, blurred vision, chest pain, cyanosis, twitching, convulsions. Excessive salivation, perspiration, gastroenteritis	Less than 1 hour
		Neurological symptoms (visual disturbances, vertigo, tingling, paralysis)	Neurological symptoms
Stool, rectal swab	Taenia saginata, T. solium	Nervousness, insomnia, hunger pains, anorexia, weight loss, abdominal pain, sometimes gastroenteritis.	3–6 months
Stool	Entamoeba histolytica	Abdominal pain, diarrhea, constipation, headache, drowsiness, ulcers, variable – often asymptomatic.	1 to several weeks
Stool	Giardia lamblia	Mucoid diarrhea (fatty stools), abdominal pain, flatulence, weight loss.	1–6 weeks
Stool	Yersinia enterocolitica	Fever, diarrhea, abdominal pain. Can mimic acute appendicitis.	3–7 days
Stool, vomit	Rotavirus, astrovirus, enteric adenovirus	Fever, vomiting, watery non-inflammatory diarrhea.	3–5 days

Alloraic cumptoms (facia	I flicking itching)		
Less than 1 hour Headache, dizzi	Headache, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, peppery taste	Histamine (scombroid)	Vomit
	in mouth, burning of throat, facial swelling and flushing, stomach pain, itching of skin.		
	Numbness around mouth, tingling sensation, flushing,	Monosodium glutamate	
	dizziness, headache, nausea.		
	Flushing, sensation of warmth, itching, abdominal	Nicotinic acid (food additive,	
	pain, puffing of face and knees.	preservative)	
Generalized infection syr	Generalized infection symptoms (fever, chills, malaise, prostration, aches, swollen lymph nodes,	ymph nodes)	
4-28 (mean 9) days	Gastroenteritis, fever, oedema around eyes,	Trichinella spiralis	Serum, muscle tissue (biopsy)
	perspiration, muscular pain, chills, prostration,		
	laboured breatning.		
7–28 (mean 14) days	Malaise, headache, fever, cough, nausea, vomiting,	Salmonella typhi	Rectal swab, stool
	bloody stools.		
10–13 days	Fever, headache, myalgia, rash.	Toxoplasma gondii	Lymph node biopsy, blood
Varying periods	Fever, chills, headache, arthralgia, prostration,	Bacillus anthracis, Brucella melitensis, B.	
(depends on specific	malaise, swollen lymph nodes and other specific	abortus, B. suis, Coxiella burnetii,	
illness)	symptoms of disease in question.	Francisella tularensis, Listeria monocytogenes, Mycohacterium	
		tuberculosis, Mycobacterium spp,	
		Pasteurella multocida, Streptobacillus	
		moniliformis, Campylobacter jejuni, Leptospira spp	
Gastrointestinal and/or neurological symptoms	<u>eurological symptoms</u>		
0.5–2 hours	Tingling, burning, numbness, drowsiness, incoherent	Paralytic shellfish poisoning (PSP)	Gastric washing
J [32]	Powerful of the total cold conserve timeline numbers	(Saxitoxilis) — Illusseis, ciallis	Octionships
2–5 minutes to	Reversal of hot and cold sensation, tingling, numbness	Neurotoxic shellfish poisoning (NSP)	Gastric washing
3–4 hours	of lips, tongue and throat, muscle aches, dizziness,	(brevetoxins)	
30 minutes to	Nausea vomiting diarrhea abdominal pain chills	Diarrhoeal shellfish poisoning (DSP)	Gastric washing
2–3 hours	fever.	(dinophysis toxin, okadaic acid, pectonotoxin, yessotoxin)	ď
24 hours	Vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal pain, confusion,	Amnesic shellfish poisoning (ASP)	Gastric washing
(gastrointestinal) to	memory loss, disorientation, seizure, coma.	(domoic acid)	
(neurological)			
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تعميم وزارة الصحة العامة رقم 80 تاريخ 14 تشرين الاول 2011

Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health - Epidemiology Surveillance Program **Trichinellosis Investigation Form** Case |_____| Year |_____| Section 1. Personal Data Name Gender □ M \Box F Date of birth ___/___/___ Nationality Occupation Institution Caza Locality Phone Section 2. Diagnostic Data Date of illness Thirst □ Yes □ No ☐ Unk ☐ Yes □ Unk □ No □ Unk Fever □ No **Sweating** ☐ Yes Periorbital edema ☐ Yes ☐ No □ Unk Nausea ☐ Yes ☐ No □ Unk Photophobia ☐ Yes ☐ No □ Unk Diarrhea ☐ Yes □ No ☐ Unk ☐ Yes □ No □ Unk Other: Myalgia **Laboratory Testing:** Laboratory Results Date Eosinophilia Count /mm3: Muscle biopsy ☐ Positive ■ Negative ■ Not done ☐ Positive □ Negative ☐ Equivocal ☐ Not done Serology ☐ Equivocal ☐ Positive Serology ■ Negative ☐ Not done Other ☐ Positive □ Negative □ Equivocal ☐ Not done Outcome: ☐ Recovered ☐ Died, date □ Unknown Section 3. Food product Data Suspected food: Type Pork (specify): ☐ Type non Pork (specify): ☐ Unknown ☐ Store bought pork ☐ Bear meat ☐ Pork from farm-raised pig ☐ Hamburger (Ground meat) ☐ Wild boar ☐ Horse meat ☐ Other: ☐ Other: ■ Not specified ■ Not specified Date of consumption: □ No Left over: ☐ Yes ☐ Unknown Storage method: Where meat ☐ Supermarket/grocery store ☐ Butcher shop ☐ Hunted /trapped ☐ Restaurant ☐ Direct from farm ☐ Unknown obtained: ☐ Other (specify): Preparation after ☐ No further processing ☐ Ground cow meat □ Marinated ☐ Smoked ☐ Dried Jerky ☐ Unknown purchase: ☐ Other (specify): Method of cooking: ☐ Uncooked ☐ Fried □ BBQ ☐ Other (specify): ☐ Unknown

Food Laboratory Testing:

Tested food item	Date	Laboratory	Result
			Larvae in food: □Yes □No □Unk. □Not done
			Larvae in food: □Yes □No □Unk. □Not done

Investigator:

Date:

Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health - Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Botulism surveillance report: The case

LEB-A051-|__|_|_|-|__| Patient ID Patient ID LEB-A051-Patient initial Gender □Female □Male Date of birth mm-|dd-| Age yearsmonths Address: Mohafazat Address: Caza Address: Locality Tel Occupation 2 Risk Exposure Has the patient been involved in any \square Yes □No □Unsp activities that might expose wounds to If yes, specify: soil e.g. gardening, carpentry, etc? Has the patient traveled away from home $\square No$ □Unsp or overseas in the last month? □Yes If yes, specify: Place From To 3 Care Provider Hospital name Clinician name Clinician Order No. Clinician Tel Preliminary History Onset date of symptoms Date first seen by doctor Was patient hospitalized? \square Yes □No □Unsp If yes, date hospitalized Has the patient been admitted to intensive care? □Yes \square No \square Unsp If yes, date admitted

Botulism. Agent: toxins produced by Clostridium botulinum. Reservoir: spores of C. Botulinum are ubiquitous. Transmission: food borne (consumption of food in which toxin has been formed); wound (contamination of wounds); ingestion of spores. Incubation: 12-36 hours (2 hours-8 days). Communicability: no person – to –person transmission.

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MOPH circular no.153 (15/10/2007)

Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health - Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Botulism surveillance report: The case LEB-A051-|__|_|_|-|__| Has the patient been placed on a ventilator? \square No \square Unsp \square Yes If yes, date intubated Was the patient on any of the following medications in the month prior to onset? □Yes Phenothiazine □No \square Unsp \square Yes □No □Unsp Aminoglycoside □Unsp Anticholinergic \square Yes \square No 5 Clinical History Briefly describe history and general symptom progression 6 Specific Symptom History Abdominal pain \square Yes □No □Unsp Nausea \square Yes \square No □Unsp Vomiting \square Yes \square No □Unsp Diarrhoea \square Yes \square No □Unsp Constipation \square Yes \square No □Unsp Blurred vision □Unsp \square Yes \square No Diplopia \square Yes \square No □Unsp Dizziness \square Yes \square Unsp \square No Slurred speech \square Yes \square No □Unsp Thick tongue \square Yes \square No \square Unsp Unsp Change in sound of voice □Yes \square No Hoarseness \square Yes \square No □Unsp Dry month $\square No$ □Unsp \square Yes Difficulty swallowing \square Yes \square No □Unsp Shortness of breath \Box Yes □No □Unsp Subjective weakness \square Yes □Unsp \square No

Botulism. Agent: toxins produced by Clostridium botulinum. Reservoir: spores of C. Botulinum are ubiquitous. Transmission: food borne (consumption of food in which toxin has been formed); wound (contamination of wounds); ingestion of spores. Incubation: 12-36 hours (2 hours-8 days). Communicability: no person – to –person transmission.

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 \square Yes

 $\square No$

Fatigue

□Unsp

Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health - Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Botulism surveillance report: The case LEB-A051-|__|_|_|-|__| Paraesthesia \square Yes \square No □Unsp If yes, describe paraesthesia Does the patient have a wound, boil or abscesses, no matter how trivial? \square Yes \square No □Unsp If yes, describe site and nature # Site Nature 7 Vital Signs on Admission Temperature $|^{\circ}C$ Blood pressure mmHg Heart rate |/mn Respiratory rate /mn 8 Physical Examination Findings □No □Yes □Unsp Altered mental state □Bilateral □Unsp Extraocular palsy \square Yes \square No **Ptosis** \square Yes □Bilateral □No □Unsp Pupils Dilated □Bilateral □Unsp \square Yes \square No Pupils constricted \square Yes □Bilateral \square No □Unsp Pupils fixed \square Yes □Bilateral \square No □Unsp □Bilateral □Unsp Pupils reactive \square Yes □No Facial paralysis \square Yes □Bilateral \square No □Unsp Palatal weakness □Bilateral □Unsp \square Yes □No Impaired gag reflex \square Yes □Bilateral \square No □Unsp Sensory deficit(s) \square Yes □Bilateral \square No □Unsp If yes, describe deficit 9 Deep Tendon Reflexes Abnormal deep tendon reflexes □Brisk □Normal □Reduced □Absent □Unsp **Biceps** □Brisk □Normal Reduced □Absent □Unsp Reduced Triceps □Brisk □Normal □Absent □Unsp Brachial □Brisk □Normal \square Reduced □Absent \square Unsp Patellar □Brisk □Normal □ Reduced □Absent □Unsp

Botulism. Agent: toxins produced by Clostridium botulinum. Reservoir: spores of C. Botulinum are ubiquitous. Transmission: food borne (consumption of food in which toxin has been formed); wound (contamination of wounds); ingestion of spores. Incubation: 12-36 hours (2 hours-8 days). Communicability: no person – to –person transmission.

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□Brisk

□Normal

Ankle

□Reduced

□Absent

 \square Unsp

Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Botulism surveillance report: The case LEB-A051-|_|_|_|-|_-|

10	Weakness and Paralysis				
	Upper extremities	□Yes		□No	
	If yes: Distal weakness/paralysis	□Yes	□Bilateral	□No	□Unsp
	Proximal weakness/paralysis	□Yes	□Bilateral	□No	□Unsp
	Trommar Wealmess, pararysis				
	Lower extremities	□Yes		□No	
	If yes: Distal weakness/paralysis	□Yes	□Bilateral	□No	□Unsp
	Proximal weakness/paralysis	□Yes	□Bilateral	□No	□Unsp
	If yes to any of the above,	□Yes	□Bilateral	□No	
	Ascending (beginning in the lower extremities, moving to		□Bilaterai		□Unsp
	upper extremities and then cranial nerves) Descending	□Yes	□Bilateral	□No	Unsp
	(beginning with the cranial nerves, moving to				⊔∪пѕр
	upper then lower extremities)				
11	Laboratory Results				
11	Luodi dioi y Acsuus				
a)	Was a lumbar puncture done?	\square Yes	\Box No		\Box Unsp
	If yes, Date		- _ -		- _
	RBC				
	WBC				
	Protein				
	Glucose				
b)	Was a tensilon test (Edrophonium chloride) done?	□Yes	□No		□Unsp
	If yes, Date	-	-		
	Results				
c)	Was electromyography (EMG) done?	□Yes	□No		□Unsp
ς,	If yes, Date	r	-	-	-
	Muscle group	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	
	\mathcal{E}^{-1}				
	Nerve conduction results				
	Was rapid repetitive stimulation conducted?				
	If yes, Hertz	□Yes	□No	□Yes	□No
	Results				

Botulism. Agent: toxins produced by Clostridium botulinum. Reservoir: spores of C. Botulinum are ubiquitous. Transmission: food borne (consumption of food in which toxin has been formed); wound (contamination of wounds); ingestion of spores. Incubation: 12-36 hours (2 hours-8 days). Communicability: no person – to –person transmission.

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الجمهورية اللبنانية - وزارة الصحة العامة - مصلحة الطب الوقائي

نموذج تفتيش حول سلامة الغذاء

							معومات عامه:
			:ఆ	م المالك	اس		اسم المؤسسة:
🗆 مصنع حلويات	🗆 مخبز		ن	رماركن	ى □ سوبر	□ مطعم □ سنال	نوع المؤسسة:
🗆 غيره حدد:	🗆 مسلخ			غ	🗆 ملحو	🗆 مصنع البان واجبان	
قم الهاتف:	را				•••••		المعنوان:
م الترخيص:	رق				المحافظة:		القضاء:
				الوقت:			التاريخ:
الهاتف:ا	رقم					حي:	اسم المفتش الصد
⊐ غیره حدد:	ļ	شكوى			🗆 تسمم غذائي	🗆 تفتيش روتيني	نوع الزيارة:
						ير الطعام:	أولاً- أماكن تحض
							1. <u>الأرض:</u>
ملاحظات		K	جزئياً	نعم		نقاط التفتيش	
					زلاق	لة سهلة التنظيف ومانعة للإن	مغطاة بمواد عاز
						و، خالية من التشققات	ذات أسطح ملساء
						ياه الصرف	مجهز بمصفاة لمب
						<u>نف:</u>	2. الجدران والأسف
) فاتح	ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ	مغطاة بمواد عاز
						،، خالية من التشققات	ذات أسطح ملساء
						ستعارة نظيفة وبحالة جيدة	أسقف أو أسقف م
						<u>نی:</u>	3. المعدات والاوان
					نظيف	طح ملساء ، نظيفة / سهلة الت	مصنوعة من أسم
						أواني غير قابلة للصدأ ولان	
					ں ستیل	أواني مصنوعة من الستانلس	
					طعمة	ع مختلفة بحسب اختلاف الأ	وجود ألواح تقطي
					تسهيل عملية	ة بين المعدات لمنع التلوث و	وجود مسافة كافي التنظيف

الجمهورية اللبنانية - وزارة الصحة العامة - مصلحة الطب الوقائي

الأبواب والنوافذ:

نظيفة وبحالة جيدة		
مقفلة دائما او مجهزة بشباك فعالمة لمكافحة الحشرات		
5. <u>التهوئة:</u>		
جميع الأقسام خالية من الروائح والبخار		
المراوح، أجهزة التهوئة وشفط الهواء نظيفة وفعالة		
 الإضاءة: 		
توفر الإضاءة الطبيعية أو الاصطناعية بشكل وافٍ		
7. غرفة طعام الموظفين:		

ثانياً <u>الموظفون و مجهزو الطعام:</u>

وجود غرفة طعام للموظفين نظيفة وبحالة جيدة

وجود: مغسلة، ماء ساخن، صابون ومحارم لتجفيف اليدين

النظافة الشخصية:

ملاحظات	ß	جزئياً	نعم	نقاط التفتيش
				ملابس العمل مناسبة ونظيفة
				الأظافر قصيرة واليدان نظيفتان
				احترام الحظر المفروض على الموظفين (المجوهرات وطلاء الإظافر)
				الشعر مغطى كليا
				غسل اليدين بطريقة صحيحة وعند الحاجة
				استعمال القفازات وتبديلها عند الحاجة

2. المراقبة الطبية:

		توفر معاينة طبية سريرية نصف سنوية للعاملين
		وجود شهادات صحية صالحة التاريخ
		تغطية تامة مقاومة للماء لأي جرح أو خدش لدى العاملين

الجمهورية اللبنانية - وزارة الصحة العامة - مصلحة الطب الوقائي

التدريب والمعلومات:

		تنفيذ دورات تدريبية بشكل دائم من قبل أشخاص متخصصين حول العادات الصحية الجيدة للعاملين بالأغذية وحول سلامة الغذاء
		وجود توثيق للتدريبات

ثالثاً- استلام وتحضير الطعام

1. استلام وتخزين المواد الأولية، المنتجات شبه المصنعة والمنتجات النهائية

ملاحظات	K	جزئياً	نعم	نقاط التفتيش
				استلام المنتجات في مكان نظيف ومنفصل عن اماكن تحضير
				الطعام
				المنتجات الواردة تخضع لمراقبة عند استلامها والمواد
				الغذائية صالحة للاستهلاك البشري ويتم معاينة وتسجيل حرارة
				الطعام المبرد والمثلج والمعلومات الضرورية
				هناك ما يكفي من أماكن التخزين المحلي
				التخزين في أماكن مرتفعة عن الأرض
				مراقبة وتسجيل حرارة المخزن (حرارة اقل من 25°C)
				المواد المخزنة معبأة ومعنونة بشكل سليم في المخازن؛ وجود
				تاريخ التصنيع وتاريخ الانتهاء على جميع المنتجات
				دوران المخزون بشكل مناسب وعدم وجود مواد غذائية منتهية
				(Adequate stock rotation, First In First
				Out)
				تخزين المواد الغذائية بشكل منفصل (حسب النوع)
				تحديد مكان مخصص ومعنون للمنتجات المتلفة والمنتهية
				الصلاحية

مرافق التجميد والتبريد:

ملاحظات	ß	جزئياً	نعم	نقاط التفتيش
				المرافق نظيفة وبحالة جيدة
				جميع البرادات والثلاجات (الفريزر) مزودة بأجهزة قياس للحرارة تعمل بصورة صحيحة
				نتم مراقبة وتسجيل حرارة البرادات والثلاجات يوميا (يجب ان تكون حرارة البراد اقل من $^{\circ}$ 0 والثلاجة اقل من $^{\circ}$ 80-)
				الأطعمة مخزنة على رفوف معدنية مقاومة للصدأ
				الأطعمة النيئة منفصلة عن الأطعمة المطبوخة والجاهزة للنقديم (تخزين الطعام المطبوخ والجاهز للتقديم على الرفوف العليا، والطعام النيء والبيض على الرفوف السفلى)
				تغطية الأطعمة بشكل مناسب

اله قائر	الطب	، مصلحة	العامة -	الصحة	313	ة - ق	الليناند	لجمهورية	١١
5-7	-					.,, ,	* -	- J. J. T	• •

		استخدام صناديق بلاستيكية لتخزين الخضار والفاكهة
		المواد المخزنة معنونة بشكل سليم في البرادات والثلاجات؛ وجود تاريخ الصنع وتاريخ الانتهاء على جميع المنتاجات
		عدم وجود مواد غذائية منتهية الصلاحية

3. الوقاية من التلوث ما بين المواد المختلفة:

		سير العمل بطريقة منظمة تمنع التلوث بين الاقسام (عدم وجود تقاطع بين اقسام تحضير الطعام النيء واقسام تحضير الطعام المطبوخ/الجاهز للتقديم)
		تنظيف وتطهير المعدات والأدوات المستعملة في المواد الأولية قبل إعادة استخدامها في المنتجات النهائية (المعدة أو المطبوخة)
		عدم إعادة تقديم بقايا الطعام
		غسل وتطهير الخضار والفاكهة قبل الاستعمال

رابعاً- التنظيف والتطهير:

ملاحظات	X	جزئياً	نعم	نقاط التفتيش
				وجود بروتوكول وآلية معروضة بوضوح (عبر ملصق مثلاً) يتعلق بالتنظيف والتطهير، وهل يتم اتباع البروتوكول
				وجود معدات تنظيف خاصة بكل منطقة
				مواد التنظيف الكيميائية معنونة بشكل صحيح ومخزنة بعيدا عن الماكن الطعام

خامساً - أماكن المرافق الصحية وغرف تبديل الملابس:

1. دورات المياه وغرف تبديل الملابس:

ملاحظات	ß	جزئياً	نعم	نقاط التفتيش
				وجود مراحيض نظيفة مجهزة بمضخة للماء صالحة
				للاستعمال (سيفون)
				وجود مراحيض بعيدة نسبياً عن أماكن تحضير الطعام
				وجود إشعار في حمام الموظفين حول إلزامية غسل اليدين بعد استعمال المرحاض وطريقة غسل اليدين الصحيحة
				وجود تهوئة مناسبة في المراحيض (نافذة، شفاط، مروحة)
				و جود مستو عبات نفايات تفتح بالقدم ومغطاة
				وجود إنارة كافية في المراحيض
				وجود غرف نظيفة مخصصة لتبديل الملابس

المغاسل

الجمهورية اللبنانية - وزارة الصحة العامة - مصلحة الطب الوقائي

			وجود مغاسل في دورات المياه مجهزة بالمياه الجارية،
			الصابون السائل، محارم ورقية لتجفيف الأيدي، ومستوعبات للنفايات تفتح بالقدم ومغطاة
			لتفايات تعلج بالقدم ومعطاه وجود حنفيات مغاسل تفتح بالمرفق (الكوع) او بالقدم، أو
			وجود تحقیت معسن تعلع باشرین (اندوع) او باهدم، او مجهزة بـ sensor
			مرد . المعاسل بالمحارم الورقية في حال وجود مسكات المعاسل بالمحارم الورقية في حال وجود مسكات
			للحنفيات
			عدم وجود مجففات الأيدي القاذفة للهواء
l	I	ı	,

3. أجهزة غسل الأطعمة

		وجود إمدادات كافية من مياه الشرب موصولة بمكان غسل الأطعمة منفصلة عن المغاسل
		أجهزة غسل الأطعمة نظيفة وفي حالة جيدة

سادساً- المرافق الصحية الأساسية:

إمدادات مياه الشرب:

ملاحظات	¥	جزئياً	نعم	نقاط التفتيش
				إمدادات المياه متصلة بشبكة مياه الشرب
				وجود خزان للمياه محكم الإغلاق يمكن إفراغه وتنظيفه دوريأ
				وجود بئر (ارتوازي، تجميع مياه الأمطار)
				وجود مياه آبار مخصصة فقط للصيانة او للسقي
				تعبئة مياه من مصدر نقال (صهاريج)
				وجود فلاتر
				صيانة دورية موثقة للفلاتر في حال وجودها

2. التخلص من المياه المبتذلة:

		متصلة بشبكة الصرف الصحي المحلية (البلديات)
		وجود نظام مستقل للتخلص من مياه المجاري
		وجود حفرة صحية
		قرب الحفرة الصحية من البئر في حال وجودهما

الجمهورية اللبنانية - وزارة الصحة العامة - مصلحة الطب الوقائي

3. التخلص من النفايات الصلبة:

		استخدام مستو عبات نفايات نظيفة، مجهزة بأكياس بلاستيكية لا ترشح، تفتح بالقدم ومغطاة
		وجود مكان معزول لتخزين النفايات، ذي تهوئة مناسبة (نافذة، شفاط، مروحة) ويتم تنظيفه باستمرار

4. مكافحة النواقل / الحشرات (Vector /Pest Control):

		وجود شهادات تؤكد رش مبيدات للحشرات والقوارض كل 3 -
		6 أشهر على الاقل
		عمليات مكافحة النواقل / الحشرات منفذة من قبل شركة خاصة
		مرخصة، تحت إشراف المؤسسة الغذائية أو غيرها
		عدم وجود حشرات او اشارات تدل على وجودها في اماكن
		تحضير وتخزين الطعام
		استعمال أجهزة التقاط الحشرات الطائرة في الاماكن المناسبة
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

امضاء المفتش الصحي:

Notes

Notes

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Hemorrhagic fever

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 66 (23rd Jan 2015)

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Step 2: Collect data	
Step 3: Communicate alert	
Step 4: Confirm the case	
a) Virus with human-to-human transmission	
b) Virus with vector-borne transmission	
c) Other agents	
Step 5: Confirm the outbreak	
Step 6: Search for additional cases	
Step 7: Describe cases	
Step 8: Conduct contact tracing	
a) Contact identification b) Contact identification	
c) Contact identification: Transportation use	
d) Contact identification: Health facilities	
e) Contact identification: Social events	
f) Contact assessment	
g) Follow up	
Step 9: Conduct vector investigation	
a) Entomological investigation	
b) Animal investigation	
Step 10: Investigate source of infection	
a) Time	
b) Person	
c) Place: Health facilities	
d) Place: Travel and transportation use	
e) Place: Social events	
f) Vector and animal interface	
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Annex 1: Hemorrhagic fever reporting form / Laboratory request form Annex 2: Hemorrhagic fever investigation form	
Annex 3: Ebola line listing for contacts identification	
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Annex 5: Ebola line listing for contacts follow up	

I. Purpose
This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is intended to assist the Epidemiological Surveillance program in verifying and investigation any alert or outbreak of hemorrhagic fever.

II. Generalities

Hemorrhagic fever			
Agents	Several agents: 1) Bacteria: Mainly Neisseria meningitidis		
	 2) Virus: Dengue virus: genus Flavivirus, family Flaviviridae. It includes 4 serotypes 1-4. Yellow fever virus: genus Flavivirus, family Flaviviridae Chikungunya: genus Alphavirus, family Togaviridae Rift Valley fever virus: genus Phlebovirus, family Bunyaviridae Lassa virus: Arenavirus Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus: genus Nairovirus, family Bunyaviridae Ebola Disease virus: genus Ebolavirus, family Filoviridae. It includes several subtypes. Marburg virus: genus Marburgvirus, family Filoviridae The following tables will focus on viral hemorrhagic fevers. 		
Incubation period	The incubation period varies with the agent.		
	Agent Incubation period		
	Virus		
	Dengue	3-14 days (4-7 days)	
	Yellow fever	3-6 days	
	Chikungunya	3-11 days	
	Rift Valley fever	2-6 days	
	Lassa	6-21 days	
	Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever	5-6 days	
	Ebola	2-21 days	
	Marburg	2-21 days	
Period of communicability	The period of communicability varies with the agent. Only the viral agents are mentioned in the table below. The other agents are mentioned in other sections.		

	Agent	eriod of communicability	
	Virus	,	
	Dengue	No person-to-person transmission. Patients are infective for mosquitoes from shortly before fever to the end (3-5 days).	
	Yellow fever	No person-to-person transmission. Human can infect mosquitoes shortly after onset and for 3-5 days.	
	Chikungunya	No person-to-person transmission	
	Rift Valley fever	No person-to-person transmission. Viremia occurs during early clinical illness.	
	Lassa	During the acute phase, person-to-person ma occur, since the virus is present in the throat. Virus is excreted in urines up to 3-9 weeks from onset.	
	Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever	Highly infectious, in particular in hospital setting	
	Ebola	Patient is infective from clinical onset to 60-9 days.	
	Marburg	Patient is infective from clinical onset to 60 days.	
Reservoir	The reservoir varies with the agent. Only the viral agents are mentioned in the table below.		
	Agent	Reservoir	
	Virus		
	Dengue	- Humans, mosquitoes (Aedes aegypti) - Monkeys, mosquitoes in South-East Asia and Western Africa	
	Yellow fever	Humans, mosquitoes (Aedes)	
	Chikungunya	Mosquitoes	
	Rift Valley fever	Animals, mosquitoes	
	Lassa	Wild rodents	
	Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever	Wild and domestic animals	
	Ebola	Gorillas, chimpanzees, monkeys, forest duikers, porcupines	
	Marburg	Gorillas, chimpanzees, monkeys, forest duikers, porcupines	
		,	

Modes of transmission	The modes of transmission vary with the agent.		
	Agent	Modes of transmission	
	Virus		
	Dengue	Bite of infected Aedes mosquitoes	
	Yellow fever	Bite of infected Aedes mosquitoes	
	Chikungunya	Bite of infected Aedes mosquitoes (A. aegypti, Aedes albopictus)	
	Rift Valley fever	- Bite of infected mosquitoes: Aedes or Culex - Direct/indirect contact with infected animal blood or organs: skin inoculation or aerosols	
	Lassa	 - Aerosol or direct contact with excreta of infected rodents deposited on surfaces - Laboratory acquired infections - Person-to-person: contact with pharyngeal secretions, urine, or sexual contact 	
	Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever	 Bite or crushing infected adult tick (Hyalomma genus) Nosocomial infection following exposure to blood or secretions Butchering infected animals 	
	Ebola	Person-to-person: direct contact with infected blood, secretions, organs or semen	
	Marburg	Person-to-person: direct contact with infected blood, secretions, organs or semen	

Clinical presentation	The clinical presentation varies with the agent.		
	Agent	Clinical presentation	
	Virus		
	Dengue	 - Dengue: acute febrile illness, with or without rash, and minor bleeding - Dengue hemorrhagic fever/dengue shock syndrome: increased vascular permeability with hypovolaemia and abnormal blood clotting mechanisms. - Case fatality rate is 40-50% if not treated, and 1-2% if well treated. 	
	Yellow fever	 Usually febrile jaundice Some cases, after brief remission, may evolve to intoxication with hemorrhagic fever with liver and renal failure. The case fatality may be 5-40%. 	
	Chikungunya	 Self-limiting febrile illness with fever, arthralgia/arthritis, cervical lymphoadenopathy Maculopapular rash may appear later. Rarely minor hemorrhage. 	
	Rift Valley fever	 Usually mild illness as dengue-like Conjunctivitis is common. Complications: retinitis, hemorrhage, encephalitis, hepatitis, lower limbs weakness 	

	Lassa	 - Acute mild or asymptomatic viral illness in 80% of the cases - Inflammation and exudation of the pharynx and conjunctiva - Complications: multisystem disease, abortion, pleural effusion hemorrhage, encephalopathy,seizures, hypotension or shock,oedema of the face and neck, deafness - The case fatality rate is 1-15%.
	Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever	- Sudden febrile illness - Flush on face and chest with conjunctival injection - Hemorrhagic fever with liver damage. The case fatality is 2-50%.
	Ebola and Marburg	 Sudden onset of fever, followed by pharyngitis, vomiting, diarrhea and maculopapular rash Complications: hepatic and renal dysfunction, CNS involvement, shock and multi-organ dysfunction, severe thrombocytopenia. The case fatality is 50-90% for Ebola and 5-80% for Marburg.
Worldwide The agents of viral hemorrhagic fever have various geogra		morrhagic fever have various geographical
	distributions. Agent Profile	
	Virus	
	Dengue	Endemic in the tropics
	11	
	Yellow fever	 Sylvatic (jungle) cycle: accidental human infection in tropical regions (Africa and latin America), with Aedes and Haemagogus mosquitoes Urban cycle, with Aedes Aegypti: in endemic countries of tropical Africa and Central/South America
	Yellow fever Chikungunya	human infection in tropical regions (Africa and latin America), with Aedes and Haemagogus mosquitoes - Urban cycle, with Aedes Aegypti: in endemic countries of tropical Africa and
		human infection in tropical regions (Africa and latin America), with Aedes and Haemagogus mosquitoes - Urban cycle, with Aedes Aegypti: in endemic countries of tropical Africa and Central/South America
	Chikungunya	human infection in tropical regions (Africa and latin America), with Aedes and Haemagogus mosquitoes - Urban cycle, with Aedes Aegypti: in endemic countries of tropical Africa and Central/South America Africa, South-East Asia, Philippines
	Chikungunya Rift Valley fever	human infection in tropical regions (Africa and latin America), with Aedes and Haemagogus mosquitoes - Urban cycle, with Aedes Aegypti: in endemic countries of tropical Africa and Central/South America Africa, South-East Asia, Philippines Africa, Arabia
	Chikungunya Rift Valley fever Lassa Crimean-Congo	human infection in tropical regions (Africa and latin America), with Aedes and Haemagogus mosquitoes - Urban cycle, with Aedes Aegypti: in endemic countries of tropical Africa and Central/South America Africa, South-East Asia, Philippines Africa, Arabia Endemic in Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone
Lebanon	Chikungunya Rift Valley fever Lassa Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever Ebola/Marburg	human infection in tropical regions (Africa and latin America), with Aedes and Haemagogus mosquitoes - Urban cycle, with Aedes Aegypti: in endemic countries of tropical Africa and Central/South America Africa, South-East Asia, Philippines Africa, Arabia Endemic in Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone Africa, Central Asia, Europe, Middle East Africa ers are rare in Lebanon, and usually, they are
Lebanon Control objective	Chikungunya Rift Valley fever Lassa Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever Ebola/Marburg Viral hemorrhagic fever	human infection in tropical regions (Africa and latin America), with Aedes and Haemagogus mosquitoes - Urban cycle, with Aedes Aegypti: in endemic countries of tropical Africa and Central/South America Africa, South-East Asia, Philippines Africa, Arabia Endemic in Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone Africa, Central Asia, Europe, Middle East Africa ers are rare in Lebanon, and usually, they are
	Chikungunya Rift Valley fever Lassa Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever Ebola/Marburg Viral hemorrhagic fever imported cases (Ex: d	human infection in tropical regions (Africa and latin America), with Aedes and Haemagogus mosquitoes - Urban cycle, with Aedes Aegypti: in endemic countries of tropical Africa and Central/South America Africa, South-East Asia, Philippines Africa, Arabia Endemic in Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone Africa, Central Asia, Europe, Middle East Africa ers are rare in Lebanon, and usually, they are
Control objective	Chikungunya Rift Valley fever Lassa Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever Ebola/Marburg Viral hemorrhagic fever imported cases (Ex: d	human infection in tropical regions (Africa and latin America), with Aedes and Haemagogus mosquitoes - Urban cycle, with Aedes Aegypti: in endemic countries of tropical Africa and Central/South America Africa, South-East Asia, Philippines Africa, Arabia Endemic in Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone Africa, Central Asia, Europe, Middle East Africa ers are rare in Lebanon, and usually, they are


Investigation: specimen from case	Blood	
Investigation: data about contacts	Identification, follow up	
Investigation: specimen from contacts	If symtpoms	
Test	Viral agents: serological test, PCR, culture	
Laboratories	For viral agents: reference laboratories in Lebanon or abroad	
Outbreak level	At least one confirmed case of viral hemorrhagic fever	
Notification to WHO	Yes	
Case definitions		
Hemorrhagic fever (MO	PH circular no. 49 dated on the 10 th April 2007)	
Clinical presentation	Case presenting: - Acute onset of fever of less than 3 weeks duration in a severely ill patient - And any 2 of the following: haemorrhagic or purpuric rash, epistaxis, haemoptysis, blood in stools, other haemorrhagic symptom - And no known predisposing host factors for haemorrhagic manifestations.	
Confirmed case	Case presenting an haemorrhagic fever with laboratory confirmation for one of the following agents: Neisseria meningitidis infection, dengue, Ebola-Marbrug viral diseases, Lassa fever, Yellow fever, Rift valley fever virus, hantavirus virus infections, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, and other viral, bacterial ou rickettsial diseases	
Ebola (MOPH circular no	o. 70 dated on the 11 th August 2014)	
Confirmed case: Ebola	Any suspected or probable case with laboratory confirmation: - Positive antigen or IgM detection (ELISA) - Or positive PCR with sequence confirmation - Or positive virus isolation (only in laboratory of biosafety 4).	
Probable case: Ebola	Any suspected person or suspected death who has an epidemiological link with a confirmed or probable case	
Suspected case: Ebola	Case presenting: - Acute onset of fever with any one of the following: haemorrhagic or purpuric rash, epistaxis, haemoptysis, blood in stools, other haemorrhagic symptom; and no known predisposing host factors for haemorrhagic manifestations - Acute onset of fever with any 3 of the following: headache, myalgia/arthralgia, abdominal pain, anorexia, hiccup, vomiting, diarrhea, dyspnea and dysphagia, and coming from a country who reported confirmed cases among humans and/or animals (arrival in the 2 days before onset) - Acute onset of fever with any 3 of the following: headache, myalgia/arthralgia, abdominal pain, anorexia, hiccup, vomiting, diarrhea, dyspnea and dysphagia; and having a contact with animals coming from a country who reported cases among humans and/or animals (contact in the 1 days before onset). The list countries with confirmed cases is available on the WHO	
	website: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en	

Contact	A person with no symptoms who had in the previous 21 days, contact with confirmed or probable case. The contact with confirmed or probable case is defined by at least one of the following: - Having slept/stayed in the same household - Has had direct physical contact with the case (alive or dead) during the illness - Has had direct physical contact with the deceased at the funeral - Has touched his/her blood or body fluids during the illness
	- Has touched his/her clothes and/or linens - Has been breastfed by the patient (for baby) - Has touched his/her clinical specimens.
Marburg (MOPH circular	no. 50 dated on the 10 th April 2007)
Confirmed case: Marburg	Any suspected (haemorrhagic fever) or probable case that is laboratory-confirmed: - Positive ELISA antigen detection or IgM capture - Or positive virus isolation (only in laboratory of biosafety level 4) - Or positive skin biopsy (immunohistochemistry) - Or positive PCR with sequence confirmation.
Probable case: Marburg	In epidemic situation: - Any person having had contact with a clinical case and presenting with acute fever - Or any person presenting with acute fever and 3 of the following: headache, vomiting/nausea, loss of appetite, diarrhea, intense fatigue, abdominal pain, general or articular pain, difficulty in swalling, difficulty in breathing, hiccoughs - Or any unexplained death.
Contact of Marburg case	In epidemic situation: - An asymptomatic person who had physical contact within the past 21 days with a confirmed or probable case or his/her body fluids (care for patient, participation in burial ceremony, handling of potentially infected laboratory specimens).
Yellow fever (MOPH circ	cular no. 132 dated on the 22 nd September 2006)
Confirmed case: Yellow fever	An acute onset of fever followed by jaundice within 2 weeks of onset of first symptoms with possible haemorrhagic manifestations and signs of renal failure with: - Laboratory confirmation (in reference laboratory): - Isolation of yellow fever virus - Or presence of yellow fever specific IgM or a 4-fold or greater rise in serum IgG levels in paired sera (acute and convalescent) - Or positive post-mortem liver histopathology - Or detection of yellow fever antigen in tissues by immunohistochemistry - Or detection of yellow fever virus genomic sequences in blood or organs by PCR - Or epidemiologically-linked to a confirmed case or outbreak.

Other agents		
Confirmed case: Lassa, CCHF, Rift Valley fever, Chikungunya	Case with at least one of the following: - Isolation of the virus from clinical or autopsy specimens - Detection of specific virus nucleic acid in a clinical or autopsy specimen - Positive serological test: demonstration of increase in IgG antibody titres in paired sera or detection of IgM antibody in clinical or autopsy specimen.	
Forms		
Reporting	- Standard reporting form - Hemorrhagic fever reporting form (MOPH circular no. 157 dated on the 16 th October 2014)	
Investigation	- Hemorrhagic fever investigation form for hemorrhagic fever (MOPH circular no. 158 dated on the 16 th October 2014) - Ebola contacts follow up (MOPH circular no.155 dated on 16 th October 2014)	

International figures

Figure 1: Countries at risk of dengue (Source: WHO, 2014)







Figure 3: Countries at risk of yellow fever in America (Source: WHO, 2013)








The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.

Data Source: Adapted from Fields virology
5th ed. Vol. 1. Philadelphia,
Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2006:1047.
Map Production: International Travel and Health (ITH)
World Health Organization

World Health Organization

Figure 5: Countries reporting Rift valley fever cases and outbreaks (Source: WHO, 2009)





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Data Source:Global Alert and Response Department World He alth Organization Map Production: Public Health Information and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) World Health Organization

World Health Organization

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III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance are to:

- Detect and confirm any case of viral hemorrhagic fever
- Investigate and identify the infectious agent
- Detect and investigate alerts and outbreaks
- Document containment.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is any suspected case of hemorrhagic fever.

An **outbreak** is defined by one of the following:

- At least one confirmed case of viral hemorrhagic fever with person-to-person transmission
- At least one confirmed case due to local transmission of viral hemorrhagic fever with vector-borne transmission.

V. Procedural steps

The steps described below are recommended for investigation of any alert or outbreak of hemorrhagic fever. The steps are summarized in figure (8).

Step 1: Verify alert

In case of suspected case, the Esumoh caza team contacts the treating physician. Is there fever? What are the hemorrhagic signs? Is there any medical condition leading to hemorrhage? Is there any travel history? Is malaria ruled out? Is Neisseria meningitidis ruled out?

The treating physician is asked to fill specific reporting form for hemorrhagic fever (Annex 1).

If verified, the Esumoh central team is informed immediately.

If there is suspicion of viral hemorrhagic fever due to human-to-human transmission, strict infection control procedures are applied.

Step 2: Collect data

The Esumoh mohafaza or central team conducts field visits where patient is. An investigation form is filled via patient, family and physician interview (Annex 2).

The investigation form includes the following information:

- Demography
- Illness: onset, clinical presentation...
- Travel history
- Exposure: occupation, travel, contact with animals...

The case is checked if meeting the case definition. Initial case classification is done.

The case is assessed for potential infectious agents based on:

- Contact with other hemorrhagic fever cases
- Travel history
- Animal contact.

Step 3: Communicate alert

Upon verification and assessment of the case, the Esumoh team informs immediately the DG and the concerned units at the MOPH, in particular the department for communicable diseases. The MOPH informs WHO if there is risk of human-to-human transmission.

Step 4: Confirm the case

Cases need to be laboratory investigated to identify the infectious agent.

a) Virus with human-to-human transmission

For virus with human-to-human transmission, blood is collected with high infection control precautions. Clinical specimens are handled as following:

- Non-deactivated: handled in biosafety cabinet III and shipped as IATA category
 A to reference laboratory
- Inactivated: handled as normal specimen and shipped as IATA category "Exempt" Some tests can be done in national reference laboratories. In case of positive test for human-to-human transmission, clinical specimens are sent to WHO reference laboratories for further confirmation.

Routine laboratory testing (CBC, electrolytes...) are conducted in specific mini-laboratory.

b) Virus with vector-borne transmission

For virus with vector-borne transmission, blood is collected with adequate infection control precautions.

Tests can be done in national reference laboratories. If not available, the specimens are sent to WHO reference laboratories.

c) Other agents

For bacterial and parasitic agents, cultures and other tests are done in the hospital laboratory.

Step 5: Confirm the outbreak

If viral hemorrhagic fever is laboratory confirmed, the Esumoh central team informs the MOPH/DG and concerned units.

Based on the clinical, epidemiological and laboratory findings, the outbreak is declared.

If outbreak is declared, the MOPH informs:

- National health professionals
- Governmental institutions as MOA (if animal-related), municipalities...
- WHO
- The public.

The MOPH informs the health professionals on case definition and importance of early notification of any suspected case.

Step 6: Search for additional cases

Additional cases are searched through various methods:

- Notification from health professionals:
- · Immediate notification from physicians and healthcare facilities
- Hospital zero-reporting
- Hospital active surveillance
- Hospital mortality surveillance
- Search in the vicinity of the case...
- Notification from the community:
 - Hotline 1214
 - Medias news
 - Community rumors ...

Memos and press releases are issued by the MOPH. Informative sessions are conducted for health professionals...

Step 7: Describe cases

Cases are described by:

- Time: day, week and month of onset
- Place: place of residence, place of work, place of school, in term of locality, caza and mohafaza. Also travel history is described.
- Person: age group, gender, nationality.
- Disease: classification, agent, outcomes...

Step 8: Conduct contact tracing

Contact tracing is conducted for viral hemorrhagic fever with human-to-human transmission. The containment relies on early detection and confirmation and on adequate contact tracing.

Information about contacts can be obtained from interviews of the patient, family members, workplace, school, or others with knowledge about the patient's recent activities and travels.

Contact tracing is done by the Esumoh teams at caza, mohafaza and central level.

a) Contact identification

Contacts are defined by the following:

- All persons who lived with the case (alive/dead) in the same households since onset of illness
- All persons who visited the patient (alive/dead) either at home or in the health facility since onset of illness
- All places and persons visited by the patient since onset of illness

- All health facilities visited by the patient since onset of illness and all health workers who attended to the patient (alive/dead) without appropriate infection prevention and control procedures
- All persons who had contact with the dead body from the time of death, through the preparation of the body and the burial ceremonies.

b) Contact identification

Since fever onset, all persons being in contact with the patient in daily life are listed. Additional information is collected on the contacts:

- Household contact (yes or no)
- Contact while having symptoms as fever (yes or no)
- Contact with body fluids (yes or no)
- Physical contact (yes or no)
- Date of exposures (first and last).

A line listing is filled.

c) Contact identification: Transportation use

Since fever onset, all common transport means used by the patient are listed.

Additional information is collected on those transports:

- Type of transportation mean (car, bus, train, plane ...)
- Date and time of travel
- Transporter name
- Itinerary (origin and destination)
- Duration of travel.

d) Contact identification: Health facilities

Since fever, all health facilities visited or consulted or admitted in are listed.

For each, the following information is collected:

- Type of health facility
- Type of visit (visitor, outpatient, inpatient...)
- Date and time
- Waiting in waiting room and duration
- Infection control measures applied for the patient.

e) Contact identification: Social events

Since fever, all social events with mass gathering attended by the patient are listed.

For each, the following information is collected:

- Type of social event (social, family, sport, meeting/conference...)
- Date and time
- Duration in social event...

f) Contact assessment

Based on the information, the contacts are assessed as high risk, close contact and casual contact.

Table 1: Contact exposure assesment			
Risk	Exposure	Follow up	
High risk	Contact with body fluids	Started immediately	
Close contact	- Physical contact with patient - Or conversation with patient	Started if the index case is probable or confirmed	
Casual contact	Being in the environment of the patient	No need for follow up	

g) Follow up

For all identified contacts, a follow up is conducted for a period equivalent to the incubation period.

Contacts are provided with the information on the disease, modes of transmission, prevention, and who to contact in case of fever (with contact details).

Two approaches for follow up are adopted:

- Phone interview with the patient or the parents
- Visit to the patient household.

For each day, the patient is asked if fever or other symptom has appeared.

If fever appears, the person is isolated and specimen is collected.

Follow up information is recorded in specific form.

Step 9: Conduct vector investigation

For the viral hemorrhagic fever with vector-borne transmission, entomological and animal investigation is conducted.

a) Entomological investigation

For virus transmitted by mosquitoes, field visits are conducted to:

- Assess the focus for mosquitoes bread
- Capture mosquitoes (adults and larva)
- Identify present mosquitoes species
- Characterize the mosquitoes
- Generate map for mosquitoes distribution
- Confirm mosquitoes infection
- Assess insecticides susceptibility.

b) Animal investigation

For virus transmitted by contact with animals (directly or indirectly), the Ministry of Agriculture is asked to:

- Assess the prevalence of the virus in animals
- Explore farming practices.

Step 10: Investigate source of infection

The investigation aims to identify potential sources of infection. Is the transmission imported or local? The source may be obvious or not.

a) Time

The source is found in the period of time equivalent to the incubation period prior to fever onset.

b) Person

For virus with human-to-human transmission, the patient is asked on previous contact with persons with hemorrhagic fever or fever with mild illness.

For each suspected person, the following information is collected:

- Name
- Contact details
- Fever
- Diagnosis (if known)
- Place and time of exposure...

c) Place: Health facilities

The patient is asked on previous contact with health facilities.

For each health facility, the following information is collected:

- Type of health facility (hospital, medical center, private clinic, laboratory ...)
- Type of visit (staff, visitor, outpatient, inpatient...)
- If staff: type of work
- Date and time
- Waiting in waiting room and duration
- Infection control practice in place

- Contact with person with fever...

d) Place: Travel and transportation use

The patient is asked on previous travel and use of common transportation means.

For each travel history, the following information is collected:

- Country of origin
- Country of destination
- Date and duration
- Visited cities
- Contact with person with fever...

For each common transport use, the following information is collected:

- Type of transportation mean (car, bus, train, plane ...)
- Date and time of travel
- Transporter name
- Itinerary (origin and destination)
- Duration of travel
- Contact with person with fever...

e) Place: Social events

The patient is asked on any participation to social event, in particular to funerals.

For each social event, the following information is collected:

- Type of social event (social, family, sport, meeting/conference...)
- Date and time
- Duration in social event
- Contact with person with fever...

f) Vector and animal interface

The patient is asked on any contact with animals.

For each type of animal contact, the following information is collected:

- Type of animal
- Type of contact (taking care...)
- Date and time
- Duration in social event
- Disease in animals...

The patient is asked on previous preventive measures against mosquito-borne diseases:

- Vaccination status
- Use of repellent
- Mosquito bites ...

Step 11: Enhance monitoring


During the outbreak, daily monitoring of cases is done by time, place, person and disease.


A regular bulletin is prepared and shared with CBRN national committee and partners.

- The bulletin includes figures related to:
 - Patients
 - Follow up of contacts.

Step 12: Write summary report

Once the outbreak is confined, the Esumoh central staff prepares a summary report describing the outbreak in term of agent time, place and person, in addition to the outcomes.





Hemorrhagic fever - Annex 1

Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF): Reporting form / Laboratory Request form

**					LB-	VH-		_ -
1) Health facili	ty							
Hospital na	ame			Contact person				
Ward/	Unit			Phone				
Treating physi	cian			Date of admission				
	ione			Date of reporting				
**								
2) Patient	ame			Phone				
Date of b				Address				
	ndor			Address				
Occupa	ality							
**								
3) Clinical pres	entation							
Date of onset:	_			Date of f	ever onset:		I_	
General:	□Fever		□Headache	□Myalgia		□Arth	ralgia	1
Digestive:	□Nausea		□Vomiting	□Abdomina	al pain	□Diar	rhea	
Respiratory:	□Cough		□Dyspnea	□Pulmonar	y lesions			
CNS:	□Meningitis		□Encephaliti	S				
Bleeding:	□Cutaneous Specify:		□Mucosal	□Internal b	leeding			
Other, specify:								
	☐ Death, dat							
Evolution:	L Death, uat	le.						
**								
** 4) Travel histor	ry in 30 days pr	ior onset						
**	ry in 30 days pr		n/to)	Cities/village	S	I	Notes	
** 4) Travel histor	ry in 30 days pr	ior onset	n/to)	Cities/village	S		Notes	
** 4) Travel histor	ry in 30 days pr	ior onset	n/to)	Cities/village	S		Notes	
4) Travel histor	ry in 30 days pr	ior onset	n/to)	Cities/village	S	I	Notes	
** 4) Travel histor Country **	ry in 30 days pr	ior onset Dates (fron	n/to)	Cities/village	S		Notes	
** 4) Travel histor Country ** 5) Exposure in	ry in 30 days pr	ior onset Dates (from						
** 4) Travel histor Country ** 5) Exposure in	ry in 30 days pri [30 days prior o	ior onset Dates (from	n/to)	Cities/village		□Deat		
** 4) Travel histor Country ** 5) Exposure in VHF cases:	ry in 30 days pri 30 days prior o □Confirmed Specify disea	ior onset Dates (from		□Suspected	1		h	
** 4) Travel histor Country ** 5) Exposure in VHF cases:	ry in 30 days pri [30 days prior o	ior onset Dates (from	□Probable □Zoo		1	□Deat	h	
** 4) Travel histor Country ** 5) Exposure in VHF cases: Animals:	ry in 30 days pri 30 days prior o □Confirmed Specify disea □Pets	ior onset Dates (from nset se:	□Probable □Zoo	□Suspected	d	□Deat	h er:	
** 4) Travel histor Country ** 5) Exposure in VHF cases: Animals: Occupation: **	30 days prior o Confirmed Specify disea Pets Specify anima	ior onset Dates (from nset se:	□Probable □Zoo urce:	□Suspected	d	□Deat	h er:	
** 4) Travel history Country ** 5) Exposure in VHF cases: Animals: Occupation: ** 6) Laboratory r	30 days prior o Confirmed Specify disea Pets Specify anima Health care	ior onset Dates (from nset se:	□Probable □Zoo urce:	□Suspected □Reserve/0	d Cave	□Deat	h er:	
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** 4) Travel history Country ** 5) Exposure in VHF cases: Animals: Occupation: ** 6) Laboratory r Malaria Blood/CSF cul ** 7) Specimen co	30 days prior o Confirmed Specify disea Pets Specify anima Health care results test ture	ior onset Dates (from nset se: als and soue worker F diagnosis	□Probable □Zoo urce: □Laboratory-re	□Suspected □Reserve/0 elated □Animal-re Platelet Othe	d Cave elated	□Deat □Othe	h er:	
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** 4) Travel history Country ** 5) Exposure in VHF cases: Animals: Occupation: ** 6) Laboratory r Malaria Blood/CSF cul ** 7) Specimen co	30 days prior o Confirmed Specify disea Pets Specify anima Health care results test ture	ior onset Dates (from nset se: als and soue worker F diagnosis	□Probable □Zoo urce: □Laboratory-re	□Suspected □Reserve/0 elated □Animal-re Platelet Othe	d Cave :lated	□Deat □Othe	h er:	

MOPH circular no.157 (16/10/2014)

9) Reporter (name, signature and date):

Hemorrhagic fever - Annex 2

LB-HF-Year	-Nb
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Hemorrhagic fever Investigation form

A. Case notification	
**	
	Date of case detection
Hoalth facility	Contact norson
Tuestine abouting	Dhana —
- CU 1: 1	
**	
B. Patient identity	
**	
Name	Date of birth
Gender	Nationality
I residence: Country	II residence: Country
Governorate	Governorate
City/village	City/villago
Contact details	Contact details
**	
C. Patient profession	
**	
<u>I occupation</u> : Country	II occupation: Country
Occupation	Occupation
Institution type	Institution type
Institution name	Institution name
Specific profile:	
Health care	
Laboratory worker	Mineworker
**	
D. Vital status	
**	
Status at reporting Alive Dead	
If death: Date of death	Country of death
Place of death	Desired standards
Burial country	Burial city/village
E. Onset of signs	
**	
Date of onset	Date of fever onset
Country of onset	First symptoms
Fever □DK □No □Yes, spe	
Headaches DK No Yes, spe	
Diarrhoea DK No Yes, spe	-
Stomach pain DK No Yes, spe	•
Vomiting □DK □No □Yes, spe	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Lethargy □DK □No □Yes, spe	•

Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program Hemorrhagic fever investigation form – page 1

					LI	B-HF-YearNb
	Anor	exia DK I	□No □Yes, spe	cifv:		
	Muscular p					
	Difficulty swallov	ving DK	□No □Yes, spe	cify:		
	Difficulty breath	ning DK I	□No □Yes, spe	cify:		
	Intense cough	ning DK I	□No □Yes, spe	cify:		
	Skin r	ash DK I	□No □Yes, spe	cify:		
	Bleeding at injec	tion DK l	□No □Yes, spe	cify:		
	Bleeding g	ums DK I	\square No \square Yes, spe	cify:		
	Conjunctival inject	tion DK l	\square No \square Yes, spe	cify:		
	Dark or bloody s	tool DK l	\square No \square Yes, spe	cify:		
	Vomiting of bl	ood DK l	\square No \square Yes, spe	cify:		
	Nose bleed (epista	ixis) DK	\square No \square Yes, spe	cify:		
Ur	usual vaginal bleed	ding DK I	\square No \square Yes, spe	cify:		
	Ot	her:				
**						
	xposure risk in the	3 weeks pre	eceding the onse	et of symptoms		
**						
<u>Cor</u>	ntact with:			Specify	name S	pecify date of contact
	Suspected HFV		☐Yes, specify:			
	Probable HFV		☐Yes, specify:			
	Confirmed HFV	□DK □No	☐Yes, specify:			
	Funerals	□DK □No	☐Yes, specify:			
	Animals pets	□DK □No	☐Yes, specify:			
	Animals in zoo	□DK □No	☐Yes, specify:			
Wil	d animals reserve		☐Yes, specify:			
	Cave/mine bats	□DK □No	☐Yes, specify:			
	ntact Health care:					
	mitted to hospital		☐Yes, specify:			
	ted hospital	□DK □No				
	ditional healer	□DK □No	☐Yes, specify:			
**						
	Medical history					
**						
	Chronic diseases					
	ectious diseases _					
Ch	ronic treatment _					
	Other					
**						
	Fravel to Lebanon					
**	D. 1. (!! 1.			-	6	6
#	Date flight	Company	From airport	To airport	Seat	Symptoms present
2						
			I .		I	İ

Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program Hemorrhagic fever investigation form – page 2

LB-HF-Year	-Nb
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I. Travel history 3 weeks before onset: outside country/city/village Country City/village Means Dates Visited places 1 2 3 4 J. Travel history after onset K. Case management to notification **IPC** # Health Physician Date Date Date Isolation Notes facility consultation admission discharge practice 2 3 4 5 L. Patient transportation Infection control Date Mean From То 1 2 3 4 M. Specimen collection Date of collection Place of collection Туре Conservation 1 2 3 4 N. Specimen shipment

Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program Hemorrhagic fever investigation form – page 3

Courrier

UN 3373

Date of packaging _____

Problems

LB-HF-Year	-Nb
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**

Ref laboratory ______ lgM ______ Date of arrival _____ Date of results ______ Other _____ **

P. Final classification _____ **

Date Classification Notes Evolution

**

Hemorrhagic fever - Annex 3

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة – برنامج الترصد الوبائي الجمهورية اللبنانية – الملحق (1)

ول تحديد المخالطين لفيروس الابيولا

											الع الع
											مستوى التعرض
											طريقة طريقة المتعرض
											اخر تاریخ تقام
											الصلة
											العنوان
التاريخ:											رقم الهاتف
											الجنسية
											الجنس
											العمل
اسم المحقق:											الاسلام
	С	С	C	C	С	С	С	С	С	С	#

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة – برنامج الترصد الوبائي الملحق (2) جدول تقييم المخالطين لمستوى التعرض التعرض العوارض عند المريض العرض العوارض عند المريض المعاملين المستوى التعرض العملين عاملين في المستوى التعرض العملين المستوى التعرض المستوى التعرض العملين المستوى التعرض المستوى التعرض العملين المستوى التعرض المستوى ا

ظهور العوارض عند المريض	
تاريخ ظهور	
الوطني	
/ رقمها	
تعريف الحالة	

											مسنوى التعرض
											عبر.
											مرضى مناز مين في المستشفى قبل التشخيص الانيو لا
											عاملين في المختبر تداو لو ا عينات المريض
											عاملين الصحيين تعرضوا لجرح خلال العناية بالمريض
											رضع من المريض
											بات او تناول طعاما في منزل المريض
											لامس و/او قام بتنظیف بطانیات المریض
法近望											لامس جسم المريض
											لامس سوائل المريض
											تاريخ آخر انقاء مع المريض
											احنك مع المريض منذ بدء العو ارض
اسم المحقق:											الاسم
MOI	C PH circula	no.155 (16/10/201	4)	С	С	С	С	С	С	#

Hemorrhagic fever - Annex 4

Hemorrhagic fever - Annex 5

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة – برنامج الترصد الوبائي الجمهورية اللبنانية – الملحق (3)

جدون منابعه المحالطين لفيروس الاليو تاريخ ظهور العوارض عند المريض |

							ملاحظات
							وتناريخ
مة هاتفية							-
، (هـ): متابع							
يارة منزلية							
تابعة (ز): ز						انتهاء المتابعة	ريس
حديد نوع الما						آخر تعرض	ريك
ضع العلامات التالية لتحديد نوع المتابعة (ز): زيارة منزلية ، (هـ): متابعة هاتفية				_	_		مستوى
ضع العلام							الاسم
							#

MOPH circular no.155 (16/10/2014)

ضع العلامات التالية لتحديد ظهور عوارض مرضية: نعم، كلا، غائب

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure:

Novel influenza

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 34 (19th Jan 2015)

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Annex 2: Influenza request form for laboratory testing

I. Purpose
The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps to be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance team in case of an alert or outbreak of novel Influenza.

II. Generalities

Novel Influenza	
Agent	Virus: novel subtypes of Influenza A virus due to antigenic shift. Types B and C do not have subtypes and cannot cause pandemics.
Incubation period	1-3 days (1-7 days)
Period of communicability	3-5 days before onset and until 7 days after onset
Reservoir	Humans, birds, mammalian (swine, horses)
Modes of transmission	 Person-to-person: Direct and/or indirect contact with droplets of infected person Airborne (in case of aerosol-generated procedures) from an infected person
	 Animal-to-person: Airborne, while slaughtering, defeathering, handling carcasses of infected poultry Consumption of raw contaminated poultry
Clinical presentation	- Upper respiratory infection - Complications: lower respiratory infection
Worldwide	Known past pandemics: - 1918-1919: A(H1N1) - 1957-1958: A(H2N2) - 1968-1969: A(H3N2) - 2009-2010: Influenza A(H1N1)/2009
	Current novel Influenza with pandemic potential: - A(H5N1) - A(H7N9)
Control objective	- Preparedeness: inter-pandemic phases - Containment: At early phase with no community transmission - Mitigation: If community transmission of new virus
Surveillance and Invest	tigation
Surveillance approach	Syndromic approach (acute respiratory infection)
Investigation: data about case	Clinical presentation, contact with cases, contact with animals and/or death animals, travel history
Investigation: specimen from case	Throat swab or nasal swab in viral transport media (VTM)
Investigation: data about contacts	Similar cases among contacts
Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts	If symptoms
Test	PCR test
Laboratories	National Influenza Center at Rafic Hariri University Hospital
Outbreak level	At least one confirmed case of novel Influenza infection
Notification to WHO	Yes based on IHR (2005)

Novel Influenza virus ir 2012)	nfection case definition (MOPH circular no. 38 dated on the 5th May
Confirmed case	Any laboratory-confirmed case of a recent human infection caused by an Infleunza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic.
	An Influenza A virus is considered to have the potential to cause a pandemic if: - The virus has demonstrated the capacity to infect a human - And if the heamagglutinin gene (or protein) is not a variant or
	mutated form of those circulating widely in the human population.
	An infection is considered recent if it has been confirmed by: - Positive results from PCR - Or virus isolation
	- Or paired acute and convalescent serologic tests.
Novel Influenza virus A the 24 th April 2007)	(H5N1) infection case definition (MOPH circular no. 66 dated on
H5N1: Confirmed case	A suspected or probable case and one of the following results conducted in a national, regional or international reference laboratory: - Isolation of an H5N1 virus - Positive H5 PCR results from tests using two different PCR targets, e.g. primers specific for Influenza A and H5 HA - A fourfold or greater rise in neutralization antibody titer for H5N1 based on testing of an acute serum specimen (collected 7 days or less after symptom onset) and a convalescent serum specimen. The convalescent neutralizing antibody titer must also be 1:80 or higher - A microneutralization antibody titer for H5N1 of 1:80 or greater in a single serum specimen collected at day 14 or later after symptom onset and a positive result using a different serological assay (for example, a horse red blood cell haemagglutination inhibition titer of 1:160 or greater or an H5-specific western blot positive result).
H5N1: Probable case	 A suspected case with one of the following criteria: Infiltrates or evidence of an acute pneumonia on chest radiograph plus evidence of respiratory failure (hypoxemia, severe tachypnea) Or positive laboratory confirmation of an Influenza A infection but insufficient laboratory evidence for H5N1 infection Or a person dying of an explained acute respiratory illness who is considered to be epidemiologically-linked by time, place, and exposure to a confirmed or probable or H5N1 case.

H5N1: Suspected case	 - A person presenting with unexplained acute lower respiratory illness with fever (>38°C) and cough, dyspnea - And one or more of the following exposures in the 7 days prior to symptom onset: • Close contact (within 1 meter) with a person (e.g. caring for, speaking with, or touching) who is a confirmed, probable or suspected, H5N1 case • Exposure (e.g. handling, slaughtering, defeathering, butchering, preparation for consumption) to poultry or wild birds or their remains or to environments contaminated by their faeces in an area where H5N1 infection in animals or humans has been confirmed or suspected in the last month • Consumption of raw or undercooked poultry products in an area where H5N1 infection in animals or humans has been confirmed or suspected in the last month • Close contact with a confirmed H5N1 infected animal other than poultry or wild birds (e.g. cat or pig) • Handling samples (animal or human) suspected of containing H5N1 virus in a laboratory or other setting.
Novel Influenza virus the 6 th June 2013)	A(H7N9) infection case definition (MOPH circular no. 60 dated on
H7N9: confirmed	A person with laboratory confirmation of a recent infection caused by the A(H7N9) virus
H7N9: probable	A person with an acute respiratory infection and a history of close contact, in the 2 weeks before illness, with a laboratory-confirmed case of A(H7N9) virus infection
H7N9: suspected	A person with a severe acute respiratory infection (requiring hospital admission) and a history of recent travel, within 2 weeks before illness onset, to a risk area [known to have A(H7N9) circulation]
Forms	
Reporting	Standard reporting form
Investigation	Novel Influenza investigation form for novel Influenza virus infection (MOPH circular no. 4 dated on the 7 th January 2015)
National figures	

National figures

No case of H5N1 neither of H7N9 was reported up to Dec 2015.

International figures


Table 1: Influenza A(H5N1) - Cumulative number of confirmed human cases, worldwide, 2003-Nov.2015 (Source: WHO)

Country	2003-	2009*	20	10	20	11	20	12	20	13	20	14	20	15	To	otal
Country	cases	deaths														
Azerbaijan	8	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	5
Bangladesh	1	0	0		2		3	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	7	1
Cambodia	9	7	1	1	8	8	3	3	26	14	9	4	0	0	56	37
Canada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0		0	0	1	1
China	38	25	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	0	5	1	52	31
Djibouti	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Egypt	90	27	29	13	39	15	11	5	4	3	37	14	136	39	346	116
Indonesia	162	134	9	7	12	10	9	9	3	3	2	2	2	2	199	167
Iraq	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2
Lao People's																
Democratic Republic	2	2	0		0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Myanmar	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Nigeria	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Pakistan	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1
Thailand	25	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	17
Turkey	12	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	4
Viet Nam	112	57	7	2	0	0	4	2	2	1	2	2	0	0	127	64
Total	468	282	48	24	62	34	32	20	39	25	52	22	143	42	844	449

Figure 1: Influenza A(H7N9) - Areas with confirmed cases from 2013W07 to 2015W47 (Source: www.ecdc.europa.eu)



Figure 2: Influenza A(H7N9) - Weekly count of confirmed cases from 2013W07 to 2015W47 (Source: www.ecdc.europa.eu)



III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance of novel influenza surveillance are:

- To detect and confirm human cases of novel influenza
- To identify close contacts and conduct needed follow up
- To detect secondary cases among contacts
- To document containment
- To contribute to the global influenza surveillance.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is defined by one of following:

- Suspected case of novel Influenza
- A cluster of severe acute respiratory infection
- A cluster of acute respiratory infection with link with animal/bird link
- A cluster of acute respiratory infection with non typable influenza A.

An **outbreak** is defined by at least 1 case of confirmed infection with novel Influenza virus.

V. Procedural steps

In case of an alert or outbreak of novel Influenza virus, the following steps are recommended. They are summarized in the figure (5).

Step 1: Verify the alert

Upon notification, the Esumoh caza team verifies with the treating physician and/or the hospital focal person: Is the physician suspecting a novel Influenza? Is the case meeting the case definition?

Also the caza team informs the Esumoh central level immediately.

Step 2: Investigate the case

The Esumoh mohafaza/central team starts to collect data related to the case. The investigation form is filled by the Esumoh. Data is collected by interviewing the patient, the parents and the treating physician. The investigation form is provided in Annex 1.

The investigation form includes the following information:

- Demography: age, gender, nationality
- Disease: onset, respiratory symptoms, chest X ray findings...
- Exposure: occupation, travel history, contact with confirmed cases, contact with animal or birds...

Step 3: Collect specimen

Any case of suspected novel influenza needs to be laboratory confirmed.

Clinical specimens are collected from the patient by the treating physician or the Esumoh team, using specific swabs. Needed specimens are nasopharyngeal and oro-pharyngeal swabs. Once collected, swabs are conserved in Viral Transport Media (VTM).

Specimens are collected within 5 days from onset and before starting antiviral treatment.

If specimens are tested within 48-72 hours, storage is at 4°C, otherwise specimens are stored at -70°C.

Table 2: Needed specimens and tests for novel Influenza virurses					
Specimen	Tests				
Oropharngeal swab	PCR, viral culture				
Nasopharyngeal swab	PCR, viral culture				
Bronchoalveolar labage	PCR				
Tracheal aspirate	PCR				
Lung biopsy	PCR				

Specimens are sent to the National Influenza Center (NIC) at Rafik Hariri University Hospital. If the result is negative or shows seasonal influenza, investigation is stopped.

If the result shows novel Influenza, or un-typable Influenza A, the investigation continues. Specimens of un-typable virus are sent to supranational reference laboratories.

Step 4: Classify the case and confirm the outbreak

Based on the clinical, epidemiological and laboratory findings, the case is classified as shown in the figures (3) and (4).

One confirmed case of novel Influenza is considered as an outbreak. And the investigation is continued.

Step 5: Inform

Upon confirmation of novel Influenza, the MOPH informs:

- The WHO
- The health professionals
- The MOA...

The WHO is informed as this represents a potential public health event of international concern. The health professionals are informed by official MOPH memos to Orders and Syndicates. Also, the Ministry of Agriculture is informed as this will trigger to enhance animal and bird surveillance and initiate investigation.

Step 6: Conduct contact tracing

Any containment of novel influenza virus relies on good practices for contacts identification and follow up.

All close contacts with the case while symptomatic are listed. Information about close contacts can be obtained from interviews of the patient, the family members, the workplace or school associates, or others with knowledge about the patient's recent activities and travels.

Then, contacts are assessed for their exposure to the case. Close contacts who have been exposed to the droplets or aerosol of the patients are monitored daily up to 7 days.

A line-listing of all contacts and co-exposed persons is maintained. The line list includes the following: identity, demographic information, date of last common exposure or date of contact with the case patient, daily temperature, date of onset of symptoms.

Step 7: Search for additional cases

Additional cases are searched via various methods:

- Enhanced passive surveillance: health professionals are asked to report any suspected case.
- Active surveillance is enlarged to include the suspected cases of novel Influenza.
- Active case-finding among the persons who may have been co-exposed to the same source as the case patient
- Active follow up of the contacts.

Step 8: Describe cases

Cases are described in terms of:

- Time: epidemic curve by day and week of onset
- Place: mapping cases by place of residence...
- Person: age group, gender, occupation
- Disease: classification, outcome
- Exposure: travel or domestic.

Step 9: Identify risk factors

a) Travel-related

Cases classified as travel-related are the ones with travel history to a country known to have novel Influenza virus, in the 7 days preceding the onset of symptoms.

b) Domestic animal and bird related

Cases classified as animal/bird-related are the ones who in the 7 days preceding the onset of symptoms had:

- No travel history to a country known to have novel Influenza virus
- And contact with animal/bird...

The field investigation team includes staff from Esumoh and the Ministry of Agriculture to assess any infection in wild or domestic birds or animals, and to assess the human-animal interface. Animal health surveillance is enhanced. Information about local housing, feeding and bird handling practices, recent poultry/bird movement (e.g. introduction of new poultry/birds into a flock) is collected.

c) Further studies


If no obvious risk factor is identified linked to travel or animal/bird, further studies (as analytic studies) are conducted to identify the sources of infection.


Step 10: Enhance monitoring


During the investigation, daily situation reports are produced and shared with relevant authorities at local, national and international levels and other stakeholders (e.g. the public and the media). The numbers of cases and followed contacts are monitored on daily basis. The report provides information on the cumulative number of cases and contacts by time, place and person. The report is shared with involved partners.

Step 11: Write summary report

At the end of the outbreak, a final report summarizing the outbreak and the investigation findings is written and shared with partners.







Novel Influenza - Annex 1

	Pag										ID Pat	 tient:	_ _	_ _
		C OF LE Public He		(Case Investigation form Novel Influenza				Investigation date:					
1. Repo	rting	g details		of report	Institu	ıtion		Telephone						
2. Patie	nt id	entity												
Name					Sex	-C1-	D	ate of B	irth		Nation	ality		
Full addr	ess				□male	female	С	Caza/Loca	ality		Teleph	one		
1 411 444											тегерп			
		l sympton		200				G 4			GI .		N	
Date of o	nset	of illness	Body temperatu	$re \ge 38^{\circ}$	_	1 yes □n	0	Sore the				iess oi □yes	breath	
			on to hospital.	Admiss	ion to hosp	ital? 🖳	yes	□no						
If yes,	Naı	ne of hospi		Date of admission	Patient isolated cohorted	or iso	ate of lation/ horted	1	itted to CU?			Date discha		
Hospital1					□yes □n	0		□ye			□yes □no			
Hospital2 Hospital3					□yes □n						□yes □no			
Hospital4					□yes □n			□ye:	-		□yes □no □yes □no			
5. Trave	el hi	story.			1 2,46 2.1						, , ,			
During	the '		or to the onset	t of symp			on tra	vel or r	eside a			Jyes	□no	
Countr	Country City Date of departure departure		of tran	Primary means of transport		Novel Novel influence influence anim		el za in als	a in with human cases		Con wi anin	ith nals/		
					□plane □bo	oat □road	rep	reported repor		tea	□yes	□no	bin □yes	as no
					□plane □bo	oat □road					□yes	□no	□yes	□no
					□plane □bo	oat □road					□yes	□no	□yes	□no
					□plane □bo	oat □road					□yes	□no	□yes	□no
6. Occu	ıpati	onal expo	sure. During t	he 7 day	s prior sym	ptoms (onset,	has the			en worl			
In animal-related occupation? (farm/plant worker, chef working with live or recently killed domestic fowls, dealer/trader of pet birds)?					□yes	□no								
	ker iı	ı laboratory	where samples a		□yes	□no			0					
As a health care worker?					□yes	□no								

MOPH circular no. 4 dated on the 7^{th} January 2015

1

Page 2/2	ID _ _
	Patient:

	Contact within 1 with any live or animal of species	species	Entered settings where animal species were confined or had been confined in the previous 6 weeks			list countries and these exposures o		
Domestic fowl (birds commonly reared for flesh, eggs, feathers, including chickens, ducks, geese, turkeys, guinea-fowls)	Lyes	□no	Dy	es	□no			
Wild birds	□yes	□no	□y	es	□no			
Swine	□yes	□no	Пу	es	□no			
Horses	□yes	□no	_y	es	□no			
8. History of exposure t been in contact (within	touching or spea		stance) w	ith:	the onse	t of sym	ptoms, has tl	ne person
	Yes/No		If yes, spe Influenza su			If yes, s	specify patient na	me
A confirmed human case of novel influenza A infection?	□yes □no							
A death from an unexplained acute respiratory illness?	□yes □no							
Any person suspected to have novel influenza A infection?	□yes □no							
Any cluster of severe acute respiratory infection?	□yes □no	□hou	s, specify se sehold ended family		□hospital □residenti □military	□ recreational camps al institution □ other, specify barracks		
9. Laboratory investigat	tion results for in		A/H5 Test ²	Labauat	T)16	Data of warelt	Culatava
# Type of specimen ¹	Date of confection	l l	1est-	Laborato	ory r	Result	Date of result	Subtypes
(1) Specimens: nasopharyngeal (2) Tests: rapid test, single serole	ogy, paired serology, I					eolar lava	ge, serum, paired	sera
10. Prophylaxis against	Yes/No		If yes, spe	cify				
6 months prior to symptoms onset: Influenza vaccine?	□yes □no	Vacc	ine name:		Country o	f administr	ration:	
7 days prior to symptoms onset: antiviral treatment	□yes □no	Drug	name:		Taken reg	ılarly:		
11. Final disposition& o	classification	Clinical	status				Classificati	on
	vered	ed, date:		□lost to foll	ow-up	□confi		ossible iscarded

7. History of exposure to animal populations. During the 7 days prior to symptoms onset, has the person:

MOPH circular no. 4 dated on the 7th January 2015

Novel Influenza - Annex 2

Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Laboratory Request Form for Influenza Virus Testing

I. Requester	Hospital name:										
	SARI focal person name:										
	Telephone: Fax number:										
	Email address:										
II. Patient Identification	Year Site #										
	Patient ID number:										
	Name:										
	Age:										
	Gender: ☐ Male ☐ Female										
	Date of symptom onset:/										
III. Antiviral treatment	□ No □ Yes, specify starting date:/, Name: Tamiflu®, Viriflu®										
IV. Specimen collection	Specimen collection date:/										
	Specimen type: ☐ Naso-pharyngeal swab										
	☐ Oral-pharyngeal swab										
	□ Nasal wash										
	☐ Tracheal aspirate										
	☐ Broncho-alveolar lavage ☐ Other, specify:										
V. Reception at NIC	Date of reception:/										
	Specimen condition: ☐ Adequate ☐ Inadequate, specify:										
VI. Results	Date of result:/										
	PCR testing:										
	Laboratory director: (name, signature, stamp)										

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure:

Invasive Coronavirus

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 59 (22nd Jan 2015)

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IV. Alert and outbreak tillesholds	179
V. Procedural steps	179
Step 1: Verify the alert Step 2: Investigate the case Step 3: Collect specimen9 Step 4: Confirm the outbreak a) Case classification b) Outbreak declaration c) Inform Step 5: Conduct contact tracing Step 6: Search for additional cases Step 7: Describe cases Step 8: Identify risk factors a) Travel related b) Animals c) Health care related d) Further studies Step 9: Enhance monitoring Step 10: Write summary report	
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Annex 1: MERS-CoV reporting form Annex 2: SARS-CoV investigation form	
Annex 3: MERS-CoV investigation form	
Annex 4: Specimen collection for MERS-CoV	

I. Purpose
The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps to be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance team in case of an alert or outbreak of Invasive Coronavirus.

II. Generalities

Invasive Coronavirus							
Agent	Coronavirus is a large family of viruses that can cause diseases ranging from common cold to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome.						
	Classical coronavirus: v animals:	riruses that can infect humans and					
		V: causing mild illness (229E, OC43,					
	- Animal coronavirus: may infect pigs, domestic and wild birds, bats, rodents, dogs, cats and cattle. They cause acute and chronic diseases in animals such as respiratory, gastro-enteric diseases, neurologic diseases and liver disease.						
	2) Novel coronavirus: - Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome – SARS-CoV who caused a large outbreak in 2002-2003						
	- Middle East Respiratory Syndrome–Novel Coronavirus MERS-CoV: first identified in 2012						
Incubation period	Short for the classical virus, and may be longer for the novel coronavirus.						
	Agent	Incubation period					
	Classical human coronavirus	2-4 days					
	SARS-CoV	3-10 days					
	MERS-CoV	2-14 days					
Period of communicability	Usually during active phase.						
-	Agent	Period of communicability					
	Classical human coronavirus	During the active disease					
	SARS-CoV	From onset to 21 days					
	MERS-CoV	During the illness period. The duration of infectivity after resolution of symptoms is unknown.					

Reservoir	The reservoir can be human or animal.					
	Agent	Reservoir				
	Classical human coronavirus	Humans				
	SARS-CoV	Animals are suspected to be reservoir. Himalayan masked palm civet (Paguma larvata), the Chinese ferret badger (Melogale moschata), the raccoon dog (Nyctereutes procyonoides), cats (domestic), ferrets (Mustela furo) were found to be infected with SARS-CoV.				
	MERS-CoV	Camels seems to act as reservoir.				
Modes of transmission	Known for some	, and not clarified for the novel ones.				
	Agent	Modes of transmission				
	Classical human coronavirus	Person-to-person: direct or indirect contact with infected droplets Airborne in confined place				
	SARS-CoV	Person-to-person via: - Respiratory secretions - Body fluids as fomites - Airborne (aerosolized sewerage, mechanical ventilation)				
	MERS-CoV	Limited person-to-person transmission: close contact, when providing unprotected care to a patient Suspected animal-to-person transmission				
Clinical presentation	Coronavirus can	cause mild to severe illness.				
	Agent	Clinical presentation				
	Classical human coronavirus	Gastroenteritis, encephalitis				
	SARS-CoV	- Acute respiratory distress - The global case fatality in 2002-2003 was 10%.				
	MERS-CoV	 - Acute lower respiratory infection with or without gastrointestinal symptoms. The illness may be severe in people with chronic medical conditions. It may evolve to respiratory failure, organ failure (as renal failure), septic shock - The global case fatality rate is estimated to be 27%. 				


Morldwido								
Worldwide	Agent	Worldwide						
	Classical human coronavirus	Worldwide. It is causing 10-15% of common cold cases. It has seasonal pattern with main occurrence in winter.						
	SARS-CoV	Global outbreak in 2002/2003 with cases reported in China, Canada, Singapore, Vietnam, and imported cases in several countries.						
	MERS-CoV	Since 2012, the virus appears to be circulating in the Arabian Peninsula. Cases reported outside the Middle East are travel-related with limited human-to-human transmission.						
Lebanon	Rarely detected.							
	Agent	In Lebanon						
	SARS-CoV	No case reported in Lebanon in 2002-2003						
	MERS-CoV	1 case detected in May 2014						
Control objective	Control							
Surveillance and Investig	gation							
Surveillance approach	Disease approach or	syndromic approach						
Investigation: data about case		, demography, travel history, occupation, contact with animals and camels or el milk						
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	Respiratory specime	ns (deep respiratory specimens)						
Investigation: data about contacts	For SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV: contact identification and follow up							
Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts	If symptoms							
Test	PCR test							
Laboratories	RHUH							
Outbreak level	At least 1 confirmed case							
Notification to WHO	Yes							

Case definitions	
SARS-CoV case definition (MOPH circular no. 35 dated on the 5th May 2012)	
SARS-CoV: Confirmed case	A person with laboratory confirmation of infection with SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) who: • Either fulfills the clinical case definition of SARS • Or has worked in a laboratory with live SARS-CoV or storing clinical specimens infected with SARS-CoV.
	SARS is laboratory confirmed by one of the following 3 methods: a) Conventional reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and real-time reverse transcriptase PCR (real-time RT-PCR) assay detecting viral RNA present in: • At least two different clinical specimens (e.g. nasopharyngeal and stool) • Or the same clinical specimen collected on two or more occasions during the course of the illness (e.g. sequential nasopharyngeal aspirates) • Or in a new extract from the original clinical sample tested positive by two different assays or repeat RT-PCR/real-time RT-PCR on each occasion of testing
	 b) Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) and immunofluorescent assay (IFA): Negative antibody test on serum collected during the active phase of illness followed by positive antibody test on convalescent phase serum, tested simultaneously Or four fold or greater rise of antibody titre against SARS-CoV between an acute serum specimen and a convalescent serum specimen (paired sera), tested simultaneously
	c)Virus culture: from any clinical specimen
SARS-CoV: Clinical definition	 A person presenting picture of lower respiratory infection with: Fever And one or more symptoms of lower respiratory tract illness (cough, difficulty breathing, shortness of breath) And radiographic evidence of lung infiltrates consistent with pneumonia or acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) or autopsy findings consistent with the pathology of pneumonia of ARDS without an identifiable cause
	And no alternative diagnosis can fully explain the illness
MERS-CoV case definition (MOPH circular no. 37 dated on the 7th May 2014)	
MERS-CoV: Confirmed case	Any person with positive laboratory confirmation of infection with novel coronavirus
MERS-CoV: Probable case	Any possible case with close contact during the last 10 days before onset of illness with a symptomatic confirmed case of novel coronavirus infection.
	Close contact is defined as: • Anyone who provided care for a MERS-CoV patient • Or anyone who stayed at the same place while a MERS-CoV patient was ill.

MERS-CoV: Suspected case	Any person with severe acute respiratory infection, with: a) Symptoms of fever (>= 38°C), cough, and evidence of pulmonary parenchymal disease (pneumonia or acute respiratory distress syndrome) based on clinical and/or radiological evidence b) And not already explained by any other infection or etiology c) And admitted to hospital d) And one of the following:
	 With history travel within 14 days before symptoms onset in a country who reported local cases Or contact history with a person with acute respiratory infection who traveled in a country who reported local cases Or healthcare worker caring for patients with severe acute respiratory infection Or the case occurs as part of a cluster. Cluster is defined as at least 2 persons with severe acute respiratory infection, with onset of symptoms within the same 2 weeks, and who are associated with a specific setting.
Forms	
Reporting	Standard reporting form, or MERS-CoV reporting form (MOPH circular no.56 dated on 3 rd June 2013)
Investigation	- Specific investigation form for SARS-CoV (MOPH circular no.46 dated on 17 th May 2003) - Specific investigation form for MERS-CoV

International figures

Figure 1: SARS-CoV - Countries who reported cases, worldwide, 2002-2003 (Source: WHO)









Figure 3: MERS-COV: Weekly confirmed cases, worldwide, Mar. 2012 - Nov. 2015 (Source: www.ecdc.europa.eu)



III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance for invasive coronavirus are:

- To detect and confirm human cases of invasive coronavirus infection
- To identify close contacts and conduct needed follow up
- To detect secondary cases among contacts
- To document containment.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is defined by one of following:

- Suspected case of invasive coronavirus
- A cluster of severe acute respiratory infection.

An **outbreak** of invasive coronavirus is defined by at least 1 case of confirmed infection with invasive coronavirus.

V. Procedural steps

In case of an alert of invasive coronavirus, the following steps are recommended. They are summarized in the figure (6).

Step 1: Verify the alert

Upon notification, the Esumoh caza team verifies with the treating physician and the hospital focal person: Is the physician suspecting SARS-CoV or MERS-CoV? Is the case meeting the case definition?

Also the caza team informs the Esumoh central level.

For MERS-CoV, the health facility reports the case using specific reporting form (Annex 1).

Step 2: Investigate the case

The Esumoh mohafaza/central team starts to collect data related to the case. The investigation form is filled by Esumoh team. Data is collected by interviewing the patient, the parents and the treating physician. The investigation form is provided in Annex 2.

The investigation form includes the following information:

- Demography: age, gender, nationality
- Disease: onset, respiratory symptoms, chest X ray results...
- Exposure: occupation, travel history, contact with confirmed cases, contact with animal (camels ...)

Step 3: Collect specimen

Any case of suspected SARS-CoV or MERS-CoV needs to be laboratory-confirmed.

Clinical specimens are collected from the patient by the treating physician or the Esumoh team, using specific swabs. Lower respiratory tract specimens are collected: deep tracheal aspirate, bronchoalveolar lavage or deep sputum. The specimens are collected in sterile tube without additive.

If lower respiratory tract specimens cannot be collected, naso-pharyngeal and oro-pharyngeal swabs are collected and conserved in Viral Transport Media (VTM).

Specimens are collected within 5 days from onset. If specimens are to be tested within 48-72 hours, storage is at 4°C, otherwise specimens are stored at -70°C.

Specimens are sent to the clinical laboratory at Rafik Hariri University Hospital.

Details on needed specimens and tests for MERS-CoV are presented in annex (4).

Step 4: Confirm the outbreak

a) Classify the case

Based on the clinical, epidemiological and laboratory findings, the case is classified as shown in the figures (2) and (3).

b) Declare the outbreak

One confirmed case of invasive coronavirus is considered as an outbreak. The investigation is continued.

c) Inform

Upon confirmation of SARS-CoV or MERS-CoV, the MOPH informs:

- The health professionals
- The WHO...

The health professionals are informed by official MOPH memos via the Orders and the Syndicates.

The WHO is informed as this represents a potential public health event of international concern.

Step 5: Conduct contact tracing

Any containment of SARS-CoV or MERS-CoV relies on good practices for infection control and good practice for contacts identification and follow-up.

All close contacts with the case while symptomatic are listed. Information about close contacts can be obtained from interviewing the patient, the family members, the workplace or school associates, or others with knowledge about the patient's recent activities and travels.

Then, contacts are assessed for their exposure to the case. Close contacts that have been exposed to the droplets or aerosol of the patient are monitored daily up to 10 days.

A line-listing of all contacts and co-exposed persons is established and updated. The line list includes the following: contact identity, demographic information, date of last common exposure or date of contact with the index case, daily temperature, and date of onset of symptoms (if any symptom appears).

Step 6: Search for additional cases

Additional cases are searched via various methods:

- Enhanced passive surveillance: health professionals are asked to report any suspected case.
- Active surveillance is enlarged to include the suspected cases of SARS-CoV or MERS-CoV.
- Active case-finding among the persons who may have been co-exposed to the same source as the index case
- Active follow up of the contacts...

Step 7: Describe cases

Cases are described in terms of:

- Time: epidemic curve by day and week of onset
- Place: mapping cases by place of residence or place of exposure, travel history
- Person: age group, gender, occupation, co-morbidities
- Disease: classification, outcome
- Exposure: travel or domestic...

Step 8: Identify risk factors

a) Travel-related

Cases classified as travel-related are the ones with travel history to a country known to have SARS-Cov or MERS-CoV, in the 10 days preceding the onset of symptoms.

b) Animal-related

Cases classified as animal-related are the ones who in the 10 days preceding the onset of symptoms had:

- No travel history to a country known to have SARS-CoV or MERS-CoV
- And contact with domestic or wild animals.

In case of local cases of MERS-CoV, special attention is given to camels and bats. The MOPH informs the MOA and asks for a seroprevalence of MERS-CoV in animals.

c) Healthcare-related

Cases classified as healthcare-related are the ones who in the 10 days preceding the onset of symptoms had:

- Provided healthcare to patients or been admitted to a healthcare facility
- And no travel history to a country known to have SARS-CoV or MERS-CoV.

In such context, the suspected health facility is identified. An audit of infection control practice is conducted in suspected health facility. Search for additional cases are conducted in coordination with the health facility.

d) Conduct further studies

If no obvious risk factors are identified linked to travel or contact with animals, further studies (as analytic studies) are conducted to identify the source of infection.

For MERS-CoV, if the number of local cases increases, a case control study is conducted.

Also, attempts are conducted to isolate and identify the virus. Such identification will enables:

- Comparing strains
- Identifying the source.

Step 9: Enhance monitoring


The number of cases is monitored on daily basis, and the contacts are followed on daily basis.


During the investigation, weekly situation reports and their timely communication with relevant authorities at local, national and international levels and other stakeholders (e.g. the public and the media) are critical.


The report provides information on the cumulative number of cases and contacts by time, place and person. The report is shared with involved partners.

Step 10: Write summary report

At the end of the outbreak, a final report summarizing the outbreak investigation findings is written and shared with partners.







Invasive Coronavirus - Annex 1

Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Novel Coronavirus Infection Reporting Form ESU number: LB-nCoV- |_____|

A.Reporter	
Hospital	Physician
Date of	Mobile
D. Daking at Information	
B.Patient information Name:	Gender: □ M □ F
Date of Birth:	Nationality:
Caza of	Residence: ☐ Resident ☐ Visitor ☐ Refugee
Locality of	
Phone number:	Occupation: Institution:
Priorie number.	IIISTICUTION.
C.Signs and symptoms	
Symptom _	
Fever (≥ □	Dyspnea \square
Cough \square	Pathologic chest X-ray
If other, \Box	
,	
D.Hospitalization	
Hospitalized for \square since	
Patient admitted to	□ since
Mechanical \square since	
E.Clinical and paraclinical presentation	
Diagnosis of \square	Cardiac arrest \square
ARDS \square	Hypotension requiring vasopressors
Acute Renal Failure $\ \square$	Pregnancy \square
Multi-organ failure \Box	Other, specify
55:16 . /5	
F.Risk factors/Exposure in the 10 days prior t	
Travel of Familia manula and	Where
Travel of Family member ☐ Contact with confirmed nCoV ☐	Where
	Who
Contact with non confirmed nCoV	Who
Contact with SARI	Who
Health Care Worker 🛚	Where
G.Comorbidities	
Cancer	Kidney failure □
Diabetes	Chronic liver disease
Chronic lung	Heart disease □
Asthma	Deficient immune system
Hematogical 🗌	Other, specify
H.Outcome	
	□ Dooth date of dooth
☐ Remission ☐ Still III	☐ Death,date of death
I.Specimens	
Sputum □ date	Broncholavealar □ date
Tracheal aspirate	
Serum (paired sera)	·· ············ ·
H.Date and signature:	

Invasive Coronavirus - Annex 2

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة – برنامج الترصد الوبائي Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health - Epidemiology Surveillance Program

Person Under Observation FORM For Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SARS Part I - Case first investigation

A. Reporter						
Reporting date		Reporting institution		Reporting physician phone		
				number		
				<u> </u>		
B. Demographic Details						
Name		Date of birth		Sex		
				<u> </u>	□ F	
Nationality		Occupation		1	ne a health/lab v	
				☐ Yes	□ No	□ Unk
C. History of Exposure						
Did the person have close	T		7		· T ·······	
SARS case	Country		Hospital where SA	RS case	Date of contact	
	<u> </u>					
Did the person travel to "a	T	areas" during the 1		onset of		es 🗆 No
Country	Region		From		То	
	<u> </u>					
Did the person work in lab	T		7	of sympto	7	No
Country	Laborato	Dry Laboratory type			Type of work	
	<u> </u>					
Or has worked in a labora	·		7	infected v	· 	es 🗆 No
Country	Laborato	Dry Laboratory type			Type of work	
	<u> </u>		<u> </u>		<u>I</u>	
D. Symptoms and signs at		T		T		
Date of onset of initial syn	nptoms	Body temperature		Cough	□ N-	
Dyspnea		Doonington, distance		☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Unk Other symptoms:		LI UNK
] Unk	Respiratory distress Yes No Unk		Other symptoms.		
Chest X ray: ☐ Yes ☐ N		CBC: Ses Solve		Other lab findings:		
Date:	_	Date:		other lab infamgs.		
Results:		White cell count:				
		Segmented count:				
		Platelet count:				
E. Decision						
☐ Suspected SARS						
☐ Suspected SARS		☐ Isolation at ho	ospital:	☐ Isolation at home:		
		Hospital name	e:			
Admission date:						

Date and Signature:

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة – برنامج الترصد الوبائي Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health - Epidemiology Surveillance Program

Person Under Observation FORM For Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SARS Part II –Laboratory testing

A. Identification							
Reporting Institution	Reporting Physician Phone Number	Case Name					
B. Clinical specimen collection – To be filled at the hospital							
Specimen(s)		Date of collection					
☐ Throat swab							
☐ Sputum							
☐ Deep tracheal aspirate							
☐ Broncho-alveolar lavage							
☐ Blood							
☐ Stool							
☐ Urine							
☐ Other:							
Person in charge:	Phone Number:						
Date and Signature:	Email Address:						
_							
C. Clinical specimen shipment - To	be filled by the MOPH						
Specimen, ref	Date of Shipment	Shipment References					
Person in charge:	Phone Number:						
Date and Signature:	Email Address:						
,	filled by WHO reference laboratory						
Specimen, ref	Date of Arrival	Condition on Arrival					
Person in charge:	Phone Number:						
Date and Signature:	Email Address:						
E. Laboratory results - To be filled	,						
Tests	Results	Comments					
Person in charge:	Phone Number:						
Date and Signature:	Email Address:						

Invasive Coronavirus - Annex 3

Ministry of Public Health
Epidemiological surveillance unit
Tel: 961-1-614194; Fax: 961-1-610920
E-mail: esumoh@cyberia.net.lb

1- Patient information

Hospital 1 Hospital 2

 $\quad \square \ Yes$

□ Yes

 $\; \square \; \mathsf{No}$

□ No

Died from illness

Autopsy

لجمهورية اللبنانية



Novel Coronavirus - INVESTIGATION FORM ESU number: _____

Name :	Residence: P	armanant	□ Visitor	
			□ VISILOT	
Gender: □ M □ F	Caza of residence	e:		
Date of Birth: Age:	locality of reside	nce:		
Nationality:	Phone number:			
Occupation:				
2- Signs and symptoms				
Symptoms onset date/(dd/r	mm/yyyy) <i>OR</i> 🗆 Asym	ptomatic		
	Yes	No	Don't know/ Unsu	ıre
Fever (≥ 38°c)				
Runny nose				
Sneezing				
Cough				
Sore throat				
Shortness of breath				
If other signs/symptoms, please indicate:				
3- Hospitalization				
Was the patient hospitalized for this illness?	□ Yes		No 🗆 Unkn	own
Hospital name	e Admissia	n date	Discharge date	

□ Unknown

□ Unknown

Death date

Result

4- Clinical find	ings					
Diagnosis of pneumor	nia	□ Ye	s 🗆 No	□ Unknown		
If Yes: □ Clinical □	Radiographic 🗆	Other				
If other please indicate	e:					
Patient admitted to IC	CU	□ Ye	s 🗆 No	□ Unknown		
ICU start date:						
ICU discharge date:						
Mechanical Ventilatio	n:	□ Ye	es 🗆 No	□ Unknown		
If Known, Start Date:						
Duration (days):						
Acute Respiratory Dist	tress Syndrome	□ Ye	s 🗆 No	□ Unknown		
If yes, date:						
Acute Renal Failure		□ Ye	es 🗆 No	□ Unknown		
Fatality		□ Ye	es 🗆 No	□ Unknown		
				0.0 Double 2000 20		
5- Risk factors,	/Exposure					
Did patient travel to N	/liddle east in the	10 days prior to illness of	onset?			
□ Yes □ No	□ Unknown; I	f yes, which country: 🗆 k	SA □ Qatar □ Ot	her (please indicate)		
Cou	ntry	Departure date	•	Return date		
	,	and any owner remaining promotions				
Did patient have contact with someone else who traveled to Middle east in the 10 days prior to illness onset?						
Did patient have conta	act with someone	else who traveled to M	iddle east in the 1	0 days prior to illness onset?		
□ Yes □ No	□ Unknown	else who traveled to M	iddle east in the 1	0 days prior to illness onset?		
□ Yes □ No If yes, what is the re	□ Unknown lation?			0 days prior to illness onset?		
☐ Yes ☐ No If yes, what is the re Which country: ☐	□ Unknown lation? KSA □ Qatar	□ Other (please indicate)				
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Yes	Unknown lation? KSA	Departure date Departure date e have close contact wills Sheep Other all Sheep If yes, name and city with Acute Respiratory If yes, describe:	th any of the follonimals (please incoming and please incoming and	Return date wing licate) O days prior to illness onset?		

7- Case classification	
Classification	Date
□ Unknown	
□ Confirmed	
□ Suspected	
□ Probable	

8- Investigator information					
Name	Institution	Date	Phone number	Signature	

Invasive Coronavirus - Annex 4

Specimen collection for MERS-CoV

(Source: WHO)

Presentation	Test	Type of specimen	Timing	Storage and transportation	Remarks
Symptomatic	PCR	Lower respiratory tract:sputumaspiratelavage Upper respiratory tract:naso-pharyngeal andoro-pharyngeal swabsnaso-pharyngeal wash/naso- pharyngeal aspirate Serum for virus detection (the Acute sample for serology can be used for virus detection by PCR)	Collect on presentation To confirm clearance of the virus, sample collection to be repeated until the results are negative on 2 sequential samples	If the specimen will reach the laboratory in less than 72 hours, store and ship at 4°C, if longer than 72 hours, store at - 80°C and ship on dry ice or liquid nitrogen	Follow international regulations and triple package system.
	Serology	Serum for serological testing.	Paired samples are necessary for confirmation with the initial sample collected in the first week of illness and the second ideally collected 2–3 weeks later. A single serum sample should be collected at least 14 days after onset of symptoms for determination of a probable case.	As above	As above
Presentation	Test	Type of specimen	Timing	Storage and transportation	Remarks
Asymptomatic Contact (routine testing of asymptomatic contacts is not	PCR	Nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swabs; sputum if possible.	Within 14 days of last documented contact	As above	As above
recommended)	Serology	Serum	Baseline serum taken within 14days of last documented contact and convalescent serum taken 2-3 weeks later. If only a single sample is possible, collect at least 14	As above	As above

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Meningococcal Infection

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 35 (19th Jan 2015)

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Annex 2: Meningitis investigation form Annex 3: Meningitis line listing Annex 4: Meningitis descriptive report

I Purpose

The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps to be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance program in case of meningococcal alert or outbreak.

II. Generalities

Meningococcal meningitis and meningococcal septicaemia are systemic infections caused by the bacteria Neisseria meningitidis. Humans are the only known reservoir for N. meningitidis, which is a normal inhabitant of the nasopharynx and is transmitted from person-to-person by droplets or secretions from the upper respiratory tract. Disease usually presents septicaemia, meningitis or both:


- Meningitis: inflammation of meninges (lining of the brain)
- Septicaemia: bacteria enters the bloodstream resulting in blood poisoning.


Early signs and symptoms of meningococcal disease may be non specific and therefore difficult to distinguish from influenza or other diseases. Early symptoms include fever, vomiting, malaise and lethargy with photophobia, neck stiffness and classical purpuric rash. Detailed information about the disease is presented in the table below.

Neisseria meningitidis	
Agent	Gram-negative diplococcal bacteria
Serogroups	12 serogroups of N. meningitidis have been identified, six of which can cause epidemics: A, B, C, W135, X and Y
Incubation period	2-10 days, with an average of 4 days
Period of communicability	Cases should be considered infectious from the time they are exposed until 24 hours after initiation of treatment or chemoprophylaxis with appropriate antibiotics.
Reservoir	- Humans - Asymptomatic carriage in nasopharynx is common.
Modes of transmission	Person-to-person by direct contact with respiratory droplets of infected people Most cases acquired through exposure to asymptomatic carriers.
Carrier	- 1-10% asymptomatic carriage during normal period - 10-25% during outbreaks
Vaccine	- Meningococcal A conjugate vaccine, C conjugate vaccine, tetravalent A, C, Y and W135 conjugate vaccines and meningococcal polysaccharide vaccines - No vaccine available for serogroup B
Clinical presentation	 Bacterial meningitis Septicemia: rare and severe with purpura Complications: cerebral lesion, hearing loss, learning disorders among 10-20% of survivors Case fataliry rate: 5-10% within 24-48 hours after the onset of symptoms
Worldwide	 The meningitis belt of sub-Saharan Africa, from Senegal in the west to Ethiopia in the east, has the highest rates of the disease. 80–85% of all cases in the meningitis belt are due to group A\ meningococcus, with epidemics occurring at 7–14 years interval. In the 2009 epidemic season, 88199 suspected cases, including 5352 deaths were reported from 14 African countries.
Lebanon	Sporadic cases
Control objective	To control and reduce the occurrence of secondary cases

Surveillance and Invest	tigation
Investigation: data about case	Patient identification, demographic data, clinical symptoms, nationality, hospitalization, laboratory results, immunization status, travel history, occupational status
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	CSF, blood, isolates
Investigation: data about contacts	Identify close contacts and their age, search for similar cases among contacts
Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts	No
Test	CultureSoluble antigen detectionSerogroup identificationPCR
Laboratories	- Culture: clinical laboratories - Serogroup identification: RHUH, AUB-MC
Outbreak level	At least three confirmed cases epi-linked with same agents / types
Notification to WHO	To notify confirmed cases to WHO if outbreak
Meningococcal infection (2007)	on case definition (MOPH circular no. 63 dated on the 14th April
Suspected case	A case of meningitis or septicemia with petechial or purpural rash
Probable case	 A case of meningitis or a suspected case of meningococcal disease with demonstration of gram-negative diplococci Or ongoing epidemic or epidemiological link to a confirmed case
Confirmed cases	A case of meningitis or a suspected or probable case of meningococcal disease with laboratory confirmation: - Isolation of N. meningitidis from normally sterile fluids (CSF or blood) - Or detection of N. meningitidis antigens from normally sterile fluids (CSF or blood) - Or positive test with PCR
Forms	
Reporting	Standard reporting form or specific meningitis reporting form (MOPH circular no. 53 dated on the 27 th May 2002)
Investigation	Meningitis investigation form (MOPH circular no. 76 dated on the 31st July 2013)
National figures	

Figure 1: Reported meningitis incidence rates, Lebanon, 2000–2014 (Source: MOPH)





III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of meningococcal surveillance are:

- To detect any case of meningococcal invasive infection
- To detect outbreak of meningococcal invasive infections
- To monitor cases and describe cases by time and place and person
- To identify serotypes and strains
- To provide information for proper meningococcal control.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An alert is defined by any suspected case of meningococcal disease.

An outbreak is defined by at least three confirmed cases epi-linked, with the same serotype.

V. Procedural steps

The below steps are recommended for the verification and investigation of meningococcal disease alerts and outbreaks. Figure (4) includes an algorithm that summarizes those steps.

Step 1: Detect and verify alert

Cases of suspected meningococcal disease need to be notified to the MOPH immediately, without waiting for microbial confirmation.

The treating physician or the hospital focal person notifies by phone or by fax (by filling out and sending the reporting form or the meningitis reporting form). The meningitis reporting form is provided in annex (1).

Upon reception of the form, the Esumoh caza team contacts the hospital to verify the information: presence of petechial or purpural rash and/or laboratory results. Also the caza team informs within 24 hours the mohafaza and the central teams.

Step 2: Investigate the case

The Esumoh caza team checks the completeness of reporting. For each case, the needed information is:

- Demography variables: age, gender, nationality, place of residence (caza and locality)
- Illness: date on onset

- Vaccination status
- Laboratory results: CSF cytology, CSF biochemistry, CSF Gram staining, CSF culture, CSF soluble antigen detection, blood culture and other
- Occupation: student, military staff...
- Travel history: case or family...

In case of death, a copy of the medical file is requested. An official letter may be issued for the hospital.

Once the information is completed, the Esumoh caza teams sends all the documents to the Esumoh central level.

Based on the clinical, laboratory and epidemiological data, the meningitis investigation form is filled. The investigation form is provided in annex (2).

The case is classified based on the algorithm as shown in figure (3).

Step 3: Collect isolates

In case of positive isolate at CSF or blood culture, the Esumoh central team coordinates the collection of any isolate to reference laboratory.

At designated reference laboratories, the isolates are confirmed, typed and tested for antimicrobial resistance.

Step 4: Identify close contacts

a) Identification

Meningococcal disease can spreads to close contacts via droplet transmission.

Close contacts are identified among:

- Household and family members living under the same roof
- School classmates and those sharing the bus with the patient
- Kindergarden children and employees
- Military barrack staff sharing the same dormitory room with the case
- Health care providers caring for the patient and in contact with his/her respiratory secretions without using appropriate personal protective equipment.

The Esumoh caza team lists all close contacts, and specifies their age. Also, pregnant women among close contacts are flagged.

b) Assessment of illness onset

Contacts that are experiencing symptoms compatible with meningococcal disease (fever, rash, lethargy, irritability, headache, stiff neck, vomiting, and rash) are referred to health care provider immediately for evaluation.

c) Antibiotic prophylaxis

Chemoprophylaxis is recommended for all close contacts regardless of their immunization status. Prophylaxis is initiated as soon as possible till 14 days from identification of the index patient. Chemoprophylaxis is provided by the caza health physician in coordination with the department for communicable diseases at MOPH.

Step 5: Search for additional cases

Surveillance should be intensified to confirm the presence of an outbreak.

Additional cases are searched via:

- The health sector, via passive reporting and active surveillance
- The community where the case lives, in particular the household and any specific setting.

Cases are investigated. Summary line listing is updated regularly. A template of line listing is provide in annex (3).

Step 6: Describe cases

Cases are described by:

- Time: day, week, month of onset
- Place: residence, specific setting
- Person: age group, gender, nationality
- Disease: classification, outcome
- Agent: serotype

Indicators are presented as counts and rates per 100000 inhabitants.

The annex 4 provides a template for descriptive analysis.

Step 7: Confirm the outbreak

Based on the clinical, laboratory and epidemiological data, the outbreak is declared. The Esumoh central team informs the MOPH units.

Upon declaration, the MOPH informs health partners:


- Health professionals
- UN agencies: WHO
- Other governmental institutions: Ministry of Education and High Education, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Social Affairs...


Step 8: Enhance monitoring

During the outbreak, the cases are monitored on daily basis. A weekly report is generated by the Esumoh central team.

Step 9: Write summary report

At the end of the event, the Esumoh central team prepares a summary report. The report is shared with partners.





Meningococcal Infection - Annex 1

الجممورية اللبنانية

		رة إبلاغ عن ES:				
		I LS			a	وزارة ا لــصبحــــــ ه اك
	ية للمريض	5)- العوارض الإكلينيك				1)- المريض
ضع علامة X						اسم المريض :
		Fever				اسم الأب :
		Neck stiffness				الشهرة :
		Vomiting				تاريخ الولادة : ِ
		Bulging fontanel	🗌 انثی		<u></u> ذکر	الجنس:
		Purpura				2)– عنوان المريض
		Septic choc				الْجنسية :
		Gangrene	 زائر		 مقيم	-
		غيره ، حدد :				العنوان :
	<i>حي</i>	6)- عن الوضع التلقي				القرية / المدينة
تاريخ آخر جرعة	عدد الجرعات ونوعه					رقم الهاتف :
-		Neisseria				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		meningitidis Haemophilus				3)- عن الاستشفاء
		influenzae b Pneumococcus				تاريخ ظهور العوارض
					:	تاريخ دخول المستشفي تاريخ التشخيص
خارج، مؤخرا ؟	, أو أحد المقربين إلى الـ	7)- هل سافر المريض			··	اسم المستشفى
تاريخ العودة الى لبنان؟	إلى أي البلد؟	من سافر ؟			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	اسم الطبيب المعالج
					:	رقم الهاتف
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	ىض ؟	8) _ ما هي مهنة المر	الفحوصات	ال إجراء		4)- تنابع العموضات المخبرية ، ترفق النتائج.
	:	8) – ما هي مهنة المر المهنة	، ضع x	172	أجريت، ضع x	المعبرية ، درس السالع.
	:	نوع المؤسسة	، صبع ۸	مرققة	اجریت، صع ۸	CCE direct
الثكنة :	رسة / دار الحضانة /	اسم المؤسسة / المدر				CSF- direct
		- -				
	:	الصف العنوان				CSF - culture
		المعدوران				CSF - antigens
	: :	رقم الهاتف				Blood - CBC
		Late to the Company	9 3 22	111	ادات السينة قال ديني	Blood - culture هل عولج المريض بالمض
		9) - عن أهل الدار عدد الأفراد في البيد	ىنشىقى :	به إلى المه	ادات الحيوية قبل دخو كلا	س عولج المريض بالمص
	ے : ن 5 سنوات : نعم /					ں نعم إذا نعم، ماذا :
	ع ر سورت . عم /	س پوجد اعمال دور				ادا نعم، مادا ومنذ متی : _
		10)- عن المبلغ				ومت منی
	:	اسم المبلغ				الجرثومة المسببة:
	:	التاريخ				ملاحظات :
	:	التوقيع				
ور الاشتباه بالحالـــة	حدة الترصد الوبائي ف	~				
	للمخالطين.	لأخذ التدابير اللازمة				
01/6109	01/6141 فاكس: 20	تلفون: 95				

Meningococcal Infection - Annex 2

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة – برنامج الترصد الوبائي استمارة تقصي لحالة التهاب السحايا الحاد

تعبئ الاستمارة من قبل فريق وزارة الصحة العامة

						1) المريض		
العنوان	الجنسية		تاريخ الولادة		ا لجن ت ذكر	1) المريض الاسم الثلاثي		
	قم الهاتف	ر	البلدة	ماء	القض	نوع الاقامة		
						 □ مقیم □ عامل اجنبي □ الاجئ 		
رقم هاتف الطبيب	م الطبيب المعالج	ابيـ	تاريخ الدخول		ىتىئىد.	2) الاستشفاء # اسم المس		
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						3) العوارض السريرية تاريخ ظهور العوارض		
اخرى	عوارض		مضاعفات		طفح جلا	تاريخ ظهور العوارض		
			□ Septic choc	□ None				
			☐ Gangrena	□ Purpu				
				□ Maculo-papular□ Vesicular				
						4) فحص السائل النخاعي		
Soluble antigens	Lymphocytes	%	Segmented %	WBC/mm3		CSF appearance		
Other	Culture		Gram Stain	GI	ucose	Proteins		
	Other test	ts		Bloo	d culture	Platelets		
النتيجة	الفحص النتيجة		المختبر المرجعي	ىي العينة	ض لزوم التقص تاريخ جمع	 6) جمع عينات اضافية من المري نوع العينة 		
			"			نوع العينة 🗆 🗆 سلالة جرثومية		
						🗆 مصل		
						□ سائل نخاعي		
						7) نوع التهاب السحايا الحاد		
عيره]		□ فيروسية			🗆 جرثومية		
□ Parasitic:					□ Neisseria			
☐ Fungus:☐ Unspecified:☐		□ Mu	mps st Nile Virus			nilus influenza occus pneumonia		
u onspecified.		⊔ we				ionocytogenes		
			identified			terium tuberculosis		
					□ Other:			
					□ Not identified			

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة – برنامج الترصد الوبائي استمارة تقصي لحالة التهاب السحايا الحاد

8) الوضع التلقيحي

MMR	Meningococcal	Pneumococcal	Haemophilus inf	
				عدد الجرعات
				تاريخ آخر جرعة
ملاحظات	تاريخ العودة الى لبنان	البلد/المدينة	المسافر	9) سفر الى الخارج خلال شهر ا
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			المريض المقربين :	
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	11-2-10	251.11 1 211	ن ۽ ال د ال	10) مهنة المريض
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				□ طفل في البيت
				□ تلميذ، صف:
				□ صيد، صح. □ طالب جامعي
				ا عسكري ا ا عسكري
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				ا المدرس طيره:
				ا تعرف
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	n in till offer.	**	Y	11) وقاية المخالطين
ملاحظات	بن تلقوا الوقاية ا	י אני ווגי	عدد المستهدفير	1 1
				 □ المنزل □ دار الحضانة
				□ مدرسة
				□ ثكنة عسكرية
				 □ المستشفى
				□ غيره
	ض)	بهر من تاريخ ظهور العوار،	ر. اتصال بالمربض بعد مرور ش	12) تطور حالة المريض (بتم الم
🗆 و فاة	اشتر کات	_	ا شفاء	12) تطور حالة المريض (يتم الا تاريخ الاتصال
□Date of death:	☐ Hearing loss		_	
	□ Paralysis			
	□ Other:			
نوع السحايا	هور العوارض		حيط (خلال فترة شهر قبل وش عدد الحالات	13) وجود حالات اخرى في الم
				🗖 المنزل
				□ دار الحضانة
				□ مدرسة
				□ ثكنة عسكرية
				🗖 المستشفى
				<u></u> _ غيره
P 8/201 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2				

Meningococcal Infection - Annex 3

						<m##></m##>		ID
								Name
						<m,f></m,f>		Sex
						/# d/m/y>	Ag	e (month/year)
						<dd mm="" yyyy=""></dd>		Date onset
						#		Week
								Caza
								Commune
Pag						^Y,N>	Form completed	
Page No. _						<y,n></y,n>	Purpura	
						<t,c,b></t,c,b>		appearance
						#		WBC (%PN)
						<# *>	CSF	Pro (g/l)
							¥	Gram
								culture
								soluble antigens
							Blood	Gram
							od	culture
								Bacterial
								usative agent if identified
						<y,n> <r,d,s></r,d,s></y,n>	Pro	phylaxis if Nm ot Hib
						R,D,S>		Evolution
								Hospital


Republic of Lebanon. Ministry of Public Health. Epidemiological Surveillance Program

MENINGITIS Surveillance LINE LISTING

Meningococcal Infection - Annex 4


Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health - Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Descriptive Surveillance Findings



1. Cumulative number =







3. Cases by time: counts and rates (/100000)

			All meningitis			Bacterial meningitis				Neisseria meningitidis				
		Pop20	N20	R20	R20	R20	N20	R20	R20	R20	N 20	R20	R20	R20
	Jan													
l	Feb													
ē	Mar													
onset	Apr													
	Mai													
ਰ	Jun													
	Jul													
month	Aug													
≥	Sep													
	Oct													
þ	Nov													
1 -	Dec													
	Total													

4. Monthly incidence for all meningitis



5. Monthly incidence for bacterial meningitis



6 Cases by infectious agent

6. Cases by infectious agent						
	Case	es	Deaths			
				CFR		
Etiology	N 20	% 20	D 20	20		
Nm						
Hi						
SP						
Bact Other						
BNOS						
Viral						
Unsp.						
Total, N						

7. By commune

Commune	N	Commune	N

8. By age group

	N 20	% 20				
0-4 y 5-14 y						
5-14 y						
15-24 y						
15-24 y 25-64 y						
65+ y						
Unsp						
Total						

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Measles

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 36 (19th Jan 2015)

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I. Purpose

The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps to be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance program in case of measles alert or outbreak.


II. Generalities


Measles is a highly contagious, serious disease caused by a virus. In 1980, before widespread vaccination, measles caused an estimated 2.6 million deaths each year. The disease remains one of the leading causes of death among young children globally, despite the availability of a safe and effective vaccine. Approximately 145700 people died from measles in 2013 – mostly among children under the age of 5.

More information about the disease are presented in the table below.

Measles						
Agent	Measles virus, genus Morbillivirus, family Paramyxoviridae					
Incubation	10 days (7-18 days, may be to 21 days)					
Period of	4 days before rash and 4 days after rash onset					
communicability						
Reservoir	Humans					
Modes of transmission	- Person-to-person: direct contact with droplets, rarely indirect					
	contact - Airborne (in confined place)					
Clinical presentation	 Febrile maculo-papular rash Complications: otitis media (7-9%), pneumonia (1-6%), gastro-enteritis (8%) and dehydration, blindness, convulsions (1/200), encephalitis (1/1000) Encephalitis: post-infectious encephalitis (1 week from onset) or acute encephalitis of delayed type (weeks and months after onset) Long term complication: sub-acute sclerosing pan-encephalitis (SSPE) 7 years or more after onset (1/25000 case, and 1/8000 if onset under 2 years old) Case fatality: 3-6% in developing countries, 1-3/1000 in developed countries 					
Worldwide	WorldwideIn high coverage area: outbreak every 7-8 yearsIn low coverage area: outbreak every 3-4 years					
Lebanon	Annual outbreaks from 2003 to 2007, and in 2013					
Control objective	Elimination goal					
Surveillance and Invest	igation					
Surveillance approach	Syndromic (febril macuplo-papular rash) with laboratory confirmation					
Investigation: data about case	Signs, vaccination status, travel history, contact tracing, pregnancy					
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	Serum, urine, oral fluid, dried blood, throat swab, (CSF)					
Investigation: data about contacts	Cases among contact, travel history, vaccination status, pregnancy					
Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts	If cases among contact					

Test	- IgM: 1-28 days from rash onset (serum, oral fluid, urine, CSF, dried			
	blood)			
	- PCR: 1-7 days from rash onset (oral fluid, dried blood)			
	- Culture: 1-5 days from rash onset (urine, throat swab)			
Laboratories	- Serology and PCR: RHUH (clinical laboratory)			
	- Virus isolation: Tunis Pasteur and Central Public Health of the Sultanat d'Oman			
Outbreak level	At least 3 confirmed cases epidemiologically (or virologically) linked.			
Notification to WHO	- To report to WHO if outbreak			
	- Routine monthly dataset sharing			
Control				
Control	Immunization with at least 2 doses after 1 year			
Case management	Symptomatic			
Isolation	- Droplet isolation			
	- If hospitalized: airborne isolation			
Contact prevention	MMR within 72 hours of first contact with the patient			
Mass prevention	Vaccination campaign			
School eviction	4 days after rash onset			
Measles case definition	on (MOPH circular no.11 dated on the 23 rd February 2013)			
Laboratory-confirmed	A suspect case with laboratory confirmation with presence of			
case	measles-specific IgM antibodies or positive PCR			
Epidemiologically-	A suspect case who has not had a laboratory test, and who is			
confirmed case	epidemiologically-linked to a laboratory-confirmed case in which			
	rash onset occurred 7-18 days earlier			
Suspected case /	- Any person with:			
clinical case	• Fever			
	• And maculo-papular (non vesicular) rash			
_	- Or any person in whom a clinician suspects measles infection			
Forms				
Reporting	Standard reporting form or specific measles/rubella reporting form			
	(MOPH circular no. 13 dated on the 23 rd February 2013)			
Investigation	Measles/rubella investigation form (MOPH circular no. 75 dated on			
	the 31s ^t July 2013)			
National figures				
Figure 1: Reported me	easles cases in Lebanon, 1997-2014 (Source: MOPH)			
2000 -				





III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance are:

- Detect and confirm measles cases
- Detect and investigate measles outbreaks
- Identify risk factors
- Identify circulating genotypes
- Document the process towards measles elimination.

IV. Alert and outbreak definitions

An **alert** is defined by any suspected case of measles.

An **outbreak** is defined by the occurrence of at least three confirmed measles cases which are epidemiologically and/or virologically-linked.

V. Procedural steps

The steps described below are recommended for investigation of any alert/outbreak of measles. The steps are summarized in figure (5).

Step 1: Verify alert

Any case of measles is verified by the Esumoh caza team within 24 hours.

The treating physician or hospital focal person is contacted: Is it really fever and maculo-papular rash?

If yes, the information is shared with the Esumoh mohafaza and central levels and the investigation is initiated immediately.

Step 2: Investigate the case

Upon verification of any case of measles, data is collected by using specific measles/rubella investigation form (Annex 1). The investigation is done by the Esumoh peripheral team.

The data is collected by interviewing the patient or the parents.

The investigation form includes the following information:

- Demography
- Disease
- Vaccination status
- Case management
- Risk factors: cases among contacts, travel history...

Vaccination status is collected from available data recorded in vaccination card or personal health record, medical file. If no document is available with the patient or the parents, the treating physician or the medical center where vaccination is done is contacted to collect the needed information.

Copy of the filled investigation form is sent to the Esumoh mohafaza and central levels.

If the case died, a copy of the hospital medical file is requested for the Esumoh central team.

Step 3: Confirm the case

Any suspected measles case needs to be confirmed.

If the case seems to be sporadic, the case has to be laboratory-confirmed.

If the case occurres among a cluster or a chain of transmission, at least 3 cases need to be laboratory-confirmed.

The needed specimens are summarized in the table (1) below:

Table 1: Specimens and tests for measles confirmation						
Specimen	Test	Timing (from rash onset)	Notes			
Oral fluid	IgM	1-28 days	If sample is taken within 72 hours after rash onset and results are negative, a second sample is is requested.			
	PCR	1-14 days				
Serum	IgM	1-28 days				
Dried blood	IgM	1-28 days				
	PCR	1-7 days				
Throat swab	Culture	1-5 days	Swab in VTM			
	PCR	1-5 days				
Urine	Culture	1-5 days				
	PCR	1-5 days				

Once collected, the specimen is sent by the Esumoh caza team to the Esumoh central team in charge to verify labelling before sending it to the reference laboratory.

The IgM serology and PCR tests are done at RHUH clinical laboratory. Virus isolation is done at Central Public Health Laboratory in Sultanat of Oman or at Pasteur Institute in Tunis.

If the case is suspected of being vaccine-associated, with a rash occurring in 7-14 days following vaccination, specimen for virus isolation is collected.

Step 4: Classify the case

Based on the clinical, epidemiology and laboratory findings, cases are classified according to the algorithm provided in figure (3).

The classification is done by the Esumoh central team, with the support of a technical group. That group also classifies the vaccine—associated cases (Figure 4).

Step 5: Communicate

Any confirmed case of measles is communicated to the EPI program, for proper response. At caza level, the Esumoh staff informs the caza physician and he EPI focal person. At central level, the Esumoh staff informs the EPI central team.

Step 6: Describe cases

a) Time, place and person

Cases are described by:

- Time: week, month and year of onset
- Place: place of residence, place of work, place of school, in terms of locality, caza and mohafaza. Also travel history is described.
- Person: age group, gender, nationality, vaccination status. Vaccination status is displayed by age group and nationality.
- Disease: classification, complications, case-fatality, inpatient proportion...

Indicators include counts and incidence rates (per 100000 or per 1000000).

b) Chains of transmission

Cases are described by chain of transmission. A chain of transmission is defined by at least 2 epi-linked cases. Any chain of transmission needs to have at least 3 laboratory-confirmed cases, and at least 3 specimens collected for virus isolation.

c) Circulating genotypes

The circulating measles genotypes are identified via virus isolation and virus sequencing. For 2004-2007, the local circulating genotype was D4.

In 2013, the dominant genotype was D8, in addition to sporadic cases of B3 (confirmed in supranational lab) and H1.

Step 7: Confirm the outbreak

Based on the epidemiology and laboratory findings, an outbreak is declared.

Once declared, official memos are issued by the MOPH to:

- Health professionals: physicians, hospitals, medical centers...
- WHO
- MEHE and schools
- Kindergartens
- Media...

Step 8: Search for additional cases

a) Enhance notification from health professionals

The health professionals are asked to be more aware about measles and to report any suspected case.

The official memos issued by the MOPH will include updated case definition and updated contact details of the MOPH teams for any case reporting.

Sessions may be conducted based on the extend of the outbreak.

b) Active surveillance

Measles is already targeted in the active surveillance. During field visits, additional wards will be visited as ER, and outpatients clinics.

Also, specimens will be requested from all inpatients.

c) School surveillance

Schools are informed on the confirmation of the outbreak and they are asked to immediately notify any case reported by the physicians or the parents.

If measles case is notified in school, the Esumoh staff will visit the school, and record all suspected cases in specific line listing and collect clinical non-invasive specimens (oral fluid).

d) Community search

Around the confirmed cases, the Esumoh staff will visit the neighbors and ask for any measles case. A specific line listing is filled. Clinical specimens are collected from suspected cases.

Also any rumor of measles case is verified.

Step 9: Identify susceptible contacts

The risk of confirmed measles case is to spread the virus to his/her contacts.

There is need to identify all close contacts of the case:

- In the family
- In the neighbors
- At workplace
- In school or kindergarden
- In the health care facilities (if visited)...

Contacts are assessed for their vaccination status.


The unvaccinated contacts are listed and the list is communicated to the EPI, who will be in charge to vaccinate them via medical centers or private physicians.


Step 10: Enhance monitoring

During a measles outbreak, weekly measles bulletin is edited by the Esumoh central staff and shared with partners.


Step 11: Write summary report

Once the outbreak was confined, the Esumoh central staff in coordination with the RHUH and EPI, prepares a summary report describing the outbreak, the confirmation and the response. Such report is needed to document the epidemiology history of measles in Lebanon.





Measles 217



Measles 218

الجممورية اللبنانية



استمارة إبلاغ عن حالة حصبة أوحصبة ألمانية

	•					
				۷	١ ـ اسم وعنوان المريض	
	العنوان :			ں :	الاسم الثلاثي للمريض	
				ية -	تاريخ الولاد	
	مدينة / البلدة :			ں : □ذکر □أ		
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					٢ - المعطيات الطبية	
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	سم المستشفى					
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	_	-			-	
كفك الأذن Post-auricular كفك الأذن	اللمفوية			ي ∶ □بقعي ular	نوع الطفح الجلد	
□خلف العنق Cervical			Vesicular كلت	•		
□ خلف الرقبة Sub-occipital			ر Other rash	_		
$Pneumonia$ التهاب رئو $oldsymbol{arphi}$	مضاعفات:			ية : □حرارة <i>℃</i> 8	عوارض مختلف	
Gastroenteritisالتهاب معو		Conjunctivitis التهاب ملتحمة العين \Box				
اغيره، حدد:			•	$_{l}$ نزلة أنفية $_{l}$		
نعم اکلا				اسعال ough		
نعم، تاريخ الوفاة:كلا	حدوث وفاة :	Arthralg	اصل ia/ Arthritis	ً ألم في المفا		
تعريف حالة الحصبة / الحصبة الألمانية المشتبهة:					٣ ـ معطيات التقليح	
طفح جلدي بقعي maculo-papular + حرارة	معلومة	تاريخ آخر جرعة	عدد الجرعات		Till c:	
تثبت الحالة مخبريا بفحصى IgM للحصبة	مدونة	تاریخ اکر جرعه	عدد الجرعات	(نوع اللقاح	
والحصبة الالمانية، عبر جمع :				Меа	usles / الحصبة	
-عينة مصل serum				Measles Rubell	الحصبة والحصبة الالمانية / a	
ا - أو مسحة لثوية oral fluid				ابو كعب/ <i>MMR</i>	الحصبة والحصبة الالمانية و	
-أو مسحة دم dried blood				Rubella /	الحصبة الالمانية	
وذلك في غضون ٢٨ يوم من تاريخ ظهور الطفح. وتحفظ العينة بين ٢ °8-4.			اس	سلى و عزل الفيرو	٤ - عينات للفحص المص	
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(urine) او مسحة من الزلعوم (throat swab)	🗌 مسحة دم	□ مسحة لثوية	🗌 مصل		عينة أولى	
في غضون اسبوع من الطفح.	Dried blood		Serum		عينه او تي	
لمزيد من المعلومات :هاتف 614194-01	🗌 مسحة دم	☐ مسحة لثوية	مصل		عينة ثانية	
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					٥- معلومات اخرى	
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الجمهورية اللبنانية - وزارة الصحة العامة - برنامج الترصد الوبائي

استمارة تقصى حالة حصبة /حصبة الألمانية

تعبأ الاستمارة من قبل وزارة الصحة العامة / فريق الترصد الوبائي

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	-			-		<u> </u>		5. مهنة المريض
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تعميم وزارة الصحة العامة رقم 75 تاريخ 31 تموز 2013

	رفع الهاتف								
	الحصية و الألمانية و ابو كعيب كعيب (MMR)	تاريخ أخر جرعة							
نالب(ة) ضد	الحصية و الحصية الألمانية (Measles rubella)	تاريخ أخر جرعة							
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_	الحصبة (Measles)	تاريخ أخر جرعة							
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إستمارة تقصي حول حالات غياب في المدارس بسبب الطفح الجلدي من تاريخ ----- الى ------

اسم المبلغ

المدرسة

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة – برنامج الترصد الوبائي

إستمارة تقصي حول حالات طفح جندي في حي/بندة تاريخ -------

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اسم المحقق	
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	1	M/R				
Case identification		Name				
cation		Caza				
		Age				
	Ī	Form completed				
		Investigation form				
Case r	9000	Rash onset				
Case reporting	000.0	Reported on				
	ď	Health Facility				
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
Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health - Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health - Epidemiological Surveillance Program Descriptive Surveillance Findings

Event	Level	Year	Week	Period	As on
		20			

1. Cumulative number =

2. Number of cases by time: weekly histogramm



3a By time: monthly cases and rates (/10000)

Month	R20	R20	R20	Pop20	N20	R20
Jan						
Feb						
Mar						
Apr						
Mai						
Jun						
Jul						
Aug						
Sep						
Oct						
Nov						
Dec						
Total						

4a By place: commune

7	Commune	N	Commune	N
1	Commune	14	Commune	IN.
1				
1				
1				+
1				
1				
1				
1				
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1				
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1				



4b. By place: dot map

5. By age g	5. By age group, gender and vaccination status: cases and rates (/100000) and %											
Age	Pop	Nb	Rate	Male	Female	Unsp		0d	1+d	Unsp	0d %	
0-4 y												
5-9 y												
10-14 y												
15-19 y												
20-44 y												
45+ y												
Unsp	-											
Total												

6. By classification Clin Total Lab Epi

7. By hospital admission								
In	Out	Unsp.	Total					

8. By occupation Interviewed Education DayCare

1 dot = 1 case

Notes

Notes

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Meningitis

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 64 (22nd Jan 2015)

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I. Purpose

The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps to be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance program in case of meningitis alert or outbreak.

II. Generalities

This document compiles background information and resources for the investigation of bacterial meningitis (mainly Neisseria meningitidis, Haemophilus

influenzae type B, Streptococcus pneumonia, Mycobacteruim tuberculosis, Listeria monocytogenes...) and aseptic meningitis.

Meningitis is a disease caused by the inflammation of the fluid and membranes that surround the spinal cord and brain. It has many potential infectious agents including bacterial, fungal, tuberculous, and viral pathogens. The severity of illness and the treatment for meningitis differ depending on the cause.

depending on the	cause.
Meningitis	
Agents	Several agents: 1) Bacteria: - Neisseria meningitidis (meningococcus): the serotypes responsible of invasive infection are A, B, C, W135, Y - Haemophilus influenza: there are 6 serotypes from (a) to (f). The serotype (b) is responsible of invasive infection Streptococcus pneumonia (pneumococcus): there are more than 90 serotypes Other bacterial agents: Listeria, Staphylococcus, enteric bacteria, group B Streptococci, Mycobacterium tuberculosis
	2) Virus: - Mumps - Measles - West Nile virus: a flavivirus - Enterovirus: including Coxsackie viruses A (1-11, 14, 16-18, 22, 24), Coxsackie viruses B (1-6), Echoviruses (1-7, 9-23, 25, 27, 30-33), Enterovirus 71, Poliovirus (1-3) - Herpes Simplex virus: with 2 types 1 and 2 - Varicella / Chicken-pox: Human (alpha) herpesvirus 3 (varicella-zoster) from the group Herpesvirus - Adenovirus: several types (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7), genus Mastadenovirus, family Adenoviridae - Lymphocytic choriomeningitis: Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (Arenavirus) - Sandfly fever viruses: genus phlebovirus, family Bunyaviridae. They include more than 60 antigenically distinct virus serotypes. Two main groups are identified: the sandfly fever group including the Naples serocomplex (Karimabad virus, Arabia virus, Massilia virus, Punique virus, Tehran virus, Toscana virus) and Sicilian serocomplex; and the Uukuniemi group. - Other virus: Arboviruses
	3) Parasites: - Leptospirosis: Spirochetes, Leptospira interrogans (25 serogroups) - Other: Candida albicans, Cryptococcus, Treponema pallidum

(syphilis)...

Incubation period	The incubation varies with the a	gent						
modedion poned	Agent	Incubation period						
	Bacteria	modbatton period						
	Neisseria meningitidis	3-4 days (2-10 days)						
	Haemophilus influenza	2-4 days						
	Streptococcus pneumoniae	1-4 days						
	Listeria monocytogenes	3-70 days (median of 3 weeks)						
	Virus	o ro days (median of o weeks)						
	West Nile virus	3-12 days						
	Enterovirus	7-14 days (2-35 days)						
	Herpes	2-12 days						
	Varicella / Chicken-pox	2-3 weeks						
	Lymphocytic choriomeningitis	8-13 days (15-21 days for						
	virus	meningitis)						
	Adenovirus	1-10 days						
	Sandfly fever viruses	3-4 days (up to 6 days)						
	Parasites							
	Leptospira	2-30 days (10 days)						
Period of	The period of communicability varies with the agent.							
communicability	Agent	Period of communicability						
	Bacteria							
	Neisseria meningitidis	From onset and up to 24 hours after starting antibiotherapy that has effective concentrations in nasopharynx						
	Haemophilus influenza	From onset and up to 24-48 hours of starting effective antibiotherapy						
	Streptococcus pneumoniae	As long as the bacteria is present in the upper respiratory tract						
	Listeria monocytogenes	- Mothers of infected newborns can shed the bacteria in vaginal discharges and urine 7-0 days after delivery Infected patients can shed the bacteria in stool for several months.						
	Virus							
	West Nile virus	No person-to-person transmission.						
	Enterovirus	Virus is excreted in stools for several weeks.Virus is excreted in pharynx for the first 2 weeks post infection.						
	Herpes	2-7 weeks after skin lesions onset						
	Varicella / Chicken-pox 2 days before until the skin lesions are crusted (5 days							

	Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus	No person-to-person transmission				
	Adenovirus	Shortly prior to and for the duration of the active disease				
	Sandfly fever viruses	Virus is present in blood of infected patients 1 day before and 1 day after onset of illness.				
	Parasites					
	Leptospira	Excreted in urine for 1 month				
Reservoir	The reservoir varies with the ag	ent.				
	Agent	Reservoir				
	Bacteria					
	Neisseria meningitidis	Humans				
	Haemophilus influenza	Humans				
	Streptococcus pneumoniae	Humans with possible carriage				
	Listeria monocytogenes	Soil, forage, water, mud and silage				
	Virus					
	West Nile virus	Birds				
	Enterovirus	Humans				
	Herpes	Humans				
	Varicella / Chicken-pox	Humans				
	Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus	House mouse (Mus musculus), hamster colonies. The mouse excretes the virus in saliva, feces and urine.				
	Adenovirus	Humans				
	Sandfly fever viruses	Humans and rodents				
	Parasites					
	Leptospira	Wild and domestic animals				
	1					

Modes of transmission	The modes of transmission var	y with the agent.
	Agent	Modes of transmission
	Bacteria	
	Neisseria meningitidis	Person-to-person transmission: direct contact with droplet, nasal and throat discharge
	Haemophilus influenza	Person-to-person transmission: direct contact with respiratory, nasal and throat discharge
	Streptococcus pneumoniae	Person-to-person transmission: direct contact with respiratory discharge
	Listeria monocytogenes	 Food-borne: ingestion of raw or contaminated milk, soft cheese vegetables and ready-to-eat meats (Pate) Direct contact with infectious material Neonatal: from mother to fetus or from mother to newborn (through the infected birth canal) Nosocomial transmission in nursery: via contaminated equipment or material
	Virus	
	West Nile virus	Bite by infected mosquitoes (Culex sp, or Anophele sp)
	Enterovirus	 Person-to-person: Fecal-oral Contact with respiratory secretions Contact with conjunctival secretions Contaminated water/swimming pools
		- Flies

Ι		
	Herpes	Person-to-person: - Contact with saliva - Sexual contact - Soiled hands - Neonatal (infected birth canal)
	Varicella / Chicken-pox	Person-to-person: - Contact with droplets - Contact with vesicle fluid - Indirect contact - Airborne
	Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus	- Airborne: contaminated dust - Food-borne: ingestion of contaminated food - Direct contact: skin contamination or cuts
	Adenovirus	- Person-to-person: • Fecal-oral route • Respiratory transmission • Inoculation with conjunctival secretions • Nosocomial - Contaminated water and swimming pools
	Sandfly fever viruses	Bite of infective phlebotomine (Phlebotomus papatasi, P. perfiliewi , P. perniciosus, P. major sensu lato)
	Parasites	
	Leptospira	Contact with abraded skin or mucous membranes with soil, vegetation or water contaminated with urine of infected animals Direct contact with urine or tissues of infected animals Ingestion of food or water contaminated with urine of infected animals

Clinical presentation	The symptoms vary with the agent.					
	Agent	Clinical picture				
	Bacteria					
	Neisseria meningitidis	Meningitis, septicaemia				
	Haemophilus influenza	Meningitis, epiglottitis, pneumonia				
	Streptococcus pneumoniae	Meningitis, pneumonia, septicaemia				
	Listeria monocytogenes	Meningitis, septicaemia				
	Virus					
	West Nile virus	- Usually asymptomatic - Complications: meningitis and encephalitis				
	Enterovirus	- Asymptomatic- Gastro-enteritis, flu-like illness,aseptic meningitis, paralysis				
	Herpes	 Gingivostomatitis (type1), genital infection (type 2) Complications:meningoencephalitis Reactivation is possible 				
	Varicella / Chicken-pox	 Skin eruption: first maculo-papular then vesicular Complications: pneumonia, hemorrhage, meningoencephalitis 				
	Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus	- Influenza-like illness - Complications: meningitis, parotiditis, arthritis, myocarditis				
	Adenovirus	Epidemic herato-conjunctivitis, gastro-enteritis, pharyngo-conjunctival fever, acute respiratory infection Complications:meningoencephalitis				

	1						
	Parasites Leptospira	- Usually self-limited disease: fever, myalgia, headache, photophobia Complications: Aseptic meningitis and meningoencephalitis (Toscana) Rash, hemolytic anemia, hemorrhage, hepato-renal failure, mental confusion, myocarditis					
Worldwide	Acont	Drofile					
	Agent	Profile					
	Bacteria	I= 1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
	Neisseria meningitidis	Endemic in the African meninigitis belt (from Senegal to Ethiopa)					
	Haemophilus influenza	Worldwide under 5 years					
	Streptococcus pneumoniae	Worldwide					
	Listeria monocytogenes	Worldwide					
	Virus						
	West Nile virus	Widespread in Africa, Middle East, North America, India					
	Enterovirus	Worldwide					
	Herpes	Worldwide					
	Varicella / Chicken-pox	Worldwide					
	Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus	America, Europe					
	Adenovirus	Worldwide					
	Sandfly fever viruses	In Mediterranean counties, Europe and Middle East					
	Parasites						
	Leptospirose	Worldwide					
Lebanon	The annual average of reported cases of meningitis is 192. Among them: - Meningitis due to Neisseria meningitis occurs with annual avera of 6 (2-12) cases per year - Meningitis due to Haemophilus influenza occurs with annual average of 1 (0-2) cases per year. - Meningitis due to Streptococcus pneumoniae occurs with annual average of 19 (16-21) cases per year.						
Control objective	Control						
Surveillance and Invest	estigation						
Surveillance approach	Syndromic approach: meningitis						
Investigation: data about case	Demography, clinical presentation status, travel history	on, complications, vaccination					
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	CSF, serum						

	A (11.1					
Investigation: data about contacts	Age, travel history					
Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts	If symptoms					
Test	- CSF: cytology, biochemistry, soluble antigens, culture, PCR - Blood: CBC, culture					
Laboratories	- Clinical laboratories - Reference laboratories: serotypes, virus detection and isolation					
Outbreak level	At least 3 epidemiologically-linked cases with same agent and type					
Notification to WHO	If outbreaks					
Meningitis case definiti	ons					
Meningitis (MOPH circu	lar no. 52 dated on the 10 th April 2007)					
Suspected case	Case presenting fever >= 38.5°C with: - Neck stiffness - And/or other meningeal sign: severe altered consciousness, unexplained headache, photophobia, nausea, vomiting - And/or petechial/purpural rash or other rash. For children under 2 years of age, a case presenting fever (>= 38.5°C) with:					
	- Bulging fontanelle - And/or irritability - And/or lethargy.					
	refer to meningococcal infection chapter					
	e (MOPH circular no. 54 dated on the 10 th April 2007)					
Confirmed case: Hlb	A case of bacterial meningitis that is laboratory-confirmed: - Isolation of Haemophilus influenzae type b (CSF or blood) - Or identification of Hib antigen from normally sterile fluids (CSF or blood)					
West Nile virus (MOPH	circular no. 36 dated on the 5 th May 2012)					
Confirmed case: West Nile	A case with meningitis or encephalitis with laboratory confirmation: - IgG antibody sero-conversion (or significant increase in antibody titers) in two serial specimens collected at a one week interval by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) - Or IgM antibody capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) - Or neutralisation assays - Or viral detection by reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assay - Or virus isolation by cell culture					
Other meningitis						
Confirmed cases	Meningitis with laboratory confirmation of the causative agent by culture, soluble antigens, PCR or other confirmatory tests					
Forms						
Reporting	Specific meningitis reporting form (MOPH circulat no.53 dated on 27 th May 2002) or standard reporting form					
Investigation	Specific investigation form for meningitis (MOPH circulat no.76 dated on 31st July 2013)					




Figure 2: Incidence of Haemophilus Influenza b infection (per 100000) for the under 5 years, 2000 (Source: www.who.int)




Figure 3: Incidence of pneumococcal infection (per 100000) for the under 5 years, 2000 (Source: www.who.int)




Figure 4: Distribution of West Nile fever cases in the region, season 2015 up to 19 Nov 2015 (Source: ECDC)





Figure 5: Distribution of sandfly fever viruses by serotype.

Abbreviations: S: Sandfly Sicilian Virus, N: Sandfly Naples Virus, T: Toscana virus, SFTV: Sandfly Fever Turkey Virus; SFCV: Sandfly Fever Cyprus Virus; GRV: Granada Virus.

(Source: Kocak Tufan Z, Tasyaran MA, Guven T (2013) Sandfly Fever: A Mini Review. Virol Mycol 2: 109)



III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of meningitis surveillance are:

- To monitor incidence of meningitis
- To identify and monitor circulating infectious agents (species and types) of meningitis
- To detect alert and outbreak
- To detect meningitis due to Neisseria meningitidis, Haemophilus influenzae b and ensure needed preventive measures.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is defined by any reported case of meningitis. All reported cases of meningitis need to be investigated.

High alert is defined by one of the following:

- A cluster of acute meningitis (>=3 cases same time and place)
- Relative increase.

An **outbreak** is defined by one of the following:

- At least of 3 confirmed cases in same district, within 2 incubation periods, and with same agent and type
- At least of 3 confirmed cases epi-linked or in same setting within 2 incubation periods, and with same agent and type
- At least one confirmed case of West Nile Fever.

V. Procedural steps

The below steps are recommended for the verification and investigation of meningitis cases, alerts and outbreaks. Figure (6) summarizes those steps.

Step 1: Verify alert

Cases of suspected meningitis are notified to the MOPH immediately, without waiting for microbial confirmation.

Upon notification, the hospital is asked to fill the meningitis reporting form provided in annex (1).

Step 2: Complete data collection

The Esumoh caza team checks the completeness of the reporting form. For each case, the needed information is:

- Demography variables: age, gender, nationality, place of residence (caza and locality)
- Illness: date on onset, presence of purpura...
- Vaccination status
- Laboratory results: CSF findings (culture, cytology, biochemistry soluble antigens), blood culture ...
- Occupation: student, military staff...
- Travel history of the case or family members.

It is very important to collect CSF results and blood culture results. In case of death, a copy of the medical file is requested.

Once the information is completed, the Esumoh caza teams sends all the documents to the Esumoh mohafaza and central levels.

Once data is collected, the meningitis investigation form is filled. The investigation form is provided in annex (2).

Step 3: Identify the agent

Based on available clinical, epidemiological and laboratory findings, the causal agent is suspected and/or identified.

a) Bacterial agents

In case of positive culture, CSF soluble antigens, or PCR, the case is then confirmed.

In case of positive isolate at CSF or blood culture for Neisseria meningitis or Haemophilus influenza, the Esumoh central team coordinates the collection of any isolate to reference laboratory.

At designated reference laboratories, the isolates are confirmed, typed and tested for antimicrobial resistance. It is important to identify the types:

- Of Neisseria meningitidis as some are not covered by vaccines (type B is not covered)
- Of Strepotococcus pneumonia (SP) as used vaccines do not cover all types of SP
- Of Haemophilus influenza.

b) Viral agents

In case of aseptic meningitis, collection of specimens to be tested in reference laboratories to identify the agents is indicated in the following circumstances:

- Cluster for cases
- Relative increase in aseptic meningitis
- Testing for West Nile Virus.

Step 4: Search for additional cases

Additional cases are searched via:

- Passive reporting
- Active surveillance: meningitis is included in the weekly visits to hospitals
- Review of the MOPH hospital admission database
- Laboratory-based surveillance
- Hospital-based mortality surveillance
- Community-based surveillance...

Step 5: Describe cases

a) Description

Cases are described by:

- Time: day, week, month and year of onset
- Place: residence, specific setting
- Person: age group, gender, nationality
- Disease: classification, outcome
- Agent: species and types

Indicators are presented as counts and rates per 100000.

The annex (4) provides a template for descriptive analysis.

b) Outbreak confirmation

Based on the clinical, laboratory and epidemiological findings, the outbreak is declared if the outbreak criteria are met.

c) Results dissemination

The Esumoh central team informs the MOPH units.

The MOPH shares the information related to the outbreak with:

- Health professionals
- WHO
- Other governmental institutions: Ministry of Education and High Education, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Social Affairs...

Step 6: Specific approaches

a) Close contacts targeted for chemoprophylaxis or follow up

Neisseria meningitis, Haemophilus influenza and Mycobacteruim tuberculosis can spreads to close contacts via droplet and/or air transmission.

Close contacts are defined by:

- Household members
- Classmates in school
- Persons sharing same bus school
- All children in kindergarden
- Military sharing same barraks
- Healthcare staff providing care to the patient...

Close contacts are listed in a line listing. The line listing includes the following:

- Name
- Age
- Presence of pregnancy
- Relationship with the patient
- Vaccination status (Hib)...

Prophylaxis with antibiotics is provided to close contacts of Neisseria meningitis, and Haemophilus influenza cases. It is initiated as soon as possible till 14 days from identification of the index patient. Chemoprophylaxis is provided by the caza health physician in coordination with the department for communicable diseases.

Refer to SOP meningococcal meningitis for Neisseria meningitis.

Close contacts of TB meningitis are screened for illness, IDR, sputum exam, and Chest-X ray.

b) Vaccine preventable disease

If there is a cluster or increase in meningitis due to vaccine preventable diseases (Hib, mumps...), there is need to verify the vaccination coverage, the vaccine efficacy and the genotypes.

vaccination coverage is verified via rapid survey. The objective is to measure the proportion of adequately vaccinated persons in a population sample. The target children can be defined as under 5, 10 or 15 years in the vicinity of the case. Vaccination cards or personal health records are checked.

Vaccine efficacy is conducted via case control studies or retrospective cohort studies.

Genotypes of strains if identified are compared with used vaccines in the country.

c) Source of infection

For Mycobacterium tuberculosis, there is need to identify potential sources. All close contacts are screened to identity other cases. The screen includes:

- IDR test twice with 2 months interval
- Chest X ray if symptoms or positive IDR
- Sputum exam if symptoms or positive IDR.

d) Food safety

In case of Listeria monocytogenes, specific investigation on potential food items is conducted:

- Identification of suspected food items
- Food sampling in the market
- Food inspection (if possible).

e) Vector borne diseases

Meningitis can due to virus with vector-borne transmission.

In such case, entomological investigation is conducted, including:


- Assessing the environment
- Collection of vectors (mosquitoes and sandflies)
- Identify vector species
- Confirm infection of the vectors
- Mapping the vectors
- Assess susceptibility for insecticides.

Step 7: Enhance monitoring

During the outbreak, cases are monitored on daily basis. Weekly report is prepared and shared with partners.

Step 8: Write summary report

At the end of the event, the Esumoh central team prepares a summary report. The report is shared with partners.



Meningitis - Annex 1

الجممورية اللبنانية



استمارة إبلاغ عن التهاب السحايا الحاد

ا)- أسريض 1)- أسريض 25 العوارض الإكلينيكية للعريض 10 المريض 10 الشهوة 10 الشهوة		 M	ES:	رقم ∪			
The fever			I ES	رکتر			ورا ره الــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ
المدروية		بة للمريض	5) – العوارض الإكلينيك				1)- المريض
Neck stiffness	ضع علامة x						
البين الولادة :			Fever			. – – – – – .	
الجنس الجنس الجنس Bulging fontanel Purpura Septic choc Purpura Septic choc Gangrene كرّره ، حدد كرّره ، حدد كرّره ، حدد كاريخ المدينة كرّره ، حدد كاريخ المدينة كرّره ، حدد كاريخ المدينة			Neck stiffness				
Bulying rontanela Purpura Septic choc			Vomiting				_
Septic choc Gangrene التنوان			Bulging fontanel	ا انتی		∐ ڏکر	الجنس :
الجنبية العزوان العزوان العزوان المنافعاء العزوان المنافعاء العزوان ا			Purpura				2/- عنه إن المريض
الغنوان :			Septic choc				
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القضاء :			غیره ، حدد :			·	العنوان :_
رقم الهاتف: العالم المستشفاة (25) - 20 (الاستشفاء Memingititis Haemophilus Influenzae b New Continuenzae b المريخ دخول المستشفى Pneumococcus اسم المطبيب المعالج: المن الغذاج، مؤخرا ؟ اسم المطبيب المعالج: المن الغذاج، مؤخرا ؟ المغنة العرصات المغيرية - في حال إجراء الفعوصات المغيرية - في حال إجراء الفعوصات المغيرية ، ترفق النتلج: المنابع: المغنة العرصة، ترفق النتلج: المنابع: CSF- direct المنابع: المؤلفة: المنابع: CSF- culture المنابع: CSF - culture العنابع: CSF - antigens العنابع: Blood - CBC العنابع: Blood - CBC العنابع: Blood - CBC العنابع: Blood - CBC العنابع: الإنابع: المنابع: الإنابة: المنابع: المريش بالمضادات العنوية قبل نخواد المنابع: المنابع: المريش بالمنابع: المنابع: المنابع: المنابع: المنابع: المنابع: المنابع: المنابع: المنابع: المنابع: ا			المناف الثاقب			· – – – – – · ·	
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Ticky dispersion تاریخ نشور العوارض			meningitidis				3)- عن الاستشفاء
تاريخ دخول المستشفى : - هل سافر المريض أو أحد المقربين إلى الخارج، مؤخرا ؟ اسم المسليب المعالج من سافر ؟ إلى أي البلد؟ تاريخ العودة الى لبنان؟ (مةم المهاتف 8) ــ ما هم مهنة المريض؟ المهنة المخبرية ، ترفق النتائج المحبين إلى الغربيض؟ المجبرية ، ترفق النتائج المحبيض المضادة / الثكنة : CSF - direct CSF - culture CSF - antigens Blood - CBC <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>• ,</td> <td></td>						• ,	
تاريخ التشخيص 7)- هل سافر المريض أو أحد المقربين إلى الخارج، مؤخرا ؟ اسم المستشفى اسم المؤبيب المعالج تاريخ العودة الى لينان؟ 4)- نتائج الفحوصات المخبرية - في حال إجراء الفحوصات المخبرية ، ترفق النتائج. 8)- ما هي مهنة المريض ؟ المخبرية ، ترفق النتائج. 8)- ما هي مهنة المريض ؟ المخبرية ، ترفق النتائج. المؤسسة :			_				_
اسم الطبيب المعالج :	L		<u> </u>			:	-
رقم الهاتف : 4)- نتائج الفحوصات المخبرية - في حال إجراء الفحوصات المخبرية ، ترفق النتائج. 8)- ما هي مهنة المريض ؟ الهمينة : الهمينة : أجريت، ضع X المؤسسة : أجريت، ضع X المؤسسة : CSF- direct CSF- chemical CSF - culture CSF - antigens Blood - CBC Blood - CBC Blood - CBC Blood - Culture Ab حولج المريض بالمضادات الحيوية قبل دخوله إلى المستشفى ؟ - عن أهل الدار أذا : - 20 أدا نعم المذاذ : - 30 أسم المؤسسة : - 30 أسم المبلغ : - 30 أسم ال	الخارج، مؤخرا ؟	أو أحد المقربين إلى	7)- هل سافر المريض			:	
(المخبرية) ترفق النتائج (المجند) (المجن	تاريخ العودة الى لبنان؟	إلى أي البلد؟	من سافر ؟			:	•
المخبرية ، ترفق النتائج. A المهنة المريض ؟ المهنة المهنة المريض ؟ المهنة خريث منع x مرفقة، ضع x المؤسسة المدرسة / دار الحضائة / الثكنة :						:	رقم الهاتف
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CSF- direct CSF - chemical CSF - chemical CSF - culture CSF - antigens Blood - CBC Blood - culture ab a gets the		بض ؟	8) – ما هي مهنة المري	(عقق عنات	ان إجراء	اسعبري- دي ح	
CSF- direct CSF - chemical CSF - chemical CSF - culture CSF - antigens Blood - CBC Blood - culture act Ilyector :		:		، ضع x	مرفقة،	أجريت، ضع x	
CSF - chemical CSF - culture CSF - culture CSF - culture CSF - antigens CSF - antigens CSF - antigens Blood - CBC Blood - culture CSF - antigens Blood - culture CSF - antigens CSF - culture CSF - antigens CSF - an		:					CSF- direct
CSF - culture CSF - antigens Blood - CBC Blood - culture هل عولج المريض بالمضادات الحيوية قبل دخوله إلى المستشفى ؟ إذا نعم، ماذا : ومنذ متى : الجرثومة المسببة : المحظات :	/ النكنة :	سه / دار الحضالة	اسم المؤسسة / المدر				
CSF - antigens Blood - CBC Blood - culture Ab عولج المريض بالمضادات الحيوية قبل دخوله إلى المستشفى ؟ إذا نعم ماذا :			ا ــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ				+
Blood - CBC		·					
Blood - culture Can lhalia		·					
هل عولج المريض بالمضادات الحيوية قبل دخوله إلى المستشفى ؟ و) – عن أهل الدار عدد الأفراد في البيت : =		:	رقم الهاتف				
انعم انعم انفراد في البيت الفراد في البيت الفراد في البيت المدر أطفال دون 5 سنوات: نعم / كلا ومنذ متى المدرثومة المسببة السم المبلغ التاريخ التاريخ التوقيع الت				P & #::	11 111	السيانية قاردند	l .
إذا نعم، ماذا : فل يوجد أطفال دون 5 سنوات : نعم /كلا ومنذ متى : (10 ومند متى :				ىنسقى :	له إلى المس		-
ومنذ متى : في المبلغ : السم المبلغ : السم المبلغ : السم المبلغ : التاريخ : التاريخ : التوقيع : ال							,
الجرثومة المسببة : السم المبلغ : التريخ : التاريخ : التوقيع : التوق	/ کار	ر 5 سنوات : نعم	هل يوجد اطفال دول			. – – – – – –	,
الجرثومة المسببة : التاريخ : التاريخ : ملاحظات : التوقيع			10)- عن المبلغ				ومنذ متى :
ملاحظات : التاريخ : التوقيع : التوق							الحرث مة المسية
النوقيع :							
تبلغ الاستمارة إلى وحدة الترصد الوبائي فور الاشتباه بالحالة			_				
ا بنيع الاستمارة إلى وحدة الترصد الوباتي بور الاستباه بالعالم	ä llalli, almania	المرائد ما المرائد	. II s J. s. M . i s				
لأخذ التدايير اللازمة للمخالطين.		-	-				

تلفون: 01/614195 فاكس: 01/610920

Meningitis - Annex 2

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة – برنامج الترصد الوبائي استمارة تقصي لحالة التهاب السحايا الحاد

تعبئ الاستمارة من قبل فريق وزارة الصحة العامة

				1) المريض					
العنوان	الجنسية		تاريخ الولادة	ں	الجنس	1) المريض الاسم الثلاثي			
				انثی	□ ذکر 🗆				
	قِم الهاتف	J	البلدة	اع	القض	نوع الاقامة			
						 □ مقيم □ عامل اجنبي □ لاجئ 			
						2) الاستشفاء			
رقم هاتف الطبيب	م الطبيب المعالج	اس	تاريخ الدخول		ىتشفى	# اسم المس			
			T	T		3) العوارض السريرية تاريخ ظهور العوارض			
اخرى	عوارض		مضاعفات		طفح جلد	تاريخ ظهور العوارض			
			□ Septic choc	□ None					
			□ Gangrena	□ Purpu					
				1	lo-papular				
				□ Vesic	ular				
						4) فحص السائل النخاعي			
Soluble antigens	Lymphocytes	% Segmented %		WE	BC/mm3	CSF appearance			
Other	Culture	Gram Stain		Glucose		Proteins			
						5) فحوص اخرى			
	Other tes	ts.		Bloc	od culture	Platelets			
	Other tes				ou curture	ridecies			
				·	zeti -t -	11 . 3.41 . 1			
النتيجة	الفحص		11. : 2 11	<i>ي</i> -٠٠٪	ص نروم التقصد داریت در دا	 6) جمع عينات اضافية من المريد 			
ستخه	الفخص		المختبر المرجعي	عيبه ا	تاريخ جمع اا	نوع العينة الله الله الله الله الله الله الله الل			
						ں سرتہ جرنومیہ □ مصل			
						🗖 سائل نخاعي			
						7) نوع التهاب السحايا الحاد			
🗆 غیرہ			🗆 فيروسية			🗆 جرثومية			
		□ Her			□ Neisseria				
□ Fungus: □ M						nilus influenza			
I			st Nile Virus			occus pneumonia			
		□ Oth				nonocytogenes			
		∣ □ Not	identified		□ Mycobacterium tuberculosis				
					□ Other: □ Not ident	Hifiod			
		L			I - Mor ideu	uneu			

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة – برنامج الترصد الوبائي استمارة تقصي لحالة التهاب السحايا الحاد

8) الوضع التلقيحي

MMR	Meningococcal Pneumococcal Haemophilus inf			nf عدد الجرعات	
					تاريخ آخر جرعة
ملاحظات	تاريخ العودة الى لبنان	/ المدينة	البلد	ظهور العوارض المسافر	9) سفر الى الخارج خلال شهر قبل
		·	·	ريض	
				قربين:	
				ريض قربين :	
on tire till	. (- 1)	v.t.ti 1	. "1	ï 11 ~ .	10) مهنة المريض
اسم المدير ورقم الهاتف	المعنوان	اء والبلدة	الفضي	نوع المؤسسة I	وضع المريض طفل في البيت
					□ طفل في البيت □ طفل في دار الحضانة
					□ طفل في دار الخصالة □ تلميذ، صف:
					□ تعقید، تحتف. □ طالب جامعي
					□ عسكري
					ے رپ □ مدر <i>س</i>
					_ دو □ غيره:
ملاحظات	ا بن نلقوا الوقاية	مدائن	٠۵	عدد المستهد	11) وقاية المخالطين
	بن تعور الوقاية	<u> </u>	.قين		🗖 المنزل
					_ رو _ دار الحضانة
					□ مدر سة
					□ ثكنة عسكرية
					🗖 المستشفى
					🗆 غيره
	ض)	يخ ظهور العوار.	ِ شهر من تار	سال بالمريض بعد مرور	12) تطور حالة المريض (يتم الاتص تاريخ الاتصال
🗆 و فاة	اشتركات			□ شفاء	تاريخ الاتصال
□Date of death:	☐ Hearing loss				
	□ Paralysis				
	□ Other:				
نوع السحايا	يهور العوارض			لـ (خلال فترة شهر قبل و عدد الحالاه	13) وجود حالات اخرى في المحيد
سوح است	هور احوار <u>ت</u>	-ر ی -			🗖 المنزل
					□ دار الحضانة
					 _ ثكنة عسكرية
					🗖 المستشفى
					🗆 غيره
مكافحة الامراض الانتقالية.	صد الوبائي ونسخة الى دائرة	فة الى برنامج التر	محافظة، نسخ	مني، ترسل نسخة الى الم	عند الانتهاء من تعبئة استمارة التقد

Meningitis - Annex 3

						<m##></m##>		ID	
								Name	
						<u>^</u>			
						<m,f> d/</m,f>		Sex	
						d/m/y>	Ag	e (month/year)	
						<dd mm="" yyyy=""></dd>		Date onset	
						# >		Week	
								Caza	
								Commune	
Pa						^Y,N>	Fo	orm completed	
Page No.						^Y,N>		Purpura	
<u> </u>						<t,c,b></t,c,b>		appearance	
						#		WBC (%PN)	
						#		Pro (g/l)	
							CSF	Gram	
								culture	
								soluble antigens	
	 						Blood	Gram	
							bod	culture	
								Bacterial	
								usative agent if identified	
						<y,n> <r,d,s></r,d,s></y,n>	Pro	Prophylaxis if Nm ot Hib	
						<r,d,s></r,d,s>		Evolution	
								Hospital	

Republic of Lebanon. Ministry of Public Health. Epidemiological Surveillance Program

MENINGITIS Surveillance LINE LISTING


Meningitis - Annex 4

Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health - Epidemiological Surveillance Program Descriptive Surveillance Findings



1. Cumulative number =







3. Cases by time: counts and rates (/100000)

		Pop20	All meningitis			Bacterial meningitis				Neisseria meningitidis				
			N20	R20	R20	R20	N20	R20	R20	R20	N 20	R20	R20	R20
onset	Jan													
	Feb													
	Mar													
	Apr													
	Mai													
by month of	Jun													
	Jul													
	Aug													
	Sep													
	Oct													
	Nov													
	Dec													
	Total													

4. Monthly incidence for all meningitis



5. Monthly incidence for bacterial meningitis



6. Cases by infectious agent

	Case	es	Deaths		
				CFR	
Etiology	N 20	% 20	D 20	20	
Nm					
Hi					
SP					
Bact Other					
BNOS					
Viral					
Unsp.					
Total, N					

7. By commune

Commune	N	Commune	Ν

8. By age group

	N 20	% 20
0-4 y		
0-4 y 5-14 y		
15-24 y		
25-64 y		
65+ y		
Unsp		
Total		

Notes

Notes

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Mumps

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 51 (19th Jan 2015)

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III. Objectives of surveillance	254
IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds	255
V December 1 states	055
V. Procedural steps	255
Step 1: Verify alert	
Step 2: Collect data	
Step 3: Collect specimen	
Step 4: Identify contacts	
Step 5: Describe cases	
a) Time, place and person	
b) Cross checking	
Step 6: Confirm the outbreak	
Step 7: Search for additional cases	
Step 8: Conduct further studies	
Step 9: Enhance monitoring Step 10: Write summary report	
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Annex 1: Mumps investigation form

Mumps 252

I. Purpose
The present Standard Operating Procedure is to guide the Epidemiological Surveillance Program on how to proceed in case of alert or outbreak of Mumps.

II. Generalities

Mumps	
Agent	Mumps virus, genus Rubulavirus, family Paramyxoviridae
Incubation	17 days (14-25 days)
Period of communicability	 Virus present in saliva 7 days prior and 9 days after parotiditis onset Virus present in urine 6 days prior and 15 days after onset Max 2 days prior and 4 days after onset
Reservoir	Humans
Modes of transmission	Person-to-person transmission: droplet and can be airborne
Clinical presentation	 Common manifestation: parotiditis (30-40%) Asymptomatic in 20% Complications: orchitis, oophoritis, sensoneuronal loss, hearing loss, pancreatitis (4%), aseptic meningitis/encephalitis. Rarely nephritis, arthropathy, cardiac abnormalities, death
Worldwide	Worldwide. Usually no outbreaks
Lebanon	- Annual average of reported cases 73 (14-233) from 1997 to 2013 - National outbreak in 2014-2015
Control objective	Control
Surveillance and Investi	gation
Surveillance approach	Disease
Investigation: data about case	Symptoms, complications, vaccination status, setting, profession
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	- Serum, urine, oral fluid (1-6 weeks after onset) - CSF if meningitis
Investigation: data about contacts	- Cases among contact
Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts	Specimen if the contact developes symptoms
Test	IgM, PCR, virological culture
Laboratories	- IgM serology at RHUH - Virus culture: supranational laboratories
Outbreak level	At least 3 confirmed cases epidemiologically-linked
Notification to WHO	To notify to WHO if outbreak
<u>. </u>	MOPH circular no. 110 dated on the 6th September 2006)
Confirmed case	A suspected case confirmed by laboratory by one of the following tests: - Isolation of mumps virus from clinical specimen (throat swab, urine or CSF) - Seroconversion or significant rise (at least fourfold) in serum mumps IgG titre (in the absence of mumps immunization in the preceding 6 weeks) - Positive serological test for mumps—specific IgM antibodies (in the absence of mumps immunization in the preceding 6 weeks).

Acute onset of unilateral or bilateral tender, self-limited swelling of
the parotid or other salivary gland, lasting 2 or more days without other apparent cause.
Standard reporting form
For case: specific mumps investigation form (MOPH circular no. 152 dated on the 15th October 2007)
es of mumps, Lebanon, 1997-2014 (Source: MOPH)


800 700 600 800 700 600 90 400 200 100

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Year

International figures

Figure 2: Reported mumps cases, worldwide, 1999-2014 (Source: WHO)



III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance of mumps are:

- To monitoring mumps incidence in Lebanon and descibe characteristics
- To detect and investigate outbreaks
- To identify risk factors
- to identify circulating mumps virus.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is defined by one of the following:

- A cluster of mumps cases
- At least 3 reported cases in an institution/setting
- Relative increase.

An **outbreak** is defined by one of the following:

- At least 3 confirmed cases in an institution/setting
- Observed incidence > expected incidence of cases.

V. Procedural steps

In case of alert, the following steps are recommended. They are summarized in figure (4).

Step 1: Verify alert

Alerts are detected by the Esumoh teams at caza, mohafaza and central levels.

Upon the detection of an alert, the Esumoh team verifies the following:

- The suspected diagnosis
- The real increase of the number of cases
- The presence of cluster.

Verification is done by:

- Checking the real increase in the database
- Contacting the healthcare providers.

Step 2: Collect data

Upon verification of an alert, the Esumoh caza team collects data on all mumps cases. The Esumoh team interviews the patient or the parents, and fills the investigation form (Annex 1). The investigation form includes the following information:

- Demography: age group, gender, nationality...
- Disease: clinical presentation, complications, case management...
- Vaccination status
- Risk factors: occupation, institution...

The information on vaccination status is collected from the vaccination cards or personal health records. If such document is not available, the treating physician or the medical center is contacted to have the needed information.

Step 3: Collect specimen

For each cluster, there is need to have laboratory confirmation.

The collection of specimens for mumps is done by:

- The healthcare facility: medical center, hospital, laboratory...
- Or by Esumoh staff for outpatients.

The needed specimens include: oral fluid, serum, CSF, urine... The tests include: serology (IgM, IgG), PCR, virus isolation. Tests are done at RHUH or at supranational laboratory.

Based on clinical, laboratory and epidemiological findings, case is classified as shown in figure (3).

Step 4: Identify contacts

The investigation includes the identification of close contacts in particular at household and

Contacts are assessed for their vaccination status.

Step 5: Describe cases

a) Time, place and person

Cases are described by:

- Time: week, month and year of onset
- Place: place of residence or work in terms of locality, caza and mohafaza
- Person: age group, sex, nationality, and vaccination status. Vaccination status is displayed by age group.
- Disease: classification, complications...

b) Cross checking

Data is also compared with the findings of various surveillance systems:

- Medical-based surveillance system
- Meningitis surveillance
- Hospital-based mortality surveillance
- Event-based surveillance...

Step 6: Confirm the outbreak

Based on the epidemiological and laboratory findings, the outbreak is declared. The Esumoh informs the concerned units at the MOPH, in particular the EPI.

The MOPH informs the national partners: health professionals, the MEHE, the kindergratens. Official memos are issued by the MOPH to inform health professionals. Also, the MOPH informs the WHO based on the IHR(2005) criteria.

Step 7: Search for additional cases

Additional cases are searched from various sources:

- Indicator-based surveillance:
 - Enhancing passive surveillance
 - · Including pertussis in active surveillance
- Community search via field visits (if needed)
- Event-based surveillance...

Step 8: Conduct further studies

Based on the extend of the outbreak and identified potential risk factors, additional studies can be conducted as:


- Analytic studies: to assess vaccine efficacy
- Virus genotyping: to identify circulating virus.

Step 9: Enhance monitoring

During an outbreak, the Esumoh central team prepares weekly reports to monitor cases and share them with EPI and partners.

Step 10: Write summary report

Once the outbreak has ended, the Esumoh central team prepares a summary report describing the cases, and the factors. The summary report is shared with health partners.



Mumps - Annex 1

الجمهورية اللبنانية - وزارة الصحة العامة - برنامج الترصد الوبائي

استمارة تقصي لحالات أبو كعب / Mumps / Oreillons

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Mumps. Agent: Mumps virus (family Paramyxoviridae). Reservoir: humans. Transmission: airborne, droplet, direct contact with saliva of infected person. Incubation: 14-25 days. Communicability: 7 days before parotitis and 9 days after.

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Pertussis

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 37 (19th Jan 2015)

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Step 8: Identify risk factors Step 9: Enhance monitoring	
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Annex 1: Pertussis investigation form


I. Purpose
The present Standard Operating Procedure is to guide the Esumoh on how to proceed in case of alert or outbreak of Pertussis.

II. Generalities

Pertussis	
Agent	Bacteria: Bordetella pertussis (the bacillus of pertussis) or Bordetella parapertussis (causes parapertussis)
Incubation	9-10 days (6-20 days)
Period of communicability	- During the early catarrahal phase (up to 3 weeks) - No longer after 5 days of antibiotic treatement
Reservoir	- Humans for B. pertussis - Ovins for B. parapertussis
Modes of transmission	Person-to-person: direct contact with respiratory discharges and droplets, rarely by indirect contact though contaminated objects
Clinical presentation	 Upper respiratory infection Complications: apnea (<1 y), encephalopathy, hernias, death Mis-diasgnosed among adults
Worldwide	- Worldwide. Outbreak every 3-4 years (in prevaccine era) - In high coverage area: incidence for under 15 y is <1/100000.
Lebanon	Annual average of 31 cases (1-65)
Control objective	Control
Surveillance and Investi	gation
Surveillance approach	Disease
Investigation: data about case	Symptoms, complications, vaccination status
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	Throat swab
Investigation: data about contacts	Children under 1 year among close contacts
Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts	None
Test	Bacteriological culture
Laboratories	RHUH
Outbreak level	At least 3 confirmed cases epidemiologically-linked
Notification to WHO	If outbreak
Control	
Primary prevention	Vaccine
Case management	Erythromycin or clarythromycin
Isolation	 Cases should be excluded from school for five days after starting antibiotic treatment Hospitalized patients should be placed in droplet precautions
Contact prevention	Erythromycin
Mass prevention	- Childhood vaccination - Adults should receive a booster with acellular pertussis.


Pertussis case definitio	Pertussis case definition (MOPH circular no. 109 dated on the 6th September 2006)			
Confirmed case	A suspected case that is laboratory confirmed with: Isolation of Bordetella pertussis (or parapertussis) Or detection of genomic sequences by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) Or positive paired serology			
Suspected case	 - A person with a cough lasting at least 2 weeks with at least one of the following symptoms: - Paroxysms (fits) of coughing - Inspiratory "whooping" - Post-tussive vomiting (vomiting immediately after coughing) - Or a case diagnosed as pertussis by a physician 			
Forms				
Reporting	Standard reporting form			
Investigation	Pertussis investigation form (MOPH circular no. 192 dated on the 2 nd November 2007)			
National figures				

Figure 1: Reported pertussis in Lebanon, 1997-2014 (Source: MOPH)



International figures

Figure 2: Reported pertussis cases worldwide, 1980-2014 (Source: WHO)



III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance of pertussis are:

- To monitoring pertussis
- To detect and confirm outbreaks
- To identify risk factors.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is defined by one of the following:

- A cluster of pertussis cases
- At least 3 reported cases in an institution/setting
- Relative increase.

An **outbreak** is defined by one of the following:

- At least 3 confirmed cases in an institution/setting
- Observed incidence exceeding the expected incidence of cases.

V. Procedural steps

In case of alert or outbreak, the following steps are recommended. They are summarized in figure (5).

Step 1: Verify alert

The detection of alert is done by the Esumoh caza/mohafaza team or the Esumoh central team. Upon the detection of an alert, the Esumoh peripheral team contacts the healthcare provider to verify the following:

- The suspected diagnosis
- The time and place of the event
- The suspected cluster (if any).

Once verified, the Esumoh peripheral team informs the Esumoh central team.

Step 2: Collect data

Upon the verification of the alert, the Esumoh caza team collects data on all pertussis suspected cases.

This is done by filling the investigation form (Annex 1), and interviewing the patient or the parents. The investigation form includes the following information:

- Demography: age group, gender, nationality...
- Disease: clinical presentation, complications, case management, date starting antibiotic
- Vaccination status
- Risk factors: occupation, institution
- Contacts: age group, disease...

For the vaccination status, data is collected from the vaccination cards or personal health records. If such document is not available, the treating physician or the medical center is contacted to have the needed information.

Step 3: Collect specimen

For each cluster, there is need to have laboratory confirmation.


The collection of specimens for pertussis is done by the treating physician in a healthcare facility. No specimens for pertussis should be taken by the Esumoh staff outside the hospital.

The needed specimen is a throat swab in adequate media for bacteria growth. Such swabs are provided by the Esumoh central staff. Tests are done in laboratory designated by the MOPH.

The case is classified as shown in figure (4).

The table below summarizes the needed specimens and tests for pertussis.

Table 1: Needed specimens and tests for pertussis confirmation				
Specimen	Tests	Timing	Notes	
Nasopharyngeal swab or nasal aspirate	Culture	First 2 weeks	Avoid if collected after 5 days of antibio-therapy	
	PCR	First 4 weeks		
Serum	Serology	From 2-8 weeks		



Step 4: Identify contacts

During the investigation, close contacts are identified, in particular at the household. For each contact, the following information is needed: relation, age, and vaccination status. Based on the national guidelines, vaccination and antibiotic prophylaxis is indicated for specific age groups.

Step 5: Describe cases

a) Time, place and person

Cases are described by:

- Time: week, month and year of onset
- Place: place of residence or work in terms of locality, caza and mohafaza
- Person: age group, sex, nationality, and vaccination status. Vaccination status is displayed by age group.
- Disease: classification, complications, inpatient...

b) Cross checking

Also, other sources providing data on acute respiratory infection are verified, in particular:

- Acute respiratory infection reported from dispensaries and medical centers
- Acute respiratory infection reported from schools
- Severe acute respiratory infections reported from ICU and SARI sentinel sites
- Event-based surveillance, including NGOs...

Step 6: Confirm the outbreak

Based on the epidemiological and laboratory findings, the outbreak is declared. EPI is informed. Official memos are issued by the MOPH to inform health professionals.

Step 7: Search for additional cases

Additional cases are searched from various sources:

- Indicator-based surveillance:
 - Enhancing passive surveillance
 - · Including pertussis in active surveillance
 - ICU-based surveillance...
- Event-based surveillance
- Community search (if needed).

Step 8: Identify risk factors

Based on the extend of the outbreak and identified potential risk factors, additional studies can be conducted as:

- Analytic studies: to assess vaccine efficacy
- Assess the vaccine cold chain...


Step 9: Enhance monitoring


During an outbreak, national weekly reports are prepared in order to monitor cases and to share them with EPI and partners.

The weekly reports are prepared by the Esumoh central team.

Step 10: Write summary report

Once the outbreak has ended, the Esumoh central team prepares a summary report describing cases and the factors. The summary report is shared with health partners.





Pertussis - Annex 1

الجمهورية اللبنانية - وزارة الصحة العامة - برنامج الترصد الوبائي

استمارة تقصى لحالات الشاهوق / Pertussis / Coqueluche

تعبأ الاستمارة من قبل وزارة الصحة العامة / فريق الترصد الوبائي 1) التقصي اسم المحقق تاريخ التقصى رقم استمارة التقصيي رقم استمارة Esu 2) المريض الاسم الثلاثي عند الولادة الجنس تاريخ الولادة العمر اسم الزوج الجنسية □ذکر □انثی رقم الهاتف البلدة القضاء عنوان السكن: المحافظة 3) الوضع التلقيحي تواريخ الجرعات الداعمة Booster تواريخ الجرعات الثلاث الأول عدد الجر عات وثيقة تلقيح الثانبة الأولى الثالثة الثانبة الأولي □نعم □کلا 4) المرض الأشتر اكات ، المضاعفات: تاريخ ظهور العواض دخل المستشفى \Box \Box _نعم Apnea _نعم ∟کلا اسم المستشفي □نعم Seizures العوارض السريرية: \Box _نعم Encephalopathy \Box _نعم Pneumonia □نعم Paroxysmal cough ً]نعم \Box □نعم وفاة]کلا Post-tussive vomiting تاريخ الوفاة Inspiratory whoup _نعم 5) الفحوصات المخبرية نوع الفحص المخبري إجراء فحص مخبري □مصلی مزدوج $DFA \square$ $PCR \square$ \Box □غيره: □زرع _نعم 6) المهنة مهنة المريض اذا نعم، حدد عنوان العمل: کلا نعم القضياء البلدة المؤسسة يعمل في مؤسسة صحية يتردد او يعمل في دار حضانة يتردد أو يعمل في مدرسة 7) حالات اخرى في المحيط خلال الشهر الذي سبق ظهور العوارض عدد الحالات في المنزل عدد الافر اد في المنز ل عدد الحالات في الجيران عدد الحالات في العمل 8) أشخاص معرضة للإصابة بالشاهوق مكان العمل أو الدراسة المنز ل غيره: \Box طفل دون السنة \Box نعم، عدد \Box نعم، عدد نعم، عدد \Box کلا امر أة حامل \Box □نعم، عدد \Box نعم، عدد 🗌 نعم، عدد شخص يعتني باطفال دون السنة \Box 2K□نعم، عدد \Box □نعم، عدد \Box □نعم، عدد 9)خلاصة الوضع التلقيحي تفشى المرض تصنيف الحالة _ملقح □غير ملقح □مجموعة □فردية □مشتبهة □مثنتة □غير معروف

Pertussis or whooping cough. Agent: Bordetella pertussis. Reservoir: Humans. Transmission: direct contact with discharges from respiratory mucous membranes of infected person; airborne via droplets. Incubation: 9-10 days (6-20 days). Communicability: 1 week before onset of cough and 2 weeks after.

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Plague

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 29 (19th Jan 2015)

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Annex 1: Plague investigation form

I. Purpose
The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps to be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance program in case of alert or outbreak of plague.

II. Generalities

Plague	
Agent	- Bacteria: Yersinia pestis
	- Can be used in biological warfare
Incubation	1-7 days
Period of	- Pneumonic plague: during the active phase
communicability	Bubonic phase (rare): if contact with pus from suppurative buboes
Reservoir	Wild rodents, lagomorphs (rabbits, hares), wild carnivores and domestic cats
Modes of transmission	 Most common: bite of infected fleas (Xenopsylla cheopis, rat flea) Handling tissues of infected animals Laboratory exposure
	 Person-to-person: Airborne droplets from patients with pneumonia or pharyngitis plague Pulex irritans fleas (human flea) Aerosol: deliberate use
Clinical presentation	 Bubonic plague (90%): febrile lymph nodes that become swollen, inflamed, tender and may suppurate. Most often the inguinal area is concerned, and less commonly in axillary and cervical areas. Complications: septicemic plague, meningitis, disseminated intravascular coagulation, pneumonia, mediastinitis, pleural effusion, endotoxin shock Secondary pneumonic plague: source of primary pneumonic or pharyngitis plague, causing localized outbreaks Case fatality: 50-60%
Worldwide	 - Urban plague: Africa - Wild plague: America, Africa, Asia, Europe - Endemic in China, India, Las, Mongolia, Myanmar, Vietnam, Ecuador, Brazil and Peru
Lebanon	Cases were reported during the 14 th century. No report was found since 1994.
Control objective	Control
Surveillance and Investi	gation
Surveillance approach	Disease
Investigation: data about case	Clinical presentation, complications, occupation, exposure
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	Blood, clotted blood
Investigation: data about contacts	Identify contacts and ensure needed follow up

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Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts	If symptom
Test	Culture, PHA test, seroconversion, FA
Laboratories	WHO reference laboratories
Outbreak level	At least 1 confirmed case
Notification to WHO	Yes
Plague case definition (N	MOPH circular no. 113 dated on the 6th September 2006)
Confirmed case	A suspected or probable case that is laboratory confirmed by: - Isolation of Yersinia pestis in cultures from buboes, blood, CSF or sputum - Or passive haemagglutination (PHA) test, demonstrating an at least 4-fold change in antibody titre specific for F1 antigen of Y. pestis (haemagglutination inhibition test in paired sera)
Probable case	Suspected case with: - Positive direct fluorescent antibody (FA) test for Yersinia pestis in clinical specimen - Or passive haemagglutination test, with antibody titre of at least 1:10, specific for the F1 antigen of Y. pestis as determined by the haemagglutination inhibition test (HI) - Or Epidemiological link with a confirmed case
Suspected case	Rapid onset of fever, chills, headache, severe malaise, prostration with: - For the bubonic form: extreme painful swelling of lymph nodes (buboes) - For the pneumonic form: cough with blood-stained sputum, chest pain and difficult breathing Both forms can progress to a septicaemic form with toxaemia.
Forms	
Reporting	Standard reporting form
Investigation	Plague investigation form (MOPH circular no.8 dated on the 7 th January 2015)
National figures	

National figures

No cases reported in Lebanon during the last 2 centuries.

International figures (Source: www.who.int)

400 cases reported to WHO in 2012 in 5 countries from Africa and America.

Figure 1: Reported human plague cases, worldwide, 2000-2009 (Source: WHO and CDC)



III. Objective of surveillance

The objectives of the plague surveillance are:

- To identify and confirm any plague case/outbreak
- To investigate any outbreak
- To trigger the CBRN committee in case of bio-terrorism event
- To document the containment of any plague outbreak.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is defined by any suspected case.

An **outbreak** is defined by at least 1 confirmed case.

V. Procedural steps

In case of an alert or outbreak of plague, the Esumoh proceeds with the following steps. They are summarized in figure (3).

Step 1: Verify alert

Any alert needs to be verified.

The Esumoh team that receives the information contacts the source, healthcare providers to verify the information. It is important to contact the treating physician or the hospital focal point to verify the diagnosis. Do the health professionals suspecting plague?

Once verified, the Esumoh central level and the MOPH/DG are immediately informed.

Step 2: Collect data

Upon verification of the information, the Esumoh central team initiates data collection using the investigation form (Annex 1). The data is collected from the interview of the patient or the relatives, the interview of the treating physician and the consultation of the medical file and laboratory results.

The investigation form includes the following core information:

- Demography: age, gender, occupation, place of residence
- Disease: date of onset, clinical presentation (bubonic, septicaemic, pneumonic), complications, case management, evolution
- Exposure: place of exposure if known, source of exposure if known, possible exposure of other persons in contact with the patient...

Step 3: Confirm the case

Any suspected case of plague needs to be confirmed.

The table (1) summarizes the needed specimens from suspected cases. Confirmation needs to be done in reference laboratory.

Table 1: Needed specimens and tests for plague confirmation			
Specimens	Tests	Notes	
Lymph node aspirate	Microscopy, culture	PCR, Direct fluorescent	
Bubo aspirate	Microscopy, culture	antibody (DFA)	
Blood	Microscopy, culture		
Serum	Serological tests	Paired sera (acute and convalescent 4-6 weeks)	
Sputum	Culture		
Respiratory wash	Culture		
Autopsy	PCR, Direct fluorescent antibody (DFA)	Post-mortem: lymph, spleen, lung, liver, bone marrow	

Plague 277

Specimens need to be collected before treatment. On microscopy, the Y. pestis appears as bipolar-staining, ovoid, Gram-negative organisms with a "safety pin".

If cultures are negative, and plague is still suspected, serologic testing is indicated to confirm the diagnosis.

In case of death of the case before the collection of specimens, specimens are collected:

- In post-mortem: autopsy
- Among close contacts: blood samples (ex: family members).

Based on clinical, laboratory and epidemiological findings, the case is classified as shown in figure (2).

Upon the confirmation of at least one case, an outbreak is declared.

The main question following the confirmation is: Is the case related to animal/fleas contact or to bioterrorism attack?

Step 4: Inform

The MOPH informs officially:

- The CBRN national committee
- The WHO, based on the IHR(2005)
- The health professionals, to be aware on the event
- The MOA...

Based on the IHR (2005), plague in Lebanon will be serious and unexpected event. The event fills the criteria of potential public health event of international concern. The notification to WHO allows also to refer the specimens to supranational laboratories and to benefit from technical support.

The CBRN national committee needs to know about the event. The national team will be mobilized to investigate any source of deliberate release.

Health professionals are informed via official letters to Orders of Physicians, Syndicate of private hospitals, and Syndicate of private laboratories. The official memos include summary information on the event and reminder on case definition, and how to notify cases to MOPH.

Step 5: Find additional cases

a) Indicator-based surveillance

Health professionals are asked to report immediately any suspected case. The importance of prompt reporting should be emphasized especially for pneumonic plague. Specific sessions for hospitals and physicians are conducted as soon as possible.

In addition to classical reporting, other systems are enhanced and scaled up:

- ICU-based surveillance
- Hospital-based mortality surveillance
- Active surveillance...

Any new case needs to be confirmed.

b) Event-based surveillance

Also, the event-based surveillance is reinforced:

- Activating the hotline1214 to receive calls on plague
- Screening news and media on plague
- Raising awareness of the public, municipalities, and NGO...

Any rumor should be verified.

Step 6: Describe cases

Cases are described by:

- Time: day, week, month of onset
- Place: setting, locality, caza, mohafaza of residence or exposure

Plague 278

- Person: age, gender, nationality, setting, refugees...
- Disease: form. evolution. classification...

The used indicators are counts and incidence rates.

Furthermore, the data analysis is used to assess the source of infection.

Step 7: Identify source of infection

Efforts should be initiated to identify the source of infection.

a) If animal-related

The investigation is carried in coordination with the MOA. It includes field investigation with rodents surveillance, carnivores serosurveys and fleas surveillance.

Are rodent infected?

Rodents are the reservoirs of plague, and nearly all human cases are associated with rodent epizootics.

Rodent surveillance includes:

- Rodent mortality surveillance: collecting carcasses of dead rodents and examining them
- Rodent morbidity surveillance: trapping rodents for population data, serum and tissue samples collection...

Are the carnivores infected?

Rodents are consumed by carnivore populations. Carnivores may be infected following the consumption on infected rodents.

The recommended method is to conduct carnivore's sero-surveys to detect evidence of plague activity. Serum is collected from carnivores that consume rodents (live or carcasses).

This method is especially recommended when:

- Vast geographical area is affected
- No plague detected in local rodent populations previously
- No epizootics occurred in local rodent populations for many years
- No recent history of human plague case in the area, plague is human unexpected disease.

The target carnivores may include:

- Canidae family: Wild and domestic dogs and their relatives who survive plague infection and develop antibodies that can be detected for as long as six months
- Felidae family: Cats may die from the infection.

Are the fleas infected?

Fleas are the vectors of plague.

Local fleas surveillance can provide precious information for better control as:

- Species of local fleas
- Numbers of fleas per host
- Host preferences
- Y. pestis infection rates for the species of fleas collected...

b) If terrorism act

In case of suspicion of bioterrorism act, the CBRN plan is activated.

Crisis management is done under the commandment of the CBRN national committee.

The Esumoh reports to the MOPH/DG and the CBRN leader team.

Step 8: Conduct contact tracing

In case of pulmonary plague, the contacts are at risk to get the infection. The Esumoh staff is in charge to:

- Identify contacts of the cases
- Assess the risk of exposure
- Follow up: daily monitoring up to 7 days from date of last contact with the case.

In case of non-pulmonary plague, exposed persons to same sources are targeted for


identification, assessment and daily monitoring up to 7 days after the date of last exposure.


Step 9: Enhance monitoring

On daily basis, the counts of cases and contacts are monitored and described by time, place and person. Weekly bulletin is edited and shared with partners.

Step 10: Write summary report

Once the outbreak was contained, the Esumoh central staff prepares a summary report. This report is shared with involved partners.





Plague - Annex 1

Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Plague Case Investigation Form

Case ID |

A Investigator				Case ID
Name of investigator		Phone	Setting/team	Date of investigation
** B Reporter				
	f reporter	Phone	Health facility	Date of reporting
**				
C Patient identity				
Patier	nt name	Gender	Date of birth	Age
Nationality	Type of residence	Occupation	Institution	Institution address
Residence: caza	Locality	Phone	Detailed	address
**				
D Clinical picture Dates	Data on ansat		Date of 1st	
Dates	Date on onset		consultation	
Vital signs	Temperature	□Ye s □No □Unk	Heart rate	□Yes □No □Un
(currently)	Blood pressure	□Yes □No □Unk	Respiratory rate	□Ye s □No □Ur
Symptoms at	Fever	□Yes □No □Unk	Abdominal pain	□Ye s □No □Ur
initial	Sweats/chills	□Yes □No □Unk	Nausea/vomiting	□Yes □No □Ur
presentation	weakness	□Ye s □No □Unk	Diarrhea	□Yes □No □Ur
	Confusion/delirium	□Ye s □No □Unk	Sore throat	□Yes □No □Ur
	Headache	□Yes □No □Unk	Dyspnea	□Yes □No □Ur
	Muscle/joint pains	□Ye s □No □Unk	Chest pain	□Yes □No □Ur
	Swollen tender	□Ye s □No □Unk	Other:	□Yes □No □Ur
	glands			
Respiratory	Cough	□Ye s □No □Unk	Date onset of cough	
	Bloody sputum	□Ye s □No □Unk		
Bubo	Presence of bubo	□Yes □No □Unk		
	Cervical	□Ye s □No □Unk	Femoral	□Yes □No □Ur
	Axillary	□Ye s □No □Unk	Other:	□Yes □No □Ur
	Inguinal	□Ye s □No □Unk		
Skin	Insect bite	□Ye s □No □Unk	Skin ulcer	□Yes □No □Ur
	Location:		Location:	
Clinical	Bubonic	□I □II □No □Unk	Pneumonic	□ I □ II □No □U
presentation	Pharyngeal	□I □II □No □Unk	Gastrointestinal	□ I □ II □No □U
	Meningitis	□I □II □No □Unk	Ocular	□ I □ II □No □Uı
	Septicemic	□I □II □No □Unk	Other:	□ I □ II □No □Uı
Underlying condition	Chronic disease	□Ye s □No □Unk	Specify:	
** E Chest X Radiolog	v findings			
Dates:	Clear	□Yes □No □Unk	Pulmonary abscess	□Yes □No □Un
Dates.	Hilar adenopathy	□Yes □No □Unk	Pulmonary nodules	□Yes □No □Un
	Unilateral infiltrates	□Yes □No □Unk	Interstitial changes	□Yes □No □Un
	D:1	-VNU-1:	nicersticial changes	-VNU-

□Ye s □No □Unk

Pleural effusion

MOPH circular no. 8 dated on the 7th January 2015

Bilateral infiltrates

□Yes □No □Unk

Plague Case Investigation Form

	Case ID	_
**		

F Laboratory findings

Specimens	Date of collection	Test	Laboratory	Result
Blood culture 1				
Blood culture 2				
Bubo aspirate				
Sputum sample				
CSF sample				
Other				

**

G Case management

Hospital admission	Hospital name	Date admission	Intubation	Isolation (contact, droplet, respiratory)
□Ye s □No □Unk				
Antibiotics	Name ATB	Date started	Date stopped	Posology

**

H Evolution and outcome

Trevolution and outcome						
Complications	Limb	□Ye s □No	□Unk	Multisystem organ	□Yes □No	□Unk
_Yes □No □Unk	ischemia/amputation			failure		
	Bleeding	□Ye s □No	□Unk	Renal failure	□Yes □No	□Unk
	Cardiac arrest	□Ye s □No	□Unk	Secondary pneumonia	□Yes □No	□Unk
	Respiratory failure	□Ye s □No	□Unk	Shock	□Yes □No	□Unk
Outcome	Recovered	□Ye s □No	□Unk	Death	□Yes □No	□Unk
	Complications	□Ye s □No	□Unk	Date death		

**

I Exposure

Animals	Contact with sick / dead animal	□Ye s □No □Unk
	Exposure to abandoned burrows	□Ye s □No □Unk
	Hunting, including with wild animals	□Ye s □No □Unk
	Flea or insect bites	□Yes □No □Unk
III persons	Contact with ill persons	□Yes □No □Unk
	Contact with ill person who died last week	□Ye s □No □Unk
	Contact with known plague patient	□Yes □No □Unk
Pets	Pets at home, specify:	□Ye s □No □Unk
	III pets at home, specify:	□Yes □No □Unk
	Pets brought dead animals at home	□Yes □No □Unk
Other	Specify:	□Yes □No □Unk

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Rabies

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 30 (19th Jan 2015)

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Rabies 286

I. Purpose
The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance program in case of rabies alert or outbreak.

II. Generalities

Rabies	
Agent	Rabies virus, genus Lyssavirus
Incubation period	3-8 weeks (6 days – 7 years)
Period of communicability	 Rabid dogs/cats are infectious 3-7 days before onset and up to death Rabid bats are infectious 12 days before onset and up to death Person-to-person transmission is possible but have never been confirmed
Reservoir	Wild and domestic cannidaeIn some countries, bats
Modes of transmission	 Usually: virus-laden saliva of rabid animal introduced through wound (scratch, bite, existing wound) Possible: mucous membranes (eyes, nose, mouth) contaminated with saliva Airborne in cave with rabid bats
Clinical presentation	Encephalomyelitis, with hydrophobia, fatal within 2-6 days from onset
Worldwide	Worldwide
Lebanon	 Annual average of 430 exposures managed by the anti-rabies centers Annual 0-2 cases of human rabies reported
Control objective	Control via post-exposure prophylaxis
Surveillance and Investig	ation
Surveillance approach	Syndromic approach
Investigation: data about case	Exposure history
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	CSF, serum, saliva, skin biopsy
Investigation: data about contacts	If other exposed persons
Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts	If symptoms
Test	Serology, PCR, virus culture
Laboratories	Supranational laboratories
Outbreak level	At least one case
Notification to WHO	If cross-border case or cross-border origin
Control	,
Primary prevention	Pre-exposure vaccination for exposed professions

287 **Rabies**

Post-exposure prevention	1) Human rabies immunoglobulin 20UI/Kg for wounds near the neck, the head, or the fingers 2) Antirabic vaccine: - Day 0 : 2 doses IM - Day 7: 1 dose - Day 21:1 dose
	- Day 90: 1 booster dose
Case management	- Symptomatic - Specific protocol
Isolation	Prevent contact with biological liquids and saliva
Contact prevention	Anti-rabies vaccination for close contacts
Rabies exposure case defi	nition (MOPH circular no. 50 dated on the 26th April 2005)
Confirmed case	A person who had a close contact (usually a bite or a scratch) with a laboratory-confirmed rabid animal
Possible case	A person who had a close contact (usually a bite or a scratch) with a rabies-susceptible animal in/or originating from a rabies-infected area
Rabies case definition (MO	PH circular no. 109 dated on the 6 th September 2006)
Confirmed case	Confirmed case: A suspected case that is laboratory-confirmed by one or more of the following: - Detection of rabies viral antigens by direct fluorescent antibody (FA) in clinical specimens, preferably brain tissue (collected post-mortem) - Detection of rabies viral antigens by FA on skin or corneal smear (collected ante-mortem) - FA positive after inoculation of brain tissue, saliva or CSF in cell culture, or after intracerebral inoculation in mice or in suckling mice - Detectable rabies-neutralizing antibody titre in CSF of an unvaccinated person - Identification of viral antigens by PCR on fixed tissue collected post-mortem in a clinical specimen (brain tissue or skin, cornea or saliva) - Isolation of rabies virus from clinical specimens and confirmation of rabies viral antigens
Probable case	A suspected case with a history of contact with a suspected rabid animal
Suspected case	A case with acute neurological syndrome (encephalitis) dominated by forms of hyperactivity (furious rabies) or paralytic syndromes (dumb rabies) progressing towards coma and death, usually by respiratory failure, within 7 to 10 days after the first symptom if no intensive care is instituted
Forms	
Reporting of exposure	Rabies exposure form (MOPH circular no. 90 dated on the 19 th September 2005): filled by the anti-rabies centers
Reporting of human case	Standard reporting form for communicable diseases
Investigation	Specific investigation form for rabies ((MOPH circular no. 74 dated on the 31st July 2012)

Rabies 288






Figure 2: Exposed persons to rabies as reported by anti-rabies centers, Lebanon, 1997-2012 (Source: MOPH)



International figures

Figure 3: Areas at risk of rabies in the world (Source: WHO, 2013)



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.

Data Source: WHO Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTD)
Map Production: Health Statistics and Information Systems (HSI)
World Health Organization

World Health Organization

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III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance are:

- Detect and investigate human rabies cases
- Monitor and describe human rabies cases
- Identify high risk areas for specific animal-related interventions.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is defined by any suspected case of rabies.

An **outbreak** is defined by the occurrence of human rabies (probable or confirmed) case acquired locally.

V. Procedural steps

The steps described below are recommended for investigation of any alert or outbreak of rabies. The steps are summarized in figure (5).

Step 1: Verify the case

In case of reporting of a human case of rabies, the Esumoh caza team contacts the treating physician, hospital or medical center. Is the case a patient of human rabies or an exposed person to rabies?

A case of human rabies is a patient showing illness after exposure to rabies. An exposed person to rabies is a person with history of bite or scratch by an animal.

Once verified, the Esumoh caza team informs the mohafaza and central levels.

Step 2: Collect data

For each case of rabies, the Esumoh team visits the patient at household or health facility. The patient and the family are interviewed. An investigation form is filled (Annex 1).

The investigation form includes the following information:

- Demography
- Exposure
- Illness
- Laboratory results
- Post-exposure prophylaxis.

Copy of the filled investigation form is sent to the Esumoh mohafaza and central levels.

If the case died, a copy of the hospital medical file is requested for the Esumoh central team.

Step 3: Confirm the case

If possible, clinical specimens are collected from the case.

The needed ante-mortem specimens are summarized in the table below.

Table 1: Summary specimens and tests for rabies confirmation							
Specimens	Tests						
Saliva	PCR, virus culture						
Serum	Serology						
CSF	Serology						
Skin biopsy of hair follicles at the nape of the neck	RT/PCR, immunofluorescent staining if rabies antigen						

The specimen collection is done by the health facility in coordination with the Esumoh central team. Specimens are sent to supranational reference laboratories.

The laboratory confirmation is not needed to declare an outbreak, but it is useful to identify the circulating rabies virus genotype.

Step 4: Investigate absence of PEP

Any exposed person should receive the post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) at one of the anti-rabies centers.

This step will clarify the lack of effective PEP:

- Lack of awareness of the patient and family
- Lack of adequate case management at the health facility
- Lack of PEP provision by the anti-rabies center.

a) Patient and family interview

In case of human case of rabies, the patient and family are interviewed to identify the measures taken after exposure:

- Presence of any medical consultation
- Presence of any orientation to an anti-rabies center
- Reception of anti-rabies vaccines: number of doses
- Reception of anti-rabies serum: quantity.

b) Health professional interview

The Esumoh team contacts and visits the health facilities seen after exposure:

- Health care professionals: medical diagnosis and prescription
- Anti-rabies centers: consultation and preventive measures taken.

Step 5: Investigate the animal

a) Animal outcome

The family is asked about the rabid animal:

- Domestic or stray animal
- Type of animal
- The outcome of the animal is searched. Was the animal killed or find dead? Where the animal had been buried? How?
- Did the animal attack other animals or humans? Who?

b) Ministry of Agriculture

In case the exposure was in Lebanon, the MOPH informs the Ministry of Agriculture.

The MOA will assess:

- Presence of animal rabies
- Follow up of exposed animals if identified
- Identify target areas for any animal rabies vaccination.

Step 6: Search for additional cases or exposed persons

Based on the exposure history, additional exposed persons and cases are identified.

a) Exposed persons

The rabid animal may have attacked other persons in the vicinity of the patient. All exposed persons are identified, provided with appropriate post-exposure prophylaxis and followed up.

b) Symptomatic patients

The health professionals are informed. They are requested to orient any exposed person to anti-rabies center. In case of human cases, they are asked to report immediately to the MOPH.

c) Animals

The rabid animal may have attacked other animals in the vicinity of the patient. All exposed animals are identified and reported to the MOA for appropriate follow up.

Step 7: Describe cases

a) Time, place and person

Cases are described by:

- Time: week, month and year of onset
- Place: place of residence, place of exposure, in term of locality, caza and mohafaza
- Person: age group, gender, nationality
- Presence of post-exposure-prophylaxis.

b) Outbreak


Based on the epidemiology findings, an outbreak is declared. The Esumoh central team informs the MOPH units. Local health professionals are informed via official memos issued by the MOPH. Also the MOPH informs the MOA.


c) Circulating genotypes

In case of laboratory test was done as virological culture and PCR, the virus genotype is described and compared with the national animal findings and the regional picture.

Step 8: Write summary report

Once the outbreak is confined, the Esumoh central staff prepares a summary report describing the outbreak. Such report is needed to document the epidemiology history of rabies in Lebanon.





Rabies - Annex 1

مرکز د الوبائي		مركز: رقم الاستمارة:		ک لب) لداء الا	چ تعرض	تمارة	است			العامة صحية وقائي الكلب	سحة القالية الأطب الواسمة المالية الم	الجمهور وزارة الح مديرية الو مصلحة ال مراكز مكاف – معلومات
ل	، الكاما	العنوان		سية	الجن	نن	الو	,	العمر			الثلاثي	
				رقم الهاتف		االحي	البلدة	۶	القضاء		المهنة		
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												حادثة	3)- ظروف ال
			، الحادثة	أسباب					ة/الحي	البلد	ضاء	القد	تاريخ الحادثة
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													اليوم الاول
													اليوم السابع
			حادي والعشرون					اليوم الحادي والعث					
													اليوم التسعون
تاريخ الاعطاء		اسم الطبيب	В	رقم atch	الماركة	اسم	بوبات	د الأمد	ة عد	المعطاذ	الكمية	Ļ	مصل ضد داء الكل
													اليوم الاول

اسم الطبيب وتوقيعه: التاريخ: ملاحظات:

Rabies - Annex 2

Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiology Surveillance Program

Rabies Investigation Form

Name
Community
Date of onset
Date of onset
Fever
Headache
Localized pain
Nausea
Vomiting Yes No Localized weakness Yes No Muscle spasm Yes No Dysphagia Yes No Paresthesia Yes No Behavior changes Yes No Hypersalivation Yes No Confusion/delirium Yes No Dyspnea Yes No Anorexia Yes No Autonomic instability Yes No Anxiety Yes No III. Case management Inpatient Yes No Hospital 1 Admission date Admission date Invalidate
Dysphagia
Hypersalivation
Anorexia
III. Case management Inpatient
Inpatient
Hospital 2 Admission date
IV. Laboratory investigation Specimen Serum Saliva CSF Nuchal biopsy Other: Date collection Laboratory name Result V. Animal Exposure Date of exposure Animal Domestic dog Stray dog Cat Wild animal Other Injury Bite Scratch Lick Location Upper limb Lower limb Head Trunk Multiple Circumstances
Specimen Serum Saliva CSF Nuchal biopsy Other: Date collection Laboratory name Result V. Animal Exposure Date of exposure Animal Domestic dog Stray dog Cat Wild animal Other Injury Bite Scratch Lick Location Upper limb Lower limb Head Trunk Multiple Circumstances
Date collection Laboratory name Result V. Animal Exposure Date of exposure Animal Domestic dog Stray dog Cat Wild animal Other Injury Bite Scratch Lick Location Upper limb Lower limb Head Trunk Multiple Circumstances
Laboratory name Result V. Animal Exposure Date of exposure Animal
Result V. Animal Exposure Date of exposure Animal Domestic dog Stray dog Cat Wild animal Other Injury Bite Scratch Lick Location Upper limb Lower limb Head Trunk Multiple Circumstances
V. Animal Exposure Date of exposure Caza Commune Animal Domestic dog Stray dog Cat Wild animal Other Injury Bite Scratch Location Upper limb Lower limb Head Trunk Multiple Circumstances
Date of exposure Caza Commune Animal □Domestic dog □Stray dog □Cat □Wild animal □Other Injury □Bite □Scratch □Lick Location □Upper limb □Lower limb □Head □Trunk □Multiple Circumstances
Date of exposure Caza Commune Animal □Domestic dog □Stray dog □Cat □Wild animal □Other Injury □Bite □Scratch □Lick Location □Upper limb □Lower limb □Head □Trunk □Multiple Circumstances
Animal □Domestic dog □Stray dog □Cat □Wild animal □Other Injury □Bite □Scratch □Lick Location □Upper limb □Lower limb □Head □Trunk □Multiple Circumstances
Injury ☐ Bite ☐ Scratch ☐ Lick Location ☐ Upper limb ☐ Lower limb ☐ Head ☐ Trunk ☐ Multiple Circumstances
Location □Upper limb □Lower limb □Head □Trunk □Multiple Circumstances
Circumstances
NA/Lock Locus and all and a second a second and a second
MI-st harmon and
What happened
to the animal?
VI. anti-rabies Post Exposure Prophylaxis
PEP received
□If yes D1 D7 D21 D90
Date
Center
Vaccine, Serum
□If no, why:
VII.Outcome
Outcome
Date of death
Investigator name: Date:

Notes

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Rubella

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 38 (19th Jan 2015)

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I. Purpose

The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps to be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance program in case of rubella alert or outbreak.

II. Generalities

Rubella is a contagious, generally mild viral infection that occurs most often in children and young adults. Rubella infection in pregnant women may cause fetal death or congenital defects know as Congenital Rubella Syndrome (CRS). There is no specific treatment for rubella but the disease is preventable by vaccination.

More information about the disease are presented in the table below

Rubella	
Agent	Virus: rubella, genus Rubullovirus, family Togaviridae
Incubation period	14-17 days (14-21 days)
Period of	7 days before rash and 4 days after rash onset
communicability	
Reservoir	Humans
Modes of transmission	 Person-to-person: direct contact with droplets Infants with CRS shed large quantities of virus in their pharyngeal secretions and urine.
Clinical presentation	 Febril maculo-papular rash Complications: thrombocytopenia (1/3000), post-infectious encephalitis (1/6000), rarely chronic arthritis, CRS if pregnant women
Worldwide	Worldwide
Lebanon	Outbreak in 2004
Control objective	Control
Surveillance and Invest	igation
Surveillance approach	Syndromic: febril macuplo-papular rash
Investigation: data about case	Symptoms, vaccination status, travel history, contact, pregnancy
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	Serum, urine, oral fluid, dried blood, throat swab
Investigation: data about contacts	- Cases among contact, pregnant women among contacts - Vaccination status of contacts
Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts	If cases among contact
Test	IgM, PCR, culture, genomic sequencing
Laboratories	- IgM and PCR: RHUH - Culture: Tunis Pasteur and the Central Public Health Laboratory in Sultanat of Oman
Outbreak level	At least 3 confirmed cases epidemiologically-linked
Notification to WHO	-To report to WHO if outbreak - Routine monthly dataset sharing
Control	
Primary prevention	At least 1 dose during childhood
Post-exposure prevention	None
Case management	Symptomatic treatment

Isolation	If hospitalization; contact and droplet isolation						
เรงเสแบบ	If hospitalization: contact and droplet isolation Prevent exposure to pregnant women						
Contact prevention							
Mass prevention Immunization campaign							
School eviction 4 days							
Rubella case definition	(MOPH circular no. 12 dated on the 23 rd February 2013)						
Laboratory-confirmed case	A suspected case with laboratory confirmation with presence of rubella-specific IgM antibodies or positive PCR test						
Epidemiologically- confirmed case	A suspected case who has not had a laboratory test and has an epidemiological link with a laboratory-confirmed case of rubella						
Suspected case / clinical case	 Any person with: Fever And maculopapular (non vesicular) rash Or any person in whom a clinician suspects rubella infection 						
Forms							
Reporting	Standard reporting form or specific measles/rubella reporting form (MOPH circular no. 13 dated on the 23 rd February 2013)						
Investigation	Measles/rubella investigation form (MOPH circular no. 74 dated on the 31st July 2013)						
National figures	,						
	ella cases, Lebanon, 1997-2014 (Source: MOPH)						
	5						
160							
140							
120							
100 80 80							
Ω							
40							
20							
1997 1998 1999 2000	2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014						
1997 1998 1999 2000	Year						
	real						
International figures							
Figure 2: Reported rube	ella cases in the world, 1997-2014 (Source: WHO)						
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700,000							
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100,000							
100,000	2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014						

III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance are:

- Detect and confirm rubella cases
- Detect and investigate rubella outbreaks
- Identify risk factors
- Identify circulating genotypes
- Identify CRS cases.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is defined by any suspected case of rubella (or measles).

An **outbreak** is defined by the occurrence of at least three confirmed rubella cases which are epidemiologically and/or virologically-linked.

V. General procedural steps

The steps described below are recommended for investigation of any alert or outbreak of rubella. The steps are summarized in figure (4).

Rubella surveillance is integrated within measles surveillance.

Step 1: Verify alert

Any case of rubella (or measles) is verified by the Esumoh caza team within 24 hours.

The treating physician or hospital focal person is contacted: Is it really fever with maculo-papular rash?

If yes, the information is shared with the Esumoh mohafaza and central levels and investigation is initiated immediately.

Step 2: Investigate the case

Upon verification of any case of rubella (or measles), data is collected by using specific measles/rubella investigation form (Annex 1). The investigation is done by the Esumoh peripheral team.

The data is collected by interviewing the patient or the parents.

The investigation form includes the following information:

- Demography
- Disease
- Vaccination status
- Case management
- Risk factors: cases among contacts, travel history...
- Presence of pregnancy.

Vaccination status is collected from available data recorded in vaccination card, personal health record or medical file. If no document is available with the patient or the parents, the treating physician or the medical center where vaccination is done is contacted to collect the needed information.

Copy of the filled investigation form is sent to the Esumoh mohafaza and central levels.

If the case died, a copy of the hospital medical file is requested for the Esumoh central team.

Step 3: Confirm the case

Any suspected rubella case needs to be confirmed.

Rubella and measles cases are tested for both measles and rubella. The test is sequential: specimens are tested first for measles. If negative for measles, they are tested then for rubella.

If the case seems to be sporadic, the case has to be laboratory-confirmed. If the case occurres among a cluster or chain of transmission, at least 3 cases need to be laboratory-confirmed.

The needed specimens are summarized in the table below.

Table 1: Summary specimens and tests for measles/rubella confirmation								
Specimens	Tests	Timing (after rash onset)	Notes					
Oral fluid	IgM	1-28 days	If sample is taken within 72 hours after rash onset and results are negative, a second sample is preferred.					
	PCR	1-14 days						
Serum	IgM	1-28 days						
Dried blood	IgM	1-28 days						
	PCR	1-7 days						
Throat swab	Culture	1-5 days	Swab in VTM					
	PCR	1-5 days						
Urine	Culture	1-5 days						
	PCR	1-5 days						

The specimen collection is done by the healthcare facility or Esumoh caza team. Specimens are forwarded to the Esumoh central team in charge to verify labelling and sending them to the reference laboratories.

The IgM and PCR tests are done at RHUH clinical laboratory. Virus isolation is done at Central Public Health Laboratory in Sultanat of Oman or at Pasteur Institute in Tunis.

Step 4: Classify the case

Based on the medical, epidemiology and laboratory findings, the case is classified based on the algorithm shown in figure (3).

Step 5: Communicate

Any confirmed case of rubella is communicated to the EPI program, for proper response. At caza level, the Esumoh staff informs the caza physician and the EPI focal person. At central level, the Esumoh staff informs the EPI central team.

Step 6: Describe cases

a) Time, place and person

Cases are described by:

- Time: week, month and year of onset
- Place: place of residence, place of work, place of school, in term of locality, caza and mohafaza. Also travel history is described.
- Person: age group, gender, nationality, vaccination status, pregnancy. Vaccination status is displayed by age group and nationality.
- Disease: classification, complications, fatalities, inpatient proportion...

Indicators include counts and incidence rates.

b) Chains of transmission

Cases are described by chain of transmission. A chain of transmission is defined by at least 2 epi-linked cases. Any chain of transmission needs to have at least 3 laboratory-confirmed cases, and at least 3 specimens collected for virus isolation.

Step 7: Confirm the outbreak

Based on the epidemiology and the laboratory findings, an outbreak is declared.

Once declared, official memos are issued by the MOPH to:

- Health professionals: physicians, hospitals and medical centers
- WHO
- MEHE and schools
- Kindergartens
- Media...

Step 8: Search for additional cases

a) Enhance notification from health professionals

The health professionals are asked to be more aware about rubella and the potential to have rubella among pregnant women. They are asked to report any suspected case.

The official memos issued by the MOPH will include updated case definition and updated contact details of the MOPH teams for any reporting.

Sessions for healthcare facilities may be conducted based on the extend of the outbreak.

b) Active surveillance

Rubella is already targeted in active surveillance. During field visits, more focus will be done on visiting additional wards, ER, outpatients clinics, and obstetrics wards.

Also, specimens will be requested from all inpatients.

c) School surveillance

Schools are informed on the confirmation of the outbreak and requested to immediately notify any case reported in the medical reports or by the parents.

In case of rubella cases in school, the Esumoh staff will visit the school and record any suspected case in specific line listing and collect clinical non-invasive specimens (oral fluid).

d) Community search

Around the confirmed cases, the Esumoh caza staff will visit the neighbors and ask for any rubella case. A specific line listing is filled. Clinical specimens are collected from suspected cases.

Also any rumor of rubella case is verified.

Step 9: Identify susceptible contacts

a) All contacts

The risk of confirmed rubella case is to spread the virus to his/her contacts, in particular to pregnant women.

There is need to identify all close contacts of the case:

- In the family
- In the neighbors
- At workplace
- In school or kindergarten
- In the health care facilities (if visited).

Contacts are assessed for their vaccination status. The unvaccinated contacts are listed and the list is communicated to the EPI, who will be in charge to vaccinate them via medical centers or private physicians.

b) Pregnant women

Among the identified contacts, women in child bearing age are asked for any pregnancy. If there are any pregnant women among the contacts, the recommended steps are specified in VI.

Step 10: Enhance monitoring

During a rubella outbreak, weekly bulletin on rubella is edited by the Esumoh central staff and shared with partners.

Step 11: Write summary report

Once the outbreak is confined, the Esumoh central staff in coordination with the RHUH and EPI, prepares a summary report describing the outbreak, the confirmation and the response. Such report is needed to document the epidemiology history of rubella in Lebanon.

VI. Procedural steps for rubella in pregnant women

The steps described below are recommended for verification and investigation of any alert of rubella related to pregnant women. The steps are summarized in figure (5).

Step 1: Verify alert

The alert is verified:

- Is the rubella case in a pregnant women? Is the case laboratory-confirmed?
- Is the pregnant woman a contact of a rubella case? Is the index case laboratory-confirmed?

Step 2: Assess women immunity

The history of the women is collected:

- Rubella disease: age at onset (if natural disease)
- Rubella vaccination: number of dose and year of last dose
- Rubella screening: IgG at pre-nuptial test and prenatal test...

Also the history of the pregnancy is collected:

- Age of pregnancy
- Dates of contact with the rubella case

Step 3: Test women

Rubella infection may occur without febril maculo-papular rash. There is need to test the woman. The woman is tested for rubella IgM in paired sera, and for IgG:

- If the IgG was positive and the contact/exposure with rubella was beyond the 12 weeks of gestation: there is no risk of CRS.
- If there no increase of IgM in paired sera, there is no risk of CRS.
- In other cases, the pregnant woman is monitored.

Step 4: Counselling and follow up

The follow up is done in coordination with the treating physician. Regular ultrasound is conducted to detect any abnormality.


In case of abnormalities, the physician and the mother decide on the therapeutic termination of the pregnancy.


Step 5: Pregnancy termination


At birth, the newborn is tested for rubella IgM, whatever was the condition of the baby, with or without symptoms or malformations. Testing for CRS is specified in the surveillance SOP for CRS.

Step 6: Write summary report

Once the laboratory test of the child is known, a summary report is prepared by the Esumoh central team and shared with EPI and other partners.







الجممورية اللبنانية



استمارة إبلاغ عن حالة حصبة أوحصبة ألمانية

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تعميم وزارة الصحة العامة رقم ١٣ تاريخ ٢٣ شباط ٢٠١٣

الجمهورية اللبنانية – وزارة الصحة العامة – برنامج الترصد الوبائي استمارة تقصي حالة حصبة احصبة الألمانية

تعبأ الاستمارة من قبل وزارة الصحة العامة / فريق الترصد الوبائي

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	ID				
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Case identification	Name				
cation	Caza				
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	Form completed				
	Investigation form				
Case	Rash onset				
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B	Health Facility				
1	Туре				
st sero	Collected on				
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Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health - Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Measles and Rubella Surveillance LINE LISTING


YEAR |__|_||__|

Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health - Epidemiological Surveillance Program Descriptive Surveillance Findings

Event	Level	Year	Week	Period	As on
		20			

1. Cumulative number =

2. Number of cases by time: weekly histogramm




3a. By time: monthly cases and rates (/100000)

Month	R20	R20	R20	Pop20	N20	R20
Jan						
Feb						
Mar						
Apr						
Mai						
Jun						
Jul						
Aug						
Sep						
Oct						
Nov						
Dec						
Total						


4a. By place: commune

Commune	N	Commune	N

3b. By time: curve of monthly rate (/100000)



4b. By place: dot map



5. By age group, gender and vaccination status: cases and rates (/100000) and %

Age	Pop	Nb	Rate	Male	Female	Unsp	0d	1+d	Unsp	0d %
0-4 y										
5-9 y										
10-14 y										
15-19 y										
20-44 y										
45+ y										
Unsp	-									
Total										

6. By classification

o. Dy	C. By classification						
Lab	Epi	Clin	Total				

7. By hospital admission

In	Out	Unsp.	Total

8. By occupation

Interviewed	Education	DayCare

Notes

Notes

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Congenital Rubella Syndrome (CRS)

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 40 (19th Jan 2015)

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Step 3: Confirm the case	
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Step 4: Classify the case	
Step 5: Find susceptible contacts Step 6: Find additional cases	
Step 7: Follow up	
Step 8: Review rubella epidemiology	
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Annex 2: CRS investigation form

I. Purpose

The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps to be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance program in case of alert or outbreak of CRS.

II. Generalities

Congenital Rubella Virus (CRS)					
Agent	Rubella virus, genus Rubullovirus, family Togaviridae				
Period of communicability	Several months after birth				
Reservoir	Humans				
Modes of transmission	- Materno-foetal transmission: 90% of infants born to women infected with rubella during the 1st trimester. The risk of transmission is 10-20% by the 16th week, and rare after the 20 th week.				
Clinical presentation	 Intrauterine death, spontaneous abortion Congenital malformations: deafness, cataract, microphtalmia, congenital glaucoma, pigmentary retinopathy, nystagmus, microcephaly, meningo-encephalitis, mental retardation, patent ductus arteious, atrial or ventricular septal defects, other congenital heart disease, purpura, hepatosplenomegaly, jaundice, radiolucent bone disease 				
Worldwide	Worldwide				
Lebanon	Rare				
Control objective	Control				
Surveillance and Investig	ation				
Surveillance approach	Disease-based approach				
Investigation: data about case	Clinical symptoms: eye, ear, cardiac and neurology malformations, outcomes				
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	Serum, urine, CSF				
Investigation: data about contacts	Rubella history, vaccination status				
Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts	If symptoms appear among contacts				
Test	IgM				
Laboratories	RHUH				
Outbreak level	At least 2 confirmed cases of CRS following a rubella outbreak (6-9 months after)				
Notification to WHO	If outbreak				
Control					
Primary prevention	Vaccination				
Isolation	Contact isolation: Infants with CRS may shed virus for several months				
Contact prevention	Immunization of contacts				
Mass prevention	Vaccination				

Congenital Rubella Synd 3 rd April 2007)	rome case definition (MOPH circular no. 45 dated on the					
Laboratory-confirmed case	An infant with a positive blood test for rubella IgM who has clinically-confirmed Congenital Rubella Syndrome					
Clinical-confirmed case	A case in whom a qualified physician detects: - At least 2 of the following: cataract(s), congenital glaucoma, congenital heart disease, loss of hearing, pigmentary retinopathy - Or at least one of the following: purpura, splenomegaly, microcephaly, mental retardation, meningoencephalitis, radiolucent bone disease, jaundice with onset less than 24 hours after birth					
Suspected case	 Any child under 1 year in whom a health worker suspects CRS when the child presents with: Heart disease And/or suspicion of deafness And/or one or more of the following eye signs: white pupil (cataract), diminished vision, pendular movement of the eyes (nystagmus), squint, small eye ball (microphthalmos), enlarged eye ball (congenital glaucoma) Or any child where there is a maternal history of suspected or confirmed rubella during pregnancy, even if the child shows no signs of CRS 					
Congenital Rubella Infection (CRI)	An infant with a positive blood test for rubella IgM who does not have clinically-confirmed Congenital Rubella Syndrome					
Forms						
Reporting	Standard reporting form or CRS reporting form (MOPH circular no. 80 dated on the 6 th August 2013)					
Investigation	Specific CRS investigation form (MOPH circular no.6 dated on 7 th January 2015)					
National figures						
One suspected case in 20	10.					
International figures						
Figure 1: Reported CRS	worldwide, 1997-2014 (source: WHO)					
350						
300						
250						
200						
100 50 1997 1998 1999 2000 200	01 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014					

III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of CRS surveillance are:

- To detect and conform CRS
- To monitor infectivity of any CRS and to prevent secondary cases
- To measure the burden of CRS.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** of CRS is defined by at least one suspected case of CRS.

An **outbreak** of CRS is defined by at least 2 confirmed cases occurring:

- At national level in a period of 12 months
- Or following a rubella outbreak (6-9 months after).

V. Procedural steps

Every suspected CRS case needs to be investigated according to the following steps summarized in figure (3).

Step 1: Verify alert

Upon notification of CRS, the Esumoh peripheral team immediately contacts the reporting physician or hospital focal point to verify the diagnosis: Do they mean CRS? If yes, the specific CRS reporting form is filled (Annex 1). The peripheral team informs the Esumoh central team, and requests copies of the medical file of the patient (discharge summary, laboratory findings...).

Clinical signs of interest are:

- Ophthalmologic signs and symptoms: cataracts, congenital glaucoma, pigmentary rethinopathy
- Ear signs and symptoms: hearing impairment or loss
- Cardiac signs and symptoms: congenital heart disease, mental retardation
- CNS signs and symptoms: microcephaly, meningoencephalitis, mental retardation ...
- Other: splenomegaly, radiolucent bone disease, purpura at birth, jaundice at birth and other abnormalities

If the suspected CRS case was admitted to more than one setting (hospital, medical center, private clinician), all of them are contacted, medical files are reviewed, and copies of medical files are requested.

Step 2: Fill the investigation form

Upon notification, the Esumoh central staff starts to fill the investigation form (Annex 2). The information is provided by two main sources:

- Mother interview
- Healthcare providers.

Investigation collects the following information:

- Maternal pregnancy history: number of previous pregnancies, number of previous live births, age at last delivery, occupation during pregnancy
- Rubella-like illness during pregnancy: if mother experienced following signs during pregnancy (maculopapular rash, fever, conjunctivitis, coryza, lymphadenopathy, arthritis...) and gestational week or month of occurrence
- Exposure to Rubella during pregnancy: if mother was exposed during pregnancy to a person (of any age) with maculopapular rash and fever, travel history during pregnancy
- Contacts of the CRS case: identifying other pregnant women, healthcare workers, nursery mates in contact with the suspected CRS case

When the medical files of the mothers' pregnancy are available, they are used to support the investigation.

Step 3: Confirme the case

Every suspected case of CRS needs to be laboratory confirmed.

a) Clinical specimens

Clinical specimens are collected from the case. The table below summarizes the various types of specimens and tests. Specimens can be collected up to 12 months of age: serum, urine, CSF, oral fluid, nasopharyngeal/throat swab.

Table 1: Needed Specimens and tests for CRS						
Specimens	Specimen recipient	Storage temperature	Tests			
Serum	Sterile tube	4-8 °C, no freezing	IgM Serology			
Urine	Sterile container	4-8 °C, no freezing	IgM Serology, Virus isolation			
CSF	Sterile tube	4-8 °C, no freezing	IgM Serology			
Oral fluid	Sponge swab	4-8 °C, no freezing	IgM Serology, RT-PCR			
Naso-oropharyngeal swab	Viral Transport Media	4-8 °C, no freezing	IgM Serology, virus isolation			

If specimen was collected soon after birth and tested negative, it is recommended to repeat specimen collection one month later.

The recommend tests are:

- At diagnosis: IgM serology positive up to 6-12 months
- For the follow up: virus isolation or virus detection

The type of specimen collection differs according to the setting.

Table 2: Selection of specimens								
Setting	Coordination of specimen collection	Specimens for IgM	Specimens for virus detection/isolation					
In hospital	With the hospital focal point or treating physician	Any type	Naso-oropharyngeal swab or urine					
At home	With the mother of the CRS case	Oral fluid	Naso-oropharyngeal swab					

Material for CRS testing includes the following:

- Sets for oral fluid and nasopharyngeal/throat swab, urine recipient
- Specimen labelling and packaging
- Ice box with frozen ice /gel-packs.

When collecting the clinical specimens, the staff in contact with the CRS case has to wear the following personal protective equipment: gloves, gown, surgical mask, eye protection...

b) Specimens referral

Clinical specimens are transported to the central level within 24 hours of collection, where they are verified for adequacy and labelling, and then referred to the national reference laboratory at Rafik Hariri University Hospital for serology testing and RT-PCR.

For virus isolation and genotyping, specimens are referred to one of the two tegional reference laboratories (Muscat-Oman and Institute Pasteur-Tunis).

Step 4: Classify the case

Based on medical and laboratory results, the case is classified as shown in figure (2).

For any suspected, probable or confirmed case, infection control practice should be applied. Infants with CRS are infectious and appropriate infection control measures are needed to be implemented.

Personal protective measures should be advised for contacts around the CRS case. Infection control measures include contact isolation, vaccinating household members and caregivers, and avoid contact with any pregnant women.

Step 5: Find susceptible contacts

The CRS case can shed the virus and still be infectious for several weeks, and can infect the contacts if not vaccinated.

The Esumoh staff identifies all close contacts among the family, the care givers and other institutions.

Contacts are then assessed for their vaccination status or IgG rubella status. If there is no documented vaccination, they are labelled as susceptible contacts.

Susceptible contacts are monitored for the incubation period from their last contact with the infective CRS case and oriented for vaccination. The list of susceptible contacts is shared with the FPI

Step 6: Find additional cases

Once a CRS case is laboratory-confirmed, it is essential to look for additional CRS cases. The MOPH issues official memos to health professionals (hospitals, orders, syndicates) informing them on the event and reminding them on the importance of rapid detection, rapid notification and appropriate infection control.

The active surveillance is also enhanced to include CRS in the weekly field rounds. Retrospective and prospective search for possible unreported CRS cases is conducted in sentinel hospital sites known to provide care for specific conditions: heart malformation, hearing loss, eye conditions...

Step 7: Conduct follow up

CRS cases are followed up.

The follow up enables to document:

- The end of infectious period of the case
- The clinical and medical outcomes.

Moreover, close contacts are followed up to detect any rubella case.

Clinical specimens are collected regularly from CRS case, on monthly basis. There is need to have at least two consecutive negative tests to declare non-infectiousness of the case.

Step 8: Review rubella epidemiology


The occurrence on any CRS case is an opportunity to review the national epidemiology of rubella.


Two levels are considered:

- The chain of transmission of rubella that infected the mother: a thorough interview with the mother is conducted to attempt to trace the chain of transmission. The mother treating physician or gynecologist are contacted to retrieve relevant information such as IgM/IgG serology testing, any illness during pregnancy...
- The rubella epidemiology at the national level: the Esumoh staff compares the findings of previous months and explore link with the current CRS case.

Step 9: Write summary report

Once the event is contained, the Esumoh prepares a report summarizing important findings. Summary report contains the following information: description of the case by time, place, person, laboratory findings, and exposure history. This summary report is shared with EPI and partners.





Congenital Rubella Syndrome (CRS) - Annex 1



Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health - Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Congenital Rubella Syndrome/Infection case reporting form

A suspected case of CRS is any infant presenting with **congenital heart disease**, and/or suspicion of **deafness**, and/or one or more of **eye signs**. For any infant fitting the suspected case definition, kindly fill the following reporting form for a better ascertainment of the case.

1- Patient identification	1						
Patient full name:				Address:			
Date of birth:	//_						
Gender: □Mal		lFemale		Town/locality:			
Nationality: □Leb			Пр-6	Qada:			
Residency: □Res		Visitor	□Refugee	Phone number:			
2- Health care provide	rs						
,				Patient hospitalized: □Yes □No			
				Hospital name:			
Examination date:	_//			Hospitalization date:/			
3- Clinical symptoms &	evolution	1					
3.1) Sensorial:				3.4) Neuro:			
Catara	ct ^a : □Yes	□No	□Unknown	Meningoencephalitis ^b : □Yes □No □Unknown			
Glaucon	naª: □Yes	□No	□Unknown	Microcephaly ^b : □Yes □No □Unknown			
Pigmentary retinopath	ıv ^a : □Yes	□No	□Unknown	Mental retardation ^b : □Yes □No □Unknown			
Microrphtal	-	□No	□Unknown	3.5) Spleen & blood:			
Nystagn	-	□No	□Unknown	Splenomegaly ^b : □Yes □No □Unknown			
Hearing impairment/Lo		□No	□Unknown	Purpura on birth ^b : □Yes □No □Unknown			
riearing impairment Lo	SS. LIES	LINO	LIUIKIIOWII	•			
3.2) Congenital heart d	sease:			Jaundice ^b (within 24 hours after birth): □Yes □No □Unknown			
Atrial septal defe	ct ^a : □Yes	□No	□Unknown	3.6) Other, specify:			
Ventricular septal defe	ct ^a : □Yes	□No	□Unknown				
Patient ductus arteros	ısª: □Yes	□No	□Unknown	3.7) Patient status:			
Coarctation of the aor	taª: □Yes	□No	□Unknown	Present status of patient: ☐ Alive ☐ Dead ☐ Unknown			
Peripheral pulmonic stenos	is ^a : □Yes	□No	□Unknown	If dead, date of death:/			
Other, speci	y:			Cause of death:			
				Autopsy conducted			
3.3) Bones:				Autopsy date: /			
Radiolucent bone disea	se ^{b:} □Yes	□No	□Unknown	Autopsy findings:			
4- Laboratory investig	ation						
Specimen collected:		□ Unl	known				
# Date of collection			Type of s	pecimen Laboratory Result			
1 st	☐ Serum	☐ Thro	at swab ☐ Urine	□ CSF □ Other			
2 nd	☐ Serum	☐ Thro	at swab	□ CSF □ Other			
5- Reporter				<u> </u>			
5- Reporter Form filled by:							
Function: Signature:							
CASE DEFINITIONS:							
				of the group (a) <u>OR</u> one complication from group (a) and one from group (b). with a positive blood/urine/CSF test for Rubella IgM.			
				blood test for Rubella IgM who does not have clinically-confirmed CRS.			
More info: <u>www.moph.gov.lb</u> /Tel:01.614194 / Fax:01.610920							

Congenital Rubella Syndrome (CRS) - Annex 2



Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program

Congenital Rubella Syndrome (CRS): investigation form for the mother

A suspected case of CRS is any infant presenting with heart disease, and/or suspicion of deafness, and/or one or more of eye signs. For a better ascertainment of the case, kindly fill the following investigation form regarding the mother of any infant fitting the suspected case definition.

1- Mother identifi	cation						
Nationality Residency 2- Maternal pregr Occupation during last p Job ty	regnancy	Town :	S :				
3- Rubella-like illi	ness during pregnancy						
➤ Did mother present any of the following clinical signs during last pregnancy? If yes, specify month of pregnancy ➤ Was rubella lab-com	Maculopapular rash Conjunctivitis Post auricular lymphadenopathy Cervical lymphadenopathy Sub-occipital lymphadenopathy Arthralgia/Arthritis Coryza Cough Other, specify:	□ Yes, month of pregnancy: □ Yes, specify: Test type : Test date :		□ Unknown			
4- Exposure to Ru	ibella during pregnancy						
	exposed during pregnancy to a with maculopapular rash and	Yes, month of pregnancy:	□ No	□ Unknown			
► Did the mother tra	ivel during pregnancy?	☐ Yes, month of pregnancy: Country: Travel duration: From:/ To :/	□ No	□ Unknown			
5- Administrative information							
Form filled by (na	ame and signature):	Date:					

MOPH circular no. 6 dated on the 7th January 2015

Notes

Notes

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Smallpox

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 39 (19th Jan 2015)

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I. Purpose

This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is intended to assist the Epidemiological Surveillance team in verifying and investigation any alert or outbreak of smallpox.

II. Generalities

Smallpox is an acute contagious disease caused by the variola virus, a member of the Orthopoxvirus family. It was one of the world's most devastating diseases known to humanity. It was declared eradicated in 1979 following a global immunization campaign led by the World Health Organization.

Smallpox is transmitted from person-to-person via infective droplets during close contact with infected symptomatic people. Vaccine administered up to 4 days after exposure provides protective immunity and is preventing infection and lessening the severity of the disease. The last known natural case was in Somalia in 1977. Since then, the only known cases were caused by a laboratory accident in 1978 in Birmingham, England, which killed one person and caused a limited outbreak. More information about the disease is presented in the table below.

Smallnay				
Smallpox				
Agent	- Variola virus of Orthopoxvirus species			
line, the stient in a stient	- Can be used in biological warfare			
Incubation period	7-19 days (10-14 days for illness, 2-4 days for rash)			
Period of communicability	3 weeks from onset of skin lesions			
Reservoir	Humans			
Modes of transmission	Person-to-person: direct contact with droplets or skin lesionsConjunctiva or placenta may be points of entry.			
Clinical presentation	 Prodomic phase with fever and flu-like illness Classical form includes fever with characteristic centrifugal deep-seated skin eruption: succession of macules, papules, vesicles, and pustules then crusted scabs. The lesions appear first at on the face, extremities, including the palms and soles, and subsequently on the trunk. Skin lesions are at same stage in same area. Two forms: minor with a CFR < 1% and major with CFR 20-50%. The major shows bleeding into the skin and mucous membranes. 			
Worldwide	Smallpox was declared eradicated in 1979. Two laboratories still have smallpox virus for essential research: - The US-CDC, Atlanta, USA - The State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology, Koltsovo, Novosibirsk region in Russian federation			
Lebanon	No cases			
Control objective	Eradication			
Surveillance and Investig	ation			
Surveillance approach	Disease approach			
Investigation: data about case	Clinical presentation, complications, occupation, exposure, intentional release, similar cases among contacts			
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	Vesicular/pustular fluid, scab biopsy, pharyngeal swab, clotted blood			
Investigation: data about contacts	Contacts tracing and follow up			

Investigation: clinical If symptoms appear					
specimen from contacts					
Test	Virological culture, PCR				
Laboratories	WHO reference laboratories				
Outbreak level	At least one confirmed case				
Notification to WHO	Immediate notification according to the International Health Regulations (2005)				
Smallpox case Case defi	nition (MOPH circular no. 37 dated on the 5 th May 2012)				
Confirmed case	An individual of any age presenting with acute onset of fever (≥38.3°C), malaise, and severe prostration with headache and backache occurring 2 to 4 days before rash onset, - And subsequent development of a maculopapular rash starting on the face and forearms, then spreading to the trunk and legs, and evolving within 48 hours to deep-seated, firm/hard and round well-circumscribed vesicles and later pustules, which may become umbilicated or confluent - And lesions that appear in the same stage of development (i.e. all are vesicles or all are pustules) on any given part of the body (e.g. the face or arm) - And no alternative diagnosis explaining the illness - And laboratory confirmation by virological culture or PCR				
Probable case	A suspected case with: - An epidemiological link to a confirmed case of smallpox - Or a documented smallpox environmental exposure				
Suspected case	An individual of any age presenting with acute onset of fever (≥38.3°C), malaise, and severe prostration with headache and backache occurring 2 to 4 days before rash onset - And subsequent development of a maculopapular rash starting on the face and forearms, then spreading to the trunk and legs, and evolving within 48 hours to deep-seated, firm/hard and round well-circumscribed vesicles and later pustules, which may become umbilicated or confluent - And lesions that appear in the same stage of development (i.e. all are vesicles or all are pustules) on any given part of the body (e.g. the face or arm) - And no alternative diagnosis explaining the illness				
Forms					
Reporting	Standard reporting form				
Investigation	Smallpox investigation form (MOPH circular no.174 dated on 31s ^t December 2015)				
National figures					
No cases					
International figures					
Eradication declared in 1979. The last minor case was in 1977 in Somalia. The last major case was in Bangladesh in 1976. An accidental laboratory release was documented in 1978 (UK).					

III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance are to:

- Detect and confirm any case of smallpox
- Detect and investigate smallpox outbreaks
- Identify source of infection
- Document containment.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

One suspected case of smallpox is considered an **alert** and necessitates an investigation.

Since smallpox no longer exists as a naturally occurring disease, a single laboratory-confirmed case of smallpox is considered an **outbreak**. Once an outbreak of smallpox has been confirmed, the following steps are conducted.

V. Procedural steps

The steps described below are recommended for investigation of any alert or outbreak of smallpox. The steps are summarized in figure (3).

Step 1: Verify alert

In case of suspected case, the Esumoh caza team contacts the treating physician. What diagnosis does he/she suspecting: Smallpox or chicken pox?

In case of suspicion of smallpox, the Esumoh central team and the MOPH/DG are informed immediately.

Step 2: Collect data

Upon verification, the Esumoh central team conducts field visits where patient is. An investigation form (Annex 1) is filled via patient and physician interview.

The investigation form includes the following information:

- Demography
- Illness: onset, lesions description...
- Vaccination
- Exposure: occupation...

The patient is assessed for smallpox (Figure 2):

- High risk:
 - Febrile prodrome
 - And classical smallpox lesion
 - And lesions in same stage of development
- Moderate risk:
 - Febrile prodrome and 1 other major criteria
 - Or febrile prodrome and less than 4 minor criteria
- Low risk:
 - No febrile prodrome
 - Or febrile prodrome and less than 4 minor criteria

The high risk case needs urgent clinical specimens for confirmation in WHO reference laboratories. The moderate risk case needs monitoring and if the case become high risk, he/she is tested for smallpox.

Step 3: Communicate alert

Upon verification and assessment of the case as high or moderate risk, the Esumoh team informs immediately the MOPH/DG.

The MOPH informs immediately the CBRN national committee, as smallpox is considered to be due to potential intentional release.

Also, the MOPH informs immediately the WHO as this event represents a potential public health event of international concern.

Smallpox is notified to WHO and CBRN national committee, even if the case is not yet confirmed.

Step 4: Confirm the case

Case needs to be confirmed by laboratory tests.

Specimens are collected with the high precautions of infection control.

Clinical specimens include vesicular material, scab specimens, biopsy lesions, oropharyngeal secretions, CSF, and blood.

Laboratory tests include PCR, virus isolation, electronic microscopy, direct fluorescence antibody (DFA).

There are 2 WHO reference laboratories to confirm smallpox:

- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, United States
- Russian State Centre for Research on Virology and Biotechnology, Koltsovo, Novosibirsk Region, Russian Federation.

The clinical specimens are shipped to reference laboratories as category A based on IATA regulations.

Detailed information on clinical specimens is provided in annex (2).

Step 5: Confirm the outbreak

If smallpox case is laboratory-confirmed, the ESU central team informs the MOPH/DG. One case constitutes an outbreak. The information is officially shared with WHO and CBRN national committee.

On the other hand, the MOPH informs the health professionals and the community with emphasis on case definition, rapid case detection and notification.

Step 6: Search for additional cases

Additional cases are searched through various methods:

- Notification from health professionals:
 - Immediate notification from physicians and health facilities
 - Hospital zero-reporting
 - Hospital active surveillance
 - Hospital mortality surveillance...
- Search in the vicinity of the case
- Notification from the community:
 - Hotline 1214
 - Medias news
 - Community rumors...

Memos and press releases are issued by the MOPH. Sessions are conducted for health professionals...

Step 7: Describe cases

Cases are described by:

- Time: day, week, month and year of onset
- Place: place of residence, place of work, place of school, in term of locality, caza and mohafaza. Travel history is described.
- Person: age group, gender, nationality, occupation...
- Disease: classification, outcomes...

Step 8: Conduct contact tracing

The containment relies on early detection, confirmation and on adequate contact tracing.

Information about contacts can be obtained from interviews of the patient, family members, workplace or school associates, or others with knowledge about the patient's recent activities and travels.

Contact tracing is done by the Esumoh teams at caza, mohafaza and central levels.

a) Document patient itinerary

All places visited by the patient are listed for the past days since fever onset.

b) Contact identification

Since rash onset, persons being in contact with the patient in the daily life are listed.

Additional information is collected on the contacts:

- Household contact or no
- Contact while having symptoms (rash)
- Contact within 6 feet distance or no
- Contact for >= 3 hours or no
- Date of exposures (first and last)...

Based on the information, the contacts are assessed as high risk if:

- Household contact
- Contact < 6 feet with or without >= 3 hours duration.

c) Transportation use

Since fever onset, all common transport means used by the patient are listed.

Additional information is collected on those transports:

- Type of transportation mean (car, bus, train, plane...)
- Date and time of travel
- Transporter name
- Itinerary (origin and destination)
- Duration of travel.

d) Health facilities

Since fever, the patient or the family lists all health facilities visited or consulted or admitted in. For each, the following information is collected:

- Type of health facility
- Type of visit (visitor, outpatient, inpatient...)
- Date and time
- Waiting in waiting room and duration
- Infection control measures applied for the patient...

e) Social events

Since fever, the patient or the family lists all social events with mass gathering.

For each, the following information is collected:

- Type of social event (social, family, sport, meeting/conference...)
- Date and time
- Duration of social event.

f) Follow up

For all identified contacts, in particular those assessed with high exposure, a follow up is conducted for 19 days from last contact with the patient.

For each day, the contact is asked if fever or rash appears.

In case, smallpox vaccination was administered to the contacts, the follow up will search for onset of adverse effects.

Step 9: Investigate the source of infection

The investigation aims to identify potential sources of infection. It is done in coordination with the CBRN national committee.

The source may be obvious or not. The infection may be accidental or of deliberate release of biological weapons. The infection may be in health facility or no. The source may be a person or a release in the environment.

a) Time

The source is found in the 19 days prior to rash onset.

b) Person

The patient is asked for any previous contact with persons with rash. The person can be identified or no.

For each suspected person, the following information is collected:

- Name
- Contact details
- Rash type
- Diagnosis (if known)
- Place and time of exposure.

c) Place: Laboratory

The patient is asked for any previous contact with laboratory setting within the 19 days prior to rash onset.

For each laboratory, the following information is collected:

- Type of laboratory (research, reference, clinical, human, animal...)
- Type of visit (staff, visitor, outpatient, inpatient...)
- Date and time
- Infection control practice in place
- Presence of persons with rash
- Manipulating of biological samples or material
- Accident in manipulating biological samples or material...

d) Place: Health facilities

The patient is asked for any previous contact with health facilities within the 19 days prior to rash onset.

For each health facility, the following information is collected:

- Type of health facility
- Type of visit (staff, visitor, outpatient, inpatient...)
- If staff: type of work
- Date and time
- Waiting in waiting room and duration
- Infection control practice in place
- Presence of persons with rash...

e) Place: Transportation use

The patient is asked for any previous use of common transportation means within the 19 days prior to rash onset.

For each common transport use, the following information is collected:

- Type of transportation mean (car, bus, train, plane ...)
- Date and time of travel
- Transporter name
- Itinerary (origin and destination)
- Duration of travel
- Contact with person with rash.

f) Place: Travel history

The patient is asked for any travel history within the 19 days prior to rash onset.

For each travel history, the following information is collected:

- Country of origin
- Country of destination
- Date and duration
- Visited cities
- Contact with person with rash...

g) Place: Social events

The patient is asked for any participation to social event within the 19 days prior to rash onset. For each social event, the following information is collected:

- Type of social event (social, family, sport, meeting/conference...)
- Date and time
- Duration in social event
- Contact with person with rash...

Step 10: Enhance monitoring

During the outbreak, daily monitoring of cases and contact is done by time, place, person and disease.

A regular bulletin is prepared and shared with CBRN national committee and WHO.

The bulletin includes figures on:

- Patients
- Follow up of contacts.

Step 11: Write summary report

Once the outbreak is confined, the Esumoh central staff prepares a summary report describing the outbreak in term of time, place, person, risk factors and outcomes.




Figure 2: Smallpox case assessment

Major criteria

Febrile prodrome:

Occurring 1-4 days before rash onset >-101F and at least one of the following: prostration, headache, backache, chills, vomiting, or severe abdominal pain

Classical smallpox lesions: deep-seated firm/hard, round well-circumscribed vesicles or pustular; as they evolve, lesions may become umbilicated or confluent

Lesions in same stage of development: on any one part of the body, all the lesions are in the same stage of development

Minor criteria

Centrifugal distribution: greatest concentration of lesions on face and distal extremities

First lesions on the oral mucosal palate, face or forearms

Patient appears toxic or moribund

Slow evolution: lesions evolve from macules to papules, pustules over days (each stage lasts 1-days)

Lesions on the palms and soles

High risk:

Febrile prodrome

- + Classical smallpox lesion
- + Lesions in same stage of development


Moderate risk:

Febrile prodrome + 1 other major criteria Or

Febrile prodrome and >4 minor criteria

Low risk:

No febrile prodrome Or Febrile prodrome and <4 minor criteria



Smallpox - Annex 1

Republic of Lebanon – Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program Smallpox investigation form A Investigator Phone Name Date of investigation Entity/MOPH unit **B** Reporter Name Date of reporting Entity/Health unit Phone **C Patient identity** Nationality Patient name Gender Date of birth (age) Type of residence Caza of residence Locality of residence Phone Detailed address D Clinical symptoms: Prodrome 1-4 days before rash onset Illness: □Yes □Unk Headache: □Unk □No $\, \Box Yes$ $\square No$ Date first symptom: Back pain: $\square Yes$ □No $\Box \mathsf{Unk}$ Fever: □Yes □Unk Abdominal pain: □Unk □No $\square Yes$ □No Maximum temperature: Seriously ill: □Yes □No □Unk Chills: □Yes □No □Unk Other, specify: □Yes □No □Unk Sore throat: □Yes □No □Unk

E Clinical symptoms: Rash

□Yes

 $\square No$

□Unk

Vomiting:

Date of rash onset			
Was the rash acute:	□Yes	□No	□Unk
Black eschar before rash:	□Yes	□No	□Unk
Generalized rash:	□Generalized	□Focal	□Unk

Smallpox investigation form

		I
□Face	□Inside mouth	□Trunk
□Arms	□Legs	□Unk
□Other, specify		
□Face or	□Scalp	□Trunk
□Arms	□Legs	□Equally distributed
□Other		
□Palms	□Soles	□Unk
□Macules (flat spots)	□Papules (solid bumps)	□Vesicles (fluid filled)
□Pustules (pus filled)	□Crusts	□Other
□Macules (flat spots)	□Papules (solid bumps)	□Vesicles (fluid filled)
□Pustules (pus filled)	□Crusts	□Other
□Superficial (on top of skin)	□Deep (deep in skin)	□Other:
□<20	□20-100	□>100
⊔Yes	□No	□Unk
□Small (1-5mm)	□Large (5-10mm)	□Other
□Yes	□No	□Unk
ll		
□Yes	□No	□Unk
□Yes	□No	□Unk
	□Arms □Other, specify □Face or □Arms □Other □Palms □Macules (flat spots) □Pustules (pus filled) □Macules (flat spots) □Pustules (pus filled) □Superficial (on top of skin) □<20 □Yes □Small (1-5mm) □Yes □Yes	□Arms □Legs □Other, specify □Face or □Scalp □Arms □Legs □Other □Palms □Soles □Macules (flat spots) □Papules (solid bumps) □Pustules (pus filled) □Crusts □Macules (flat spots) □Papules (solid bumps) □Pustules (pus filled) □Crusts □Superficial (on top of skin) □Lul □<20 □Deep (deep in skin) □Yes □No □Small (1-5mm) □Large (5-10mm) □Yes □No □Yes □No

F Chickenpox cases within 21 days before rash onset

Chicken pox in the community	□Yes	□No	□Unk	
Contact with cases 10-21 days	□Yes	□No	□Unk	
before rash				

G Other exposure within 21 days before rash onset

Contact with person with rash:	□Yes	□No	□Unk	
Contact with mice:	□Yes	□No	□Unk	

Smallpox investigation form

				lI
ľ	Exposed to ticks:	□Yes	□No	□Unk
ľ	Exposed to insect bites:	□Yes	□No	□Unk
Ī	Being in woods:	□Yes	□No	□Unk
	If yes, specify place and date			

H Complications

Skin surinfection:	□Yes	□No	□Unk	Arthralgia:	□Yes	□No	□Unk
Ocular corneal ulcer:	□Yes	□No	□Unk	Osteitis:	□Yes	□No	□Unk
Bronchitis:	□Yes	□No	□Unk	Hemorrhage:	□Yes	□No	□Unk
Pneumonia:	□Yes	□No	□Unk	Shock:	□Yes	□No	□Unk
Encephalitis:	□Yes	□No	□Unk	Other, specify:	□Yes	□No	□Unk

I Travel history within 3 weeks before rash onset

Country	Dates	Places	Contact with person with rash

J Vaccination

Chicken pox	□Yes, nb doses	□No	□Unk	
Smallpox	□Yes, nb doses	□No	□Unk	

K Medical history Specify

History of chicken pox	□Yes	□No	□Unk	
Immuno-compromised	□Yes	□No	□Unk	
Chronic diseases	□Yes	□No	□Unk	
Currently pregnant	□Yes	□No	□Unk	
Treatment with steroids	□Yes	□No	□Unk	
Chemotherapy	□Yes	□No	□Unk	
Antivirals	□Yes	□No	□Unk	
Illicit drugs	□Yes	□No	□Unk	

Smallpox investigation form

Profession					
Institution					
M Primary laboratory results					
Test	Date	Laborato	ry		Result
		<u>I</u>	<u>l</u>		
N Assessment					
	Immediate	In 24 hours	In 48 h	ours	In 72 hours
Major		<u> </u>			
Febrile prodrome					
Classical smallpox lesions					
Lesions in same stage of					
development					
Minor	I	I			I
Centrifugal distribution					
First lesions on oral mucosal, face or forearms					
Patient appears toxic					
Evolution: from macules to papules to pustules					
Lesions on palms and soles					
Risk		<u> </u>			<u> </u>

High risk: 3 major criteria

Moderate risk: febrile prodrome and another major criteria, or febrile prodrome with 4 minor criteria

Low risk: no febrile prodrome, or febrile prodrome with <4 minor criteria

Smallpox investigation form O Smallpox laboratory results Specimen Date Laboratory Test Result

Smallpox - Annex 2

Specimen Collection (Source: www.cdc.gov)

Vesicular Material

- 1. Sanitize the patient's skin with an alcohol wipe and allow skin to dry.
- 2. Open the top of a vesicle or pustule with a scalpel, sterile 26-gauge needle, or slide. Collect the skin of the vesicle top in a dry, sterile 1.5- to 2-mL screw-capped tube. Label the tube.
- 3. Scrape the base of the vesicle or pustule with the wooden end of an applicator stick or swab and smear the scrapings onto a glass or plastic light microscope slide. Allow slide to dry for 10 minutes.
- 4. Label the slide and place it in a slide holder. To prevent cross-contamination, do not place slides from more than one patient in the same slide holder.
- 5. Take another slide, and touch it repetitively to the opened lesion using progressive movements of the slide in order to make a touch prep. Allow slide to dry for 10 minutes.
- 6. Label the slides as touch preps and place in the same slide holder. To prevent cross-contamination, do not place slides from more than one patient in the same slide holder.
- 7. If plastic-coated electron microscopic (EM) grids are available, lightly touch the shiny side of 3 EM grids to the base of the open lesion, allow EM grids to air-dry for 10 minutes, and place grids in an appropriately labeled grid box. Use varying degree of pressure (minimal, light, and moderately firm) in application of the 3 grids to the unroofed lesion. EM grids and collection materials will soon be available at Laboratory Response Network (LRN) sites.
- 8. If a slide or EM grid is not available, swab the base of the lesion with a polyester or cotton swab, place in screw-capped plastic vial, break off applicator handle, and seal.
- 9. Repeat this procedure for 2 or more lesions.

Scab Specimens

- 1. Sanitize the patient's skin with an alcohol wipe and allow skin to dry.
- 2. Use a 26-gauge needle to remove 2 to 4 scabs.
- 3. Place 1 or 2 scabs in each of 2 dry, sterile screw-capped plastic tubes.
- 4. Wrap parafilm around the juncture of the cap and vial.
- 5. Label the tube.

Biopsy Lesions

(At least 2 specimens obtained by using a 3.5- or 4-mm punch biopsy kit.)

- 1. Use sterile technique and appropriate anesthetic.
- 2. Place 1 sample in formalin for immunohistochemical or histopathologic evaluation and store at room temperature.
- 3. The second specimen should be placed dry (do not add transport medium) in a sterile 1.5- to 2-mL screw-capped container (do not add transport medium).
- 4. Refrigerate if shipment occurs within 24 hours; otherwise, the specimen should be frozen.

Serum Specimens

- 1. Draw 10 mL of blood for serum separation and collection.
- 2. Send serum, stored refrigerated.

Notes

Notes

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Tetanus

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 57 (22nd Jan 2015)

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b) Confirm the outbreak	
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Annex 1: Tetanus investigation form

I. Purpose
The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance program in case of tetanus alert or outbreak.

II. Generalities

Tetanus	
Agent	- Bacteria: clostridium tetani or tetanus bacillus - Toxin producer
Incubation period	3-21 days (1 day to several months), and commonly 10 days
Period of communicability	No person-to-person
Reservoir	Intestines of horses, animals, and humansTetanus spores are ubiquitous in environment and soil.
Modes of transmission	- Skin entry: Introduction of spores through puncture wound contaminated with soil, street dust or animal or human feces - Rarely by injectable contaminated drugs
Clinical presentation	 Muscle contraction, trismus (masseter contraction), neck/ trunk spasms, opisthotonos Case fatality from 10% to 90% depending on availability of intensive care
Worldwide	- Worldwide - WHO estimates 282000 deaths in 2001 - Risk factors: Agriculture work, intra-veinous drug users
Lebanon	0-2 cases per year
Control objective	Control
Surveillance and Investi	gation
Surveillance approach	Disease-based surveillance
Investigation: data about case	Wound history, vaccination status, use of injectable drugs
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	None
Investigation: data about contacts	If use of injectable drugs: vaccination status
Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts	None
Test	None
Laboratories	None
Outbreak level	- If the observed incidence exceeds the expected one - Or if there is a cluster with at least 2 epi-linked cases
Notification to WHO	According to IHR(2005) criteria
Tetanus case definition	(MOPH circular no. 53 dated on the 10 th April 2007)
Confirmed case	A clinically compatible case as reported by a physician: Acute onset of hypertonia and/or painful muscular contractions (usually of the muscles of the jaw leading to trismus, or the muscles of the neck), abdominal rigidity, opisthotonos, generalized muscle spasms, and occasional risus sardonicus, without other apparent medical cause.

Forms	
Reporting	Standard reporting form
Investigation	For case: specific tetanus investigation form (MOPH circular no. 98 dated on the 26 th October 2010)
National figures	
Figure 1: Reported Tetar	nus cases, Lebanon, 1997-2014 (Source: MOPH)
7 6 5 88 4 2 1 1997 1998 1999 2000 20	001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Year
International figures	
Figure 2: Reported Tetar	nus cases in the world, 1997-2014 (Source: WHO)
120,000 100,000 80,000 40,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985	1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2

III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance are:

- Monitor incidence of tetanus cases
- Investigate the cases
- Identify risk factors.

IV. Alert and outbreaks thresholds

An **alert** is defined by any case of tetanus.

An **outbreak** is defined when:

- The observed incidence exceeds the expected one (based on past 10 years)
- Or least 2 cases epi-linked.

V. Procedural steps

The steps described below are recommended for investigation of any alert or outbreak of tetanus. The steps are summarized in figure (3).

Step 1: Verify the case

In case of reporting of tetanus, the Esumoh caza team contacts the treating physician, the hospital or the medical center. Are they reporting a tetanus?

Once verified, the Esumoh caza team informs the mohafaza and central levels.

Step 2: Collect data

For each case of tetanus, the Esumoh team visits the patient at the hospital. The patint, the parents and the treating physician are interviewed. If the patient passed away, a copy of the medical file is requested.

An investigation form is filled (Annex 1). The investigation form includes the following information:

- Demography: age, gender, nationality
- Vaccination status
- Illness
- Case management (ICU, mechanical ventilation...)
- Outcome
- Potential point of entry of the infection...

Copy of the filled investigation form is sent to the Esumoh mohafaza and central levels.

There is no laboratory confirmation for tetanus.

Step 3: Investigate the vaccination status

a) Patient & family interview

From the family and the patient, the needed information is collected:

- Routine vaccination in childhood
- Booster at adulthood
- Care given for identified point of entry.

b) Healthcare interview

If the patient consulted the health facilities at the time of infection, the consulted health facility is interviewed.

The questions will be oriented on the tetanus prevention policy in place:

- Assessing tetanus risk
- Prescription of tetanus serum and vaccine
- Administration of tetanus serum and vaccine.

Step 4: Describe cases

a) Time, place and person

Cases are described by:

- Time: week, month and year of onset
- Place: place of residence, place of exposure, place of care, in term of locality, caza and mohafaza
- Person: age group, gender, nationality
- Disease: symptoms, outcome
- Vaccination status and tetanus prevention measures taken.


b) Confirm the outbreak

Based on the epidemiological findings, the outbreak is declared.

The Esumoh central team informs the concerned units at the MOPH, in particular the EPI. The MOPH issues memos to inform the health professionals and the health facilities, with emphasis on the preventive measures.

Step 5: Write summary report

Once the event ended, the Esumoh central staff prepares a summary report describing the case. The report is shared with EPI and other partners.



Tetanus - Annex 1

Republic of Lebanon - Ministry of Public Health – Epidemiological Surveillance Program **Tetanos Investigation Form**

To be filled by the Ministry of Public Health team

1. Patient identity				
Name			Nationality	
Date of birth			Corre	
Gender			Locality	
Occupation			Phone n°	
2. Clinical details Date of onset				
Clinical signs:	nus	_	☐ Respiratory distress	
□ Spas	ticity		☐ Autonomic dysfunct	ion
□ Dysp	hagia		☐ Spasms	
respira □ Grac embari □ Grac difficu	atory embarrassmer de 2 (moderate): Marassment, and fleet de 3a (severe): Salties, and severe are e 3b (very severe):	nt Moderate trismus ing spasm occur evere trismus ar ad prolonged spas	and general spasticity, and general spasticity, so ms (both spontaneous an	some dysphagia and respiratory evere dysphagia and respiratory d on stimulation) function, particularly sympathetic
2.75				
3. Treatment			II.a.u.ital	
Date of hospitalization Admission to ICU	□ nh of dove: □		Hospital	
Mechanical ventilation	□, no of days. _		Phone no	
Tetanus ImmunoGlobulin			I Hone ii	
TIG before tetanus onset	_			
Date of TIG				
4. Outcome Recovery Sequelae Death	□ Specify s	sequeia		
5. Wound history				
Acute wound identified			Medical care given	
Date of wound			Tetanus Toxoid given	
Soil contamination			Date TT given	
Wound type:	☐ New Specify:	☐ Chronic	☐ Unspecified	
Wound site:	☐ Head ☐ Lower limb	☐ Trunk ☐ Unspecified	☐ Upper limb	
	Specify:			
Environment:	□ Home	☐ Yard	□ Work	
	☐ Street Specify:	□ Other	☐ Unspecified	
6. Patient history Diabetes		lino-dependent		
Parental drug Abuse	□ Drugs:			
7. Vaccination				
Nb of vaccine doses	Date la	ast vaccine		
Investigator:			Date:	

Tetanus - Annex 2

République Libanaise Ministère de la Santé Publique Direction de la Prévention

TETANOS NEONATAL: Formulaire d'investigation

		For	Page 1/2		
Numéro:			1 age 1/2		
A- Déclaration					
Date de déclaration	Hôpital / struc	ture santé	Déclaré par	Date enquête	Enquêteur
B- Identification					
Nom de famille	Prénom	bébé	Prénom père	Prénom mère	Nationalité
Sexe	Date de nais	aanaa du	Caza	Commune	Téléphone
Sexe	bébé		Caza	Commune	relephone
☐ Garçon					
☐ Fille Adresse complète	<u> </u>				
Adresse complete					***************************************
C- Situation vaccinal	la da la màra				
La mère est-elle vaccin		Date	dernière dose reçue	La vaccination est	-elle documentée ?
tétanos ?			401111010 4030 10,440		
□ Oui				□ Oui	
□ Non				□ Non	
D- Soins prénatals					
Nombre de consultations	Lieu des cons	sultations	Hospitalisation Durant	Date	Motifs
prénatales	prénata	iles	la grossesse	hospitalisation	d'hospitalisation
	☐ Hôpital		□ Oui		
	☐ Cabinet m		□ Non		
	☐ Centre mé ☐ Dispensair				
	☐ Autre :				
	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1				
E- Naissance du béb		T			
Lieu d'accouchement	t, précisez	Qui a pr	atiqué l'accouchement ?		nne qui a pratiqué chement
☐ Hôpital :		☐ Médecin			
☐ Centre médical :		☐ Sage-femme			
☐ Domicile :		☐ Matrone			
	☐ Autre: ☐ Autre				
Si accouchement à domic		I C		T	ti (1) 1 (
Sur quelle surface l'accouchement a-t-il		La surface semblait-elle propre?		La personne qui a pratiqué l'accouchement s'est-elle lavée les mains?	
été pratiqué? □ Drap		□ Oui		Oui	
☐ Table non couverte		□ Oui □ Non			
□ Sol de terre					
Quel instrument a-t-on	utilisé pour	Le mate	ériel a-t-il été nettoyé et	Comment a-t-on	traité ou pansé le
sectionner le cordon? stérilisé dans l'eau bouillante avant moignon du cordon?					
		÷	i? Ou semblait-il neuf?		
			□ Oui		
I			□ Non		

Circulaire du MSP numéro 75 du 27 aout 2005

République Libanaise Ministère de la Santé Publique Direction de la Prévention

TETANOS NEONATAL: Formulaire d'investigation Page 2/2

		Pa	ige 2/2	
Numéro:				Nom du bébé :
F- Symptôn				
Date début de la		té et pleuré normalement		Si non, décrivez les faits :
maladie		oremiers jours de la vie ? ☐ Oui		
		□ Non		
		emiers jours de la vie, le		Si oui, décrivez les faits :
		l eu du mal à téter?		,
		□ Oui		
		□ Non		
		été atteint de raideur?		Si oui, décrivez les faits :
		□ Oui □ Non		
		il eu des convulsions?		Si oui, décrivez les faits :
		□ Oui		
		□ Non		
		il eu des convulsions		Si oui, décrivez les faits :
		u des crises convulsives?		
		□ Oui □ Non		
	Y a-t-il eu d'autres symptômes?			Si oui, décrivez les faits :
	☐ Oui			
		□ Non		
G- Traiteme		G: 1.	A :4 - 1	D. 4. 121
Le bébé a-t-il ét □ Oui		Si oui, nom h	орнаі	Date d'hospitalisation
Diagn		Le bébé est-il i	mort ?	Date de décès
		□ Oui		
		□ Non		
H- Remarqu Notes de l	es a familla	Notes du médeci		Notes de l'enquêteur
Notes de 1	a ramine	Notes du medech	п тапап	Notes de l'enqueteur
				I .

Circulaire du MSP numéro 75 du 27 aout 2005

Notes

Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure: Tetanus Neonatorum

Version 1 MOPH circular no. 58 (22nd Jan 2015)

Contents

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IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds	359
V. Procedural steps	359
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Step 2: Collect data	
Step 3: Confirm the case	
Step 4: Investigate the point of entry a) Family interview	
b) Delivery care interview	
Step 5: Describe cases	
a) Time, place, person	
b) Incidence rate	
Step 6: Write summary report	ı
Annexes	362
Annex 1: Tetanus Neonatorum investigation form (Ar)	

Annex 2: Tetanus Neonatorum investigation form (Fr)

I. Purpose
The purpose of this standard operating procedure (SOP) is to describe the steps be followed in by the epidemiological surveillance program in case of alert or outbreak of tetanus neonatorum.

II. Generalities

Tetanus neonatorum	1		
Agent	- Bacteria: clostridium tetani or tetanus bacillus		
	- Toxin producer		
Incubation period	6 days (3-28 days)		
Period of	No person-to-person		
communicability			
Reservoir	- Intestines of horses, animals, and humans		
	- Tetanus spores are ubiquitous in environment and soil.		
Modes of	- During delivery: introduction via the umbilical cord of tetanus spores		
transmission	through the use of an unclean instrument to cut the cord - After delivery: by dressing the umbilical stumps with substance		
	heavily contaminated with tetanus spores		
Clinical presentation	- Few days after birth the infant develops progressively trismus, generalized stiffness, spasms, convulsions and opisthotonos.		
	- Typically, an infant who sucks and cries well for the first few days after birth, and then shows progressive difficulty and inability to feed.		
100	- Complications: 80% as case fatality, 5-20% of mental retardation		
Worldwide	- Worldwide - WHO estimates 200000 deaths each year, mainly in developing		
Labanan	countries.		
Lebanon	0-1 case per year		
Control objective	Elimination		
Surveillance and Inv			
Surveillance approach	Disease-based approach		
Investigation: data about case	Delivery circumstances, umbilical wounds		
Investigation: clinical specimen from case	None		
Investigation: data about contacts	None		
Investigation: clinical specimen from contacts	None		
Test	None		
Laboratories	None		
Outbreak level	At least 1 confirmed case		
Notification to WHO	According to the IHR(2005) criteria		
Control			
Primary prevention	- Clean deliveries		
	- Tetanus toxoid for women of childbearing age		
Post-exposure	Tetanus toxoids during pregnancy		
prevention			

Case management	Admission to intensive care unit		
Mass prevention	Improve tetanus immunization		
Tetanus neonatorun 2006)	m case definition (MOPH circular no. 108 dated on the 6th September		
Confirmed case	Any neonate with a normal ability to suck and cry during the first 2 days of life, and: - Who, between 3 and 28 days of age cannot suck normally - Or becomes stiff or has convulsions (jerking of the muscles) or both		
Suspected case	 - Any neonatal death between 3 and 28 days of age in which the cause of death is unknown - Or any neonate reported as having suffered from neonatal tetanus between 3 and 28 days of age and not investigated 		
Forms			
Reporting	Standard reporting form		
Investigation	For case: specific neonatal tetanus investigation form (MOPH circular no. 75 dated on the 27 th August 2005)		
National figures	The transfer of the Little Lit		
	000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Year		
International figures			
35,000 T	eonatal tetanus in the world, 1980-2014 (Source: WHO)		
30,000			
25,000			
15,000			
5,000			

III. Objectives of surveillance

The objectives of surveillance are:

- Detect and investigate neonatal tetanus cases
- Identify risk factors
- Document the elimination status for tetanus neonatorum.

IV. Alert and outbreak thresholds

An **alert** is defined by any suspected case of tetanus neonatorum.

An **outbreak** is defined a confirmed case of tetanus neonatorum.

V. Procedural steps

The steps described below are recommended for investigation of any alert or outbreak of neonatal tetanus. The steps are summarized in figure (4).

Step 1: Verify the case

In case of reporting of neonatal tetanus, the Esumoh caza team contacts the treating physician, the hospital or the medical center. Are they reporting a neonatal tetanus?

Once verified, the Esumoh caza team informs the mohafaza and central levels.

Step 2: Collect data

For each case of neonatal tetanus, the Esumoh team visits the patient at the hospital.

The parents and the treating physician are interviewed. If the patient passed away, a copy of the medical file is requested.

An investigation form is filled (Annexes 1 and 2). The investigation form includes the following information:

- Demography
- Illness
- Case management (ICU, mechanical ventilation...)
- Outcome
- Delivery circumstances and neonatal care.

Copy of the filled investigation form is sent to the Esumoh mohafaza and central levels.

Step 3: Confirm the case

Based on the clinical findings, the case is confirmed. The outbreak is then declared. The Esumoh central team informs the MOPH concerned units, in particular the EPI.

There is no laboratory test for neonatal tetanus.

Step 4: Investigate the point of entry

a) Family interview

From the family, the needed information is collected related to:

- The delivery:
 - Place of delivery: household, clinic, hospital
 - Presence of health professional for delivery act
 - Profile of the health professional who did the delivery...
- The ombilic:
 - Manipulation of the ombilic / navel
 - Daily care
 - Use of foreign material (coin...)

b) Delivery care interview

If the healthcare was identified, the person who conducted the delivery is interviewed face-to-face. Usually, the neonatal tetanus cases are observed for babies delivered at home by local "matronne".

The questions will be oriented on the safe delivery conditions:

- Training:
 - Did the person had any formal professional training?
 - Did the person receive any formal training on safe delivery?
- Delivery:
 - Use of material: sterilized or not
 - Type of material used
 - Sterilization or disinfection of used material
 - Methods used for disinfection and sterilization...

Step 5: Describe cases

a) Time, place and person

Cases are described by:

- Time: week, month and year of onset
- Place: place of residence, place of exposure, in term of locality, caza and mohafaza
- Person: age group, gender, nationality
- Disease: symptoms, outcome
- Exposure: place of delivery, health professional presence at delivery, potential point of entry...


b) Incidence rate


The rate of neonatal tetanus is computed = number of neonatal tetanus / 1000 live births. The elimination needs to have a rate < 1/1000 live births.

Step 6: Write summary report

Once the event is ended, the Esumoh central staff prepares a summary report describing the case. The report is shared with EPI and the reproductive health unit.

The summary report is needed to document the epidemiology history of neonatal tetanus in Lebanon.





Tetanus neonatorum - Annex 1

			الكزاز الوليدي: استمارة تقصي صفحة 1/2			الجمهورية اللبنانية وزارة الصحة العامة مديرية الوقاية الصحيا رقم الاستمارة:
					بلاغ	1. الإ
اسم المحقق	يخ التقصي	تار	اسم المبلغ		المستشفى	تاريخ الإبلاغ
					ية الطفل	2. هو
الجنسية	اسم الأم		اسم الأب		اسم الطفل	اسم العائلة
رقم الهاتف	ينة / القرية	اأمد	القضاء		تاريخ الولادة	جنس الطفل
رم بهت	یت / , عری		y ———,		ا درین بورد ده	جس ،هس
						بنت
						العنوان الكامل
التاقيحي موثق / مدون؟	ها المضاه	٠ ١١>: ١:	 خ آخر جرعة لقاح ضا	زاز داد د	ضع التلقيحي للام ضد الكر حات ضد الكزاز؟	
التعليمي هودي المدوري. التعم		ـ اعدرار	ع احر جرعه عام حا		· †	هل تعت (دم ق
الطفل			دة الطفا	ناية بالأم الحامل / قبل و لا	الع	
سبب دخول المستشفى	تاريخ دخول	شفى ا	هل أدخلت الأم المسن		مكان إجراء المعاينات الم	عدد المعاينات
خلال الحمل	المستشفى		خلال الحمل			الطبية خلال الحمل
			□ نعم □ کلا		□ مستشفى □ عيادة طبية	
			72 []		□ عیادہ طبیہ □ مرکز صحی	
					□ مستوصف	
					🔲 غيره، حدد:	
					دة الطفل	5. ولا
الذي قام بعملية التوليد	اسم الشخص	?.	من قام بعملية التوليد		كان الولادة	حدد ما
			طبيب			□ مستشفی:
			□ قابلة قانونية □ دارة		حي:	□ مرکز صد
			□ داية □ غيره، حدد		•.	□ المنزل□ غيره، حد
					في حال تم التوليد في المنزل:	
هل الشخص الذي قام بالتوليد قد غسل يديه؟		.د	هل بدا المسطح نظيف؟		على أي مسطح، تمت عملية التوليد ؟	
□ نعم □ کا			ا نعم □		□ شرشف	
<u>ا</u> کلا			□ 2K		□ طاولة غير مغطاة □ أرضية المنزل	
عالجة حبل الصرة؟	کیف تم م	، بالمياه	تم تنظيف وتعقيم آلات	هل	أي آلة استعملت لقطع حبل الصرة؟	
			الساخنة؟ هل بدت جدي			••
			□ نعم □ کلا			

تعميم وزارة الصحة العامة رقم 75 تاريخ 27 آب 2005

الجمهورية اللبنانية وزارة الصحة العامة مديرية الوقاية الصحية

الكزاز الوليدي:

			استمارة تقصيي صفحة 1 / 2			
			2/1-442			رقم الاستمارة:
					ڒۼ	1. الإبا
اسم المحقق	خ التقصىي	 تاری	اسم المبلغ		المستشفى	ا. عبد تاريخ الإبلاغ
			l l			
					ة الطفل	2. هويـ
الجنسية	يم الأم	s 1	اسم الأب		اسم الطفل	اسم العائلة
رقم الهاتف	نة / القرية	!!	القضاء		تاريخ الولادة	جنس الطفل
رقم انهانف	ىه/اھريە	ויאריב	العصاع		تاریخ انولاده	جس الطفل
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						العنوان الكامل
				 کز از		
التلقيحي موثق / مدون؟	هل الوضع	د الكزاز	خ آخر جرعة لقاح ضا	تاري	مات ضد الكزاز؟	
☐ نعم □ کاد	1		نعم نعم			1
					اية بالأم الحامل / قبل و لا	
تاريخ دخول سبب دخول المستشفى المستشفى خلال الحمل			هل أدخلت الأم المسن خلال الحمل	طبية	مكان إجراء المعاينات ال	عدد المعاينات الطبية خلال الحمل
			□ نعم = معم		□ مستثنفی	
			<u></u> 2K		□ عيادة طبية □ مركز صحى	
					□ مردر صنعي □ مستوصف	
					🗖 غيره، حدد:	
					ة الطفل	5. ولاد
، الذي قام بعملية التوليد	<u> </u>	حدد مكان الولادة من قام بعملية التوليد؟				
					□ مستشفی: □ مرکز صحی:	
		□ قابلة قانونية □ داية			□ مردر صحي: □ المنزل	
			ا -ب <u>و</u> ا غیره، حدد		□ غيره، حدد:	
					في حال تم التوليد في المنزل:	
ي قام بالتوليد قد غسل يديه؟	<u>ڊ</u> ر	هل بدا المسطح نظيف؟		على أي مسطح، تمت عملية التوليد ؟		
□ نعم □ کلا			□ نعم □ کلا		☐ شرشف ☐ طاولة غير مغطاة	
7			71		□ طاوق عير معته: □ أرضية المنزل	
عالجة حبل الصرة؟	کیف تم ہ		هل تم تنظيف وتعقيم آلات بالمياه		أي آلة استعملت لقطع حبل الصرة؟	
		دة ؟	الساخنة؟ هل بدت جدي			
			□ نعم □ کلا			

تعميم وزارة الصحة العامة رقم 75 تاريخ 27 آب 2005

Tetanus neonatorum - Annex 2

République Libanaise Ministère de la Santé Publique Direction de la Prévention

TETANOS NEONATAL: Formulaire d'investigation

		FOI	Page 1/2		
Numéro:			rage 1/2		
A- Déclaration	T :				
Date de déclaration	Hôpital / struc	ture santé	Déclaré par	Date enquête	Enquêteur
	<u> </u>				
B- Identification					
Nom de famille	Prénom	bébé	Prénom père	Prénom mère	Nationalité
		4			5.07.1
Sexe	Date de nais bébé		Caza	Commune	Téléphone
☐ Garçon	Debe				
□ Fille					
Adresse complète				-	-
C- Situation vaccinal	le de la mère				
La mère est-elle vaccine		Date	e dernière dose reçue	La vaccination est	-elle documentée ?
tétanos ?			,		
□ Oui				□ Oui	
□ Non				□ Non	
D- Soins prénatals					
Nombre de consultations	Lieu des cons	sultations	Hospitalisation Durant	Date	Motifs
prénatales	prénata	ıles	la grossesse	hospitalisation	d'hospitalisation
☐ Hôpital			□ Oui		
☐ Cabinet me			□ Non		
	☐ Centre mé ☐ Dispensair				
	☐ Autre :				
E- Naissance du bébe		·			
Lieu d'accouchement	, précisez	Qui a pratiqué l'accouchement ?		Nom de la personne qui a pratiqué l'accouchement	
☐ Hôpital :			☐ Médecin	l'accou	chement
☐ Centre médical :		□ Nedecin □ Sage-femme			
☐ Domicile :		☐ Matrone			
☐ Autre:		□ Autre			
Si accouchement à domic	cile :				
Sur quelle surface l'accouchement a-t-il		La surface semblait-elle propre ?		La personne qui a pratiqué l'accouchement	
été pratiqué?				s'est-elle lavée les mains?	
□ Drap		Oui		☐ Oui ☐ Non	
☐ Table non couverte☐ Sol de terre		□ Non		□ Non	
Quel instrument a-t-on utilisé pour Le matériel a-t-il été nettoyé et Comment a-t-on traité ou pansé le					traité ou pansé le
sectionner le cordon?			lans l'eau bouillante avant		lu cordon?
			oi? Ou semblait-il neuf?		
			□ Oui		
			□ Non		

Circulaire du MSP numéro 75 du 27 aout 2005

République Libanaise Ministère de la Santé Publique Direction de la Prévention

TETANOS NEONATAL: Formulaire d'investigation

		Pa	ge 2/2	
Numéro:				Nom du bébé :
E				
F- Symptôr Date début de la		té et pleuré normalement		Si non, décrivez les faits :
maladie	pendant les 2 n	remiers jours de la vie ?		Si non, decrivez les laits.
		□ Oui		
		□ Non		
		emiers jours de la vie, le		Si oui, décrivez les faits :
		l eu du mal à téter? □ Oui		
		□ Non		
		été atteint de raideur?		Si oui, décrivez les faits :
		□ Oui		
		□ Non		
		il eu des convulsions?		Si oui, décrivez les faits :
		□ Oui □ Non		
		il eu des convulsions u des crises convulsives?		Si oui, décrivez les faits :
		□ Oui		
	□ Non			
		d'autres symptômes?		Si oui, décrivez les faits :
□ Oui □ Non				
	<u> </u>			
G- Traiteme				
Le bébé a-t-il é		Si oui, nom hô	ôpital	Date d'hospitalisation
□ Oui				
☐ Nor		Le bébé est-il 1	mort ?	Date de décès
Diugi		Oui		Duc de deces
		□ Non		
H- Remarqu				
Notes de	la famille	Notes du médecia	n traitant	Notes de l'enquêteur

Circulaire du MSP numéro 75 du 27 aout 2005

Abbreviations

Abbrevation	Meaning
AFP	Acute Flaccid Paralysis
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ARDS	Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome
BAL	Broncho-Alveolar Lavage
BSE	Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
CBC	Complete Blood Count
CBRN	Chemical Biological Radio-Nuclear
CCHF	Crieman-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever
CD	Communicable Diseases
CFR	Case Fatality Rate
CNS	Central Nervous System
COPD	Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease
CRS	Congenital Rubella Syndrome
CSF	Cerebral Spinal Fluid
DG	Director General
EBS	Event-Based Surveillance
EIA	Enzyme-Linked Immunoassay
Elisa	Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent assay
EPI	Expanded Program for Immunization
Esumoh	Epidemiology Surveillance Program
HAV	Hepatitis A Virus
HBV	Hepatitis B Virus
HCV	Hepatitis C Virus
HDV	Hepatitis D Virus
HEV	Hepatitis E Virus
Hib	Haemophilus Influenza b
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HM	Hemorrhagic Fever
HTLV1	Human T-cell Lymphotropic Virus 1
IATA	International Air Transport Association
IBS	Indicator-Based Surveillance
	Intensive Care Unit
ICU	
IHR (2005)	International Health Regulations (2005)
IPV	Inactivated Polio Vaccine
IVDU	Intravenous Drug User
KG	Kindergarten Ministry of Education and High Education
MEHE COV	Ministry of Education and High Education
MERS-CoV	Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus
MEW	Ministry of Energy and Water
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOPH	Ministry of Public Health
NEG	National Expert Group

NOO	In 6
NGO	Non-Governemental Organization
NIC	National Influenza Center
NM	Neisseria Meningitidis
OPV	Oral Polio Vaccine
PA	Particle Agglutination
PCR	Polymerase Chain Reaction
PEP	Post-Exporure Prevention
PHEIC	Public Health Event of International Concern
RT-PCR	Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction
SARI	Severe Acute Respiratory Infection
SARS-CoV	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus
SAT	Serum Agglutination Test
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SP	Streptococcus Pneumoniae
ТВ	Tuberculosis
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency / Office of the United nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Unicef	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
VPD	Vaccine Preventable Disease
VTM	Viral Transport Media
WHO	World Health Organization

Medical coding

Disease	ICD-10 code		
Acute Flaccid Paralysis	A80, G04, G37, G54, G56, G57, G58, G61, G62,		
	G72, G82, G83		
Acute poliomyelitis	A80		
Anthrax	A22		
Cholera	A00		
Congenital Rubella Syndrome	P35.0		
Diphtheria	A36		
Food Poisoning	A05		
Food poisoning: Botulism	A05.1		
Food Poisoning: Trichonosis	B75		
Hemorrhagic Fever	A99		
Hemorrhagic Fever: CCHF	A98.0		
Hemorrhagic Fever: Dengue	A91		
Hemorrhagic Fever: Ebola viral disease	A98.4		
Hemorrhagic Fever: Marbrug viral disease	A98.3		
Hemorrhagic Fever: Rift Valley	A92.4		
Hemorrhagic Fever: Yellow fever	A95		
Invasive Coronavirus	(B34.2)		
Measles	B05		
Meningitis	A87, G00, G01, G02, G03		
Meningitis: Haemophilus influenza b	G00.0		
Meningitis: Listeria	A32.1		
Meningitis: West Nile fever	A92.3		
Meningococcal Infection	A39		
Mumps	B26		
Novel Influenza	(J10)		
Pertussis	A37		
Plague	A20		
Rabies	A82		
Rubella	B06		
Smallpox	B03		
Tetanus	A33, A34, A35		
Tetanus neonatorum	A33		

